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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON HOUSEHOLD HEALTH EXPENDITURES, NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE AND UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN GHANA 
 
FEBRUARY 2016 
EVELYN KWAKYE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 
MPhil, UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Leonce Ndikumana 
Access to quality health services is essential for maintaining a healthy population 
and economic development hence the growing global consensus that universal health 
coverage is necessary. Ghana attempts to expand access by making basic health services 
free at the point of delivery through its National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Prior 
studies indicate NHIS increases demand for health services, but questions remain about its 
impact on out of pocket payments, quality of services, and the financial viability of the 
program. Hence, this dissertation analyzes the financial risk in health care seeking, the 
effect of NHIS on out of pocket payments and access to quality health care, and the 
financial viability of NHIS compared with the outcomes of Rwanda’s community-based 
health insurance programs with similar objectives but different approaches. The empirical 
analyses use data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey conducted in 2005-2006 
covering 37,212 individuals in 8,868 households, data from the 2008 Ghana Demographic 
and Health Survey V covering 9919 respondents aged 15-49 years, and data logging from 
 viii 
 
other sources. The methods include two-stage multivariate regression modelling and 
maximum likelihood estimations. The study finds health expenditures respond strongly to 
need and weakly to income, the poor are more likely than the rich to pay of pocket for 
health care, and catastrophic out of pocket payments occur in all income groups and 
significantly among the poor. The need for uninsured services and ability to pay 
significantly determine of out of pocket payments by the insured. These findings imply that 
NHIS expands access to desired health services for the better-offs but does not eliminate 
catastrophic out of pocket payments, especially for the poor. Attitude of health worker, 
rather than the technical effectiveness of services, significantly predicts dissatisfaction with 
quality. The Rwandan model is more equitable than NHIS, but NHIS spends ten times 
more per capita.  Drawing from Ghana’s and Rwanda’s experience, effective strategies for 
national health insurance programs must include i) practical means-testing in setting 
insurance premiums to improve equity, ii) mandatory enrollments by whole households as 
a strategy for financial sustainability, and iii) client-based performance-evaluation in 
provider reimbursements to improve client satisfaction. 
 
 
 
  
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ v 
 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xv 
 
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... xvi 
  
CHAPTER 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
 
1.1 Health and health insurance ........................................................................ 1 
1.2 Goal and objectives of the study ................................................................. 8 
1.3 Overview of the three essays .................................................................... 10 
1.4 Relevance of the study .............................................................................. 14 
 
2. HOUSEHOLD HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES DETERMINANTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GHANA LIVING STANDARDS SURVEY V ......... 16 
 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 16 
 
2.1.1 The research goal, questions and hypotheses ..................................... 21 
2.1.2 Source of data ..................................................................................... 26 
2.1.3 Outline of the study ............................................................................. 28 
 
2.2 Theoretic framework ................................................................................. 28 
 
2.2.1 On the demand for health care ............................................................ 29 
2.2.2 Empirical evidence in the literature .................................................... 33 
 
2.3 Modelling the determinants of health care expenditures .......................... 37 
 
2.3.1 Specification of the empirical models................................................. 42 
2.3.2 Choice of explanatory variables.......................................................... 46 
 
2.4 Data and stylized facts .............................................................................. 55 
 
2.4.1 Patterns in morbidity, care-seeking and payments ............................. 56 
 x 
 
2.4.2 Summary statistics of regression variables ......................................... 63 
 
2.5 Results and discussion .............................................................................. 65 
 
2.5.1 The predictors and the determinants of household health care 
expenditures ........................................................................................ 66 
 
2.6 Incidence of catastrophic health care expenditures .................................. 83 
 
2.6.1 Patterns in the incidence of catastrophic household health spending in 
Ghana .................................................................................................. 88 
2.6.2 Predicting catastrophic household health spending ............................ 90 
 
2.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 97 
 
 
3. INCIDENCE OF OUT OF POCKET PAYMENTS AND PERCEPTIONS 
ABOUT QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES BY THE INSURED: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE GHANA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY V ........... 101 
 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 101 
 
3.1.1 The National Health Insurance Scheme in context ........................... 102 
3.1.2 Research goal, questions and hypotheses ......................................... 106 
3.1.3 Source of data ................................................................................... 109 
3.1.4 Outline of the study ........................................................................... 110 
 
3.2 Theoretic framework ............................................................................... 111 
 
3.2.1 Client-perceived quality of health services ....................................... 111 
3.2.2 On the value of health insurance and out of pocket expenses .......... 116 
 
3.3 Empirical models and variables .............................................................. 122 
3.3.1 Determining the likelihood of health insurance coverage ................ 122 
3.3.2 Probit model and variables to predict health insurance status .......... 123 
3.3.3 Contingency tables for analysis of regional differences ................... 127 
3.3.4 Probit models for predicting out of pocket payments ....................... 129 
3.3.5 Multinomial logistic models for estimating predictors of perceived 
quality ............................................................................................... 132 
 
3.4 Data and results from the analysis .......................................................... 139 
 
3.4.1 Summary statistics of variables ........................................................ 140 
3.4.2 Who is likely to be insured ............................................................... 142 
3.4.3 Incidence of out of pocket expenses by the insured ......................... 155 
3.4.4 Predictors of the perception of quality of health care services ......... 162 
 xi 
 
3.4.5 Predictors of perceived quality received by NHIS cardholder ......... 166 
 
3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 171 
 
4. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH 
INSURANCE APPROACHES TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN 
GHANA AND RWANDA ................................................................................. 174 
 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 174 
 
4.1.1 The research goal, questions and hypotheses ................................... 180 
4.1.2 Method of analysis and data sources ................................................ 183 
4.1.3 Conceptualizing universal access to health care ............................... 184 
4.1.4 Outline of the study ........................................................................... 187 
 
4.2 Country background................................................................................ 188 
 
4.2.1 Structure of economy and poverty .................................................... 188 
4.2.2 Health system performance in Rwanda and Ghana .......................... 192 
4.2.3 Patterns in expenditures on health .................................................... 195 
 
4.3 Evidence on the outcomes in health care utilization and financial risk 
protection of Ghana NHIS and Rwanda Mutuelle .................................. 199 
 
4.3.1 Financial protection, health care utilization and health status .......... 206 
4.3.2 Equity in enrollment ......................................................................... 208 
 
4.4 Institutional features of Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS ................. 215 
 
4.4.1 Insurance benefits package ............................................................... 216 
4.4.2 Insurance costs and subsidies............................................................ 219 
4.4.3 Administrative structure and governance ......................................... 225 
4.4.4 The political context of universal coverage ...................................... 235 
 
4.5 Financial sustainability issues and the policy implications .................... 242 
 
4.5.1 Patterns in expenditures .................................................................... 243 
4.5.2 Funding sources and the prospects ................................................... 251 
4.5.3 Fiscal accountability and the threat to program sustainability.......... 256 
4.5.4 The financial sustainability verdict of the status quo........................ 262 
4.5.5 Policy changes needed for financial sustainability ........................... 267 
 
4.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 268 
 
5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 274 
 
 xii 
 
5.1 Summary of findings............................................................................... 275 
5.2 Policy implications.................................................................................. 281 
5.3 Limitations of the study .......................................................................... 284 
5.4 Research prospects .................................................................................. 286 
 
 
APPENDICES 
A. PATTERNS IN POVERTY, DISEASE BURDEN, HEALTH SERVICES AND 
HEALTH SPENDING ........................................................................................ 288 
B. PATTERNS IN HEALTH CARE DEMAND IN GHANA ............................... 295 
C. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
GHANA, DHS V (2008)..................................................................................... 302 
D. FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY, HEALTH SERVICES AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN GHANA AND RWANDA .............................. 313 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 333 
 
 
  
 xiii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
2-1. Summary statistics on health care expenditures by individuals in Ghana ............ 20 
2-2. The Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005/2006 Sample ..................................... 26 
2-3. Definition of vectors and variables ....................................................................... 44 
2-4. Illness and care-seeking by quintile of welfare, 1991-2006 ................................. 58 
2-5. Indicators of health risk by quintile of welfare, 2005/2006 .................................. 58 
2-6. Distribution of household health care expenditures.............................................. 61 
2-7. Health care payments by type of patient and expenditure category ..................... 62 
2-8. Summary statistics of household income and health care expenditures ............... 64 
2-9. Summary statistics of household indicators .......................................................... 65 
2-10. Predictors of household decision to spend on health care .................................... 67 
2-11. Determinants of household health care expenditures in Ghana ............................ 69 
2-12. Household food and non-food expenditures ratios ............................................... 87 
2-13. Probability of catastrophic household health care expenditures, GLSS5 ............. 91 
2-14. Likelihood of catastrophic health spending, by welfare quintile .......................... 94 
2-15. Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures in percent of total household 
expenditures .......................................................................................................... 95 
2-16. Incidence of catastrophic health care spending in percent of non-food 
expenditures .......................................................................................................... 96 
3-1. Regional distribution of Ghana NHIS subscribers.............................................. 105 
3-2. Summary statistics on insurance coverage, out of pocket payments and 
perceptions about quality of health services in Ghana ........................................ 141 
3-3. Predictors of health insurance coverage among 15-49 year olds ........................ 145 
3-4. Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured, Ghana DHS 2008 .......... 158 
 xiv 
 
3-5. Factors predicting perceptions about quality of services received at health 
facilities: Multinomial logistic regression .......................................................... 164 
3-6. Factors predicting perceptions about quality received by NHIS cardholders 
compared to others: multinomial regression ....................................................... 168 
4-1. The general structure of financing and coverage: NHIS versus Mutuelle .......... 187 
4-2. Types of studies reviewed ................................................................................... 204 
4-3. Strength of evidence about the impact of insurance schemes ............................. 207 
4-4. Evidence on the enrollment rates: Ghana NHIS versus Rwanda Mutuelle ........ 212 
4-5. Evidence on differences in health care utilization rates by groups of insured and 
uninsured ............................................................................................................. 213 
4-6. Differences in out of pocket health expenditures by groups of insured and 
uninsured Ghana and Rwanda ............................................................................ 214 
4-7. Percent population enrolled in Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS .................. 218 
4-8. Insurance costs and benefits: NHIS in Ghana versus Mutuelle in Rwanda ........ 224 
4-9. Institutional differences between Rwanda Mutuelle and the Ghana NHIS ........ 233 
4-10. Expenditure components of the Mutuelle and the NHIS .................................... 248 
4-11. NHIS reimbursements per outpatient and inpatient contact, 2005-2012 ............ 249 
4-12. Claims payments for services provided to Mutuelle members, 2011/2012 ........ 250 
4-13. Funding sources for Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS in various years ........ 252 
4-14. National Health Insurance Levy contributions and allocations .......................... 256 
 
  
 xv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Page 
2-1. Share of out of pocket payments in the total health expenditures in Ghana ......... 17 
4-1. Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP): Ghana and Rwanda ................... 191 
4-2. Gross national income per capita in Ghana and Rwanda (current US $) ........... 191 
4-3. Population distribution by locality and access to electricity in Ghana and Rwanda 
(percent of total population) ................................................................................ 192 
4-4. Health outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda ............................................................. 194 
4-5. Physicians per one thousand population: Ghana and Rwanda............................ 195 
4-6. Expenditures on health as a share of GDP: Ghana versus Rwanda .................... 197 
4-7. Public health expenditures and external resources as percent of GDP: Ghana 
versus Rwanda .................................................................................................... 198 
4-8. The share of out of pocket payments in the total health expenditures in Ghana and 
Rwanda ............................................................................................................... 198 
4-9. Organizational structure of the Mutuelle de Santé of Rwanda ........................... 229 
4-10. Organizational structure of the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme ....... 230 
4-11. Percent of NHIS active membership by category of premium exemption,       
2008-2012 ........................................................................................................... 254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xvi 
 
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CBHI   Community-based health insurance scheme 
DHS   Demographic and Health Survey 
EICV   Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie de Ménages, Rwanda 
GDHS   Ghana Demographic and health Surveys 
GHS   Ghana Health Service 
GLSS   Ghana Living Standard Survey 
MOH   Ministry of Health, Ghana 
MOH-R Ministry of Health, Rwanda 
NHIA   National Health Insurance Authority 
NHIF   National Health Insurance Levy 
NHIS   National Health Insurance 
NSIR   National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 
ODA  Overseas Development Assistance 
RHNIP  Rwanda National Health Insurance Policy 
SSNIT  Social Security and National Insurance Trust, Ghana 
UHC   Universal Health Coverage 
WHO   World Health Organization 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Health and health insurance 
The general consensus that health is a fundamental human right that should not be 
denied anyone based on socioeconomic status, race or creed has been demonstrated by 
ratification of the right to health - Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations 1948). The right to health is fundamental to a person's capabilities to 
achieve economic freedom (Sen 2009). Health has implications for development at local 
and global levels through its direct effect on human capital and entrepreneurship (Sachs 
2001). The World Health Organization has defined health as “a state of complete physical, 
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO 
1948, Huber et al 2011).  Alternatively, health is ‘ability to adapt and to self manage’ in 
the absence of complete well-being (Huber et al 2011). In addition, health is influenced by 
complex interactions of nature, environmental factors and resource endowment, with 
varying degrees of control by citizens and health system planners over these factors 
(Roemer 1991, WHO 2000, WHO 2011). Specifically, the impact of ill-health is important 
from an economic point of view because of linkages between health and economic 
performance. Maintaining and promoting health commands resources and high health 
expenditures can plunge households into poverty, possibly having inter-generational 
repercussions (McIntyre and Thiède 2003). The repercussions are especially relevant to 
developing countries because of the higher poverty rates coupled with inadequate social 
security and safety nets. Moreover, while households in developing countries make as 
much, if not more, out of pocket payments on health care as advanced countries 
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(Brugiavinni and Pace 2010) they have worse health outcomes (see Table A1 in Appendix 
A). The growing burden of chronic diseases adds to the economic challenges that infectious 
diseases like malaria already present. Indirect costs such as the value of time lost in seeking 
treatment and caring for the ill add on to the direct costs of treatment. The catastrophic cost 
of ill health is better appreciated if one takes into account the opportunity costs involved 
such as losses in labor productivity (McIntyre et al 2006).  
In the absence of adequate safety nets growing health needs increase the probability 
for the non-poor to fall into poverty, the poor to stay trapped in poverty and for health 
needs to worsen. Inequalities worsen in the event of growing health needs for those unable 
to gain access to effective healthcare, be it the result of financial barriers (non affordability 
of health care and healthy life styles) or physical barriers (inadequate human resources and 
infrastructure). The result is increased vulnerabilities to the vicious cycle of poverty and 
worse health outcomes, potentially eroding achievements in economic development such 
as reduction in mortality rates and poverty.  The linkages between health and poverty have 
been well acknowledged, and meeting the health needs of people is both a factor and an 
outcome of development. Consequently, a progressive health system would emphasize 
financing mechanisms that ensure that vulnerable households are protected from the 
financial risk of the prevention and management of ill-health. Several country case studies 
suggest that catastrophic health spending occurs with out of pocket payments exceeding 
2.5-40 percent of household discretionary income (Xu et al 2003, O’Donnell et al 2007, 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2008, Okunade at al 2010, Xu et al 2011). [Catastrophic health 
spending refers to the scenario where a household must reduce its basic expenditure over 
a period of time in order to cope with health costs].  Similarly, evidence from a cross section 
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of sixty-eight advanced and low income countries suggests that the share of private 
spending (including out of pocket payments) should be at most 15 percent of the total health 
care spending in an economy to minimize the chances of household catastrophic 
expenditures (Xu et al 2003).  
Household health care expenditure is a subject that needs more investigation 
particularly in Ghana where out of pocket payments comprised 39.19 percent of the overall 
expenditures on health regardless of improved trends in recent decades (see Figure 2-1 and 
Table A2 in Appendix A). In some estimations households use borrowed funds from 
outside sources to finance up to 80 percent of their medical expenditures (deGraft-Aikins 
2007, Ofori-Adjei 2007, Tagoe 2010). Similarly, calculations based on data from the 
Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey in 2005/2006 indicate that for 96 percent of 
the individuals who reported any health care expenditure, majority of health care payments 
were made out of pocket. For these individuals, the average health care payments in the 
two weeks preceding interview was $7. In contrast, a minority (4%) for whom government, 
insurance or private employer pays most health care expenditures reported an average of 
$16 over the same period.  Although these numbers say little about ability to pay or 
intensity in the consumption of health care services, it is safe to assume that if health care 
expenditures are a necessity, inequalities in access to health care would only worsen in the 
absence of protection against the financial risk of seeking care. An investigation of the 
relative influence of ability to pay and the needs for health services would shed light on the 
role of out of pocket payments and the incidence of catastrophic spending by households 
in Ghana. Such information is useful in making recommendations for effective health 
reforms that may protect households against the financial risks of seeking health care.   
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However, we have no knowledge of a study that calculates or estimates the incidence of 
catastrophic payments for health care by households in Ghana, and this study attempts to 
fill some of these gaps in knowledge. 
Reducing the financial costs associated with seeking essential health care is a value 
concept that has for the most part been embraced in Ghana even though implementation of 
appropriate policies has proven difficult. Shortly after Ghana attained independence from 
British colonial rule in 1957 the Nkrumah government was convinced that ‘health before 
wealth’ was necessary for development and so committed to the public provision of free 
health care for all (Wahab 2011). However, political turmoil and resulting changes in 
government, coupled with dwindling public revenues began to undermine public capacity 
to provide free quality health care.  Public financing took a turn for the worst in the late 
1970’s as global economic crises and commodity price shocks resulted in mounting 
balance of payments deficits and increasing public debt.  Ghana’s Economic Recovery 
Program and the World Bank prescribed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) adopted 
in 1983 introduced significant reductions in public spending and cost recovery in public 
services provision. Public expenditures on health had been reduced to 1.3 percent of GDP 
by 1997 (Agyeman-Konadu 2000).  A controversial reform was the institutionalization of 
hospital user fees (popularly known as ‘cash and carry’) in 1985 (Hospital Fee Regulation 
Law, LI1313) that is still currently in effect (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999, Osei-Akoto 2003, 
Agyepong and Nagai 2011). Households had to cope with the increasing burden of out of 
pocket payments for the full cost of medicines and supplies and an additional mark up for 
overhead costs of the public health facilities (Biritwum 1994).  In some estimates, for 
example, out of pocket payments for drugs constitute about 60% of the cost of malaria 
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treatment (Asenso-Okyere et al 1998) in addition to the fact that malaria is the leading 
cause of morbidity and mortality in Ghana.  
Although the Bamako Initiative adopted in 1987 by Sub Sahara African countries 
may be credited for reforms that brought emphasis on primary health care and health sector 
decentralization, it clearly was not enough (Chabot 1988). The institutional support for 
health facility user fees by this same Initiative was a contradiction in policy for it took 
health care away from communities that could not afford it rather than make more revenues 
available for better health care provision as had been promised (Biritwum 1994, Nyonator 
and Kutzin 1999). Patients have been detained in hospitals until they could settle bills. 
Patients needing urgent care have been left to their demise for lack of payment for health 
services and individuals are known to delay seeking health care or do so too late due to 
lack of funds (Adu-Oppong et al 2010, Agyepong and Nagai 2011). The Millennium 
Development Goals agenda has generated some attention to the improvement of health 
outcomes but out of pocket payments continue to be a major constraint on access to health 
care (McIntyre and Thiède 2003). 
Given this background, Ghana has once again adopted policy to pursue the goal of 
making basic health services free at the point of service, this time through a National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) which was established in 2003. Ghana’s National Health 
Insurance Act (Republic of Ghana 2003), renewed in the National Health Insurance Act of 
2012, has three specific objectives: (i) to eliminate financial barriers to access health care 
(ii) to improve equity in access to health care, and (iii) to guarantee a basic package of 
health care for all residents regardless of ability to pay. Similarly, there is a growing global 
consensus that universal health coverage, broadly defined as “all people receiving the 
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quality health services they need without being exposed to financial hardship” is the vehicle 
to accelerate poverty reduction and the attendant benefits in socioeconomic development, 
hence the global development agenda (post 2015 Millenium Development Goals) to attain 
health for all by the year 2030 (World Bank 2014, World Health Organization and World 
Bank 2015). In effect, Ghana’s goal is not simply ambitious, it is laudable. However, 
evidence-based policy implementation is critical to success and for this reason it is 
important to examine out of pocket health expenditures particularly among the insured to 
measure the impact that the NHIS has had on extending access to care without 
compromising quality.   
The NHIS has attracted attention as an innovative approach to health care financing 
for the reason that it combines community-based health insurance practices with some 
social health insurance (SHI) practices common to the advanced country context (Jehu-
Appiah et al 2011, NHIA 2012, Kusi et al 2014). Most advanced countries that have 
attained access to health care for all (universal health care) have done so through third party 
prepaid arrangements (whether by government as a single payer as practised in Canada and 
France, or direct public provision of health care such as in the UK, or by social health 
insurance through government mandated contributions by employer and, or employee to 
pools of fund such as in Germany). In most cases attaining universal health care has been 
possible because of the important role of public financing. Populous middle income 
countries as Brazil, India and Mexico have some basic health care package for all citizens 
through active public spending. Vietnam, a low income country, has expanded access to 
health care through its public supplemental health insurance program that has reached 68% 
of the population (WHO and World Bank 2015).  
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By several accounts, Ghana and Rwanda are the two Sub-Sahara African countries 
considered to have achieved what may be described as an intermediate stage of 
development in universal health coverage with a handful of others, including Nigeria, 
Kenya and Mali in the early stages of reform (Dhillon et al 2012, Lagomarsino et al 2012, 
Dixon et al 2014). Rwanda’s National Health Insurance Policy (Republic of Rwanda 2010) 
has the objective to expand access to health for all regardless of ability to pay. Rwanda has 
a two-sector approach: social health insurance and community-based insurance (Mutuelles 
de Santé schemes). Rwanda’s Mutuelle de Santé (hence Mutuelle) has received acclaim 
for the reason that majority of the population is enrolled.  
In effect Ghana and Rwanda have similar policies but not so similar approaches 
toward universal coverage. Impact studies have been conducted in both countries but we 
have no knowledge of an existing study that focuses on comparing the relative progress of 
the two countries.  Arguably countries are different and so are the policy contexts, but 
common indicators could make comparisons feasible and useful.   Both countries attempt 
national health insurance coverage by organizing at the district level. Rwanda began an 
expansion of community based health insurance from a pilot phase in three districts around 
the time Ghana began implementing the NHIS in 2005. Ghana similarly began 
implementation with a handful of pre-existing community-based schemes. By the end of 
2006, voluntary enrollments had increased to reach seventy-six percent of the Rwandan 
population and by 2010 at least ninety percent of Rwandans had some form of health 
insurance (Republic of Rwanda 2011). By 2006 15 percent of the Ghanaian population had 
some form of health insurance coverage (GSS 2008); by 2010 about 33 percent were 
enrolled in the NHIS (NHIA 2011). In Rwanda an additional 15 percent of the population 
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are covered by health insurance arrangements outside the district-based schemes (Republic 
of Rwanda 2011).  The faster expansion of population coverage in Rwanda has generated 
interest in what the critical factors to Rwanda’s higher enrollments would be, how 
comparable the benefits and costs of insurance could be, and how cost effective and 
sustainable the programs could be.  A comparative analysis of the Ghanaian and the 
Rwandan models holds potential to contribute to the knowledge base on appropriate 
strategies to attain universal care. Such information is useful to developing countries and 
the Sub Saharan African context in particular. As more countries are moving toward 
universal health coverage some gaps in the literature have been identified such as the need 
for a common set of comparable indicators by which countries may assess their progress 
(Lagomarsino et al 2012).  Hence, a comparative analysis is useful in contributing to the 
set of tools for developing indicators, and by which countries may develop and evaluate 
evidence-based policy on universal health coverage, the implementation strategies, or the 
outcomes.  
1.2 Goal and objectives of the study 
This study aims to investigate the financial risk potential in health expenditures of 
households in Ghana and to measure the progress of NHIS in reducing financial barriers to 
accessing quality health care and the consequent potential for universal health coverage. 
Universal access to health care is a desirable but challenging goal to both advanced and 
developing countries because of the scale of resources, the social or the political consensus 
that must be in place. Therefore, compelling evidence about the outcomes is useful in 
aiding consensus-building. In addition, universal health coverage is a moving target 
because circumstances change and countries must adapt effectively. Evidence on progress 
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and outcomes become important for meeting policy goals in an efficient way. An 
increasing number of studies have been carried out to assess the impact of Ghana’s NHIS, 
often in local or community settings. Some gaps in knowledge still exist on issues like the 
determinants of household health care expenditures, how the allocation of out of pocket 
expenditures may be changing in the context of NHIS (impact on financial risks), what 
effect the NHIS has on quality of health services received in the context of health care 
being accessible, what progress Ghana has made toward attaining universal health 
coverage and how feasible the NHIS could reach that goal. This study therefore attempts 
to fill some of these gaps. 
This study undertakes three specific tasks with the objective to generate evidence 
to arrive at conclusions that fulfill the goal of the study. The first task is to analyze 
household health care expenditures to produce measures of catastrophic health care 
payments and key factors that determine which households pay for health care out of 
pocket and by how much they spend. This analysis is based on information from a national 
survey of household living conditions in 2005/2006, a period that coincides with the first 
year of NHIS implementation.  The second task is to identify the key determinants of who 
has health insurance in Ghana, and among the insured, what factors influence the decision 
to make out of pocket payments and what factors influence perceptions about the quality 
of health services received. The empirical analysis uses data from the 2008 Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS-V). The third task is to measure the progress that 
Ghana has made with its approach to universal health coverage and the feasibility of 
sustaining the NHIS, by comparing with Rwanda along a common set of indicators. The 
analysis involves systematic literature reviews of published, peer-reviewed empirical 
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studies (econometric estimates of the determinants of health insurance coverage and 
outcomes in health care utilization and financial risk protection), and extensive reviews 
and logging of information contained in country reports, news journals and other sources.  
1.3 Overview of the three essays 
Given the range of objectives, this study is organized into three essays on different 
but interrelated themes. The objective of the first essay is to analyze the health care costs 
of households in Ghana using data from living standards measurement surveys. The key 
predictors and the determinants of household health care expenditures are estimated. 
Further analysis is made to identify which households face potentially catastrophic health 
care spending. The empirical analysis specifically seeks to find out whether (i) income has 
a comparable influence as health needs in the household’s selection into health care 
expenditures (ii) the amount of health care expenditures reflect household income and 
welfare and (iii) what proportion of households and which type of household is more likely 
to experience catastrophic health spending.  
The results indicate that in a two-week recall period, at least two-thirds of 
households participate in health care expenditures regardless of illness status. With regards 
to cost components, medication is the most patronized and hospitalization is the most 
expensive, which is to be expected. Catastrophic health expenditures increase with severity 
of morbidity as measured by hospitalization and the poorest households are the most 
affected. The coefficients on the predictors of household health care spending suggest that 
illness is the strongest determinant of the probability to spend followed by the presence of 
young children (under age 5), while income has a positive but relatively weak influence on 
the decision to spend, after controlling for household size and other characteristics. 
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Interestingly, households in the bottom quintiles of welfare are more likely to spend than 
households in the upper quintiles two quintiles when health needs and other factors have 
been taken into account. After households have made the decision to spend, morbidity and 
its severity are the strongest factors of the amount of expenditures. Income measures are 
significant but the results indicate that health expenditures have a low degree of 
responsiveness to income, hence low income elasticity, and health expenditures behave as 
a necessity. Other household characteristics such as education of the household head, 
geographical residence and religion are statistically significant determinants of the level of 
health care expenditures. In sum, health care expenditures are nondiscretionary for 
households in Ghana and morbidity is the strongest factor for the decision to spend, 
whereas affordability is an important determinant of the amount of expenditures. 
Households in the bottom quintiles of welfare have a higher likelihood to spend and are 
consequently the most vulnerable to catastrophic expenditures. The implication for policy 
is to effectively target poor households with free health care or health insurance coverage 
to reduce the financial risk of seeking health care. The chances of catastrophic health care 
expenditures could be significantly reduced if Ghana NHIS effectively targets households 
in the two bottom quintiles of welfare. 
The objective of the second essay is to estimate the predictors of household 
selection into health insurance with emphasis on regional variations, and to examine the 
incidence of out of pocket payments and perceptions about the quality of health services 
among the group of insured individuals. The analysis uses data from the fifth round of the 
Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 2008. The empirical analysis 
specifically investigates: (i) key determinants of health insurance, and how these differ 
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across administrative regions in Ghana, (ii) the determinants of out of pocket payments for 
the insured, especially exploring the role of the need for uncovered services, ability to pay, 
and satisfaction with quality, and (iii) perceptions about quality of services received by the 
insured. The results show that community of residence, ability to pay and gender are the 
key predictors of the likelihood that an individual or household would be insured. 
Specifically, poorer regions, rural communities and females have a higher probability of 
being insured and so are households in higher wealth brackets. When insured individuals 
have to make out of pocket payments the need for service not covered by insurance is the 
driving factor, but the two upper wealth brackets have significantly higher probability of 
paying out of pocket. The implication is that insurance improves access to health care but 
it does not eliminate catastrophic out of pocket payments especially for the poor in the 
event of critical need of services that are not insured. Alternatively, insurance expands the 
feasible set of desired health services for wealthier households. Bad attitude of health 
workers has a significant negative effect on perceived quality of care, more so than the 
adequacy of information or communication about the treatment process. Hence the results 
suggest that insured clients may be content with technical quality of the treatment process. 
The results imply that improving perceived quality of health services may be less of a 
technical issue. This suggests therefore that a behavioural approach such as a rebranding 
of customer services and the training health workers to approach clients with a positive 
attitude is an effective strategy to improve access to health care.  
In the third essay Ghana’s and Rwanda’s approaches to universal access to health 
care are compared with emphasis on what factors explain differences in outcomes and 
financial sustainability. The study specifically seeks to compare (i) outcomes in population 
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coverage, access to health services, financial risk protection, (ii) the institutional factors 
and program design features and how these explain differences in outcomes, and (iii) the 
key challenges to financial sustainability of the programs.  The analysis is based on 
information from peer-reviewed publications, published and unpublished reports by 
governments and development partners. The evidence suggests that common critical factor 
in the design of universal health coverage policies and the models adopted in Rwanda and 
in Ghana is the predominance of political commitment to protecting households from 
financial risk of seeking health care. Rwanda’s insurance system includes a mandatory 
feature through the requirement of enrollment by whole household units and household 
contributions to insurance premiums are determined by ability to pay. The program design 
corroborates the evidence in the empirical literature that suggests that disadvantaged 
groups are excluded from Ghana’s NHIS to a greater extent than in Rwanda (e.g., 
Binagwaho et al  2010, Dhillon et al 2012, Lu et al 2012, Dixon et al 2014b, Kusi et al 
2015) as illustrated in Table 4-3 with details in Table D1 and Table D2 in Appendix D. 
NHIS enrollments have been strongly associated with a higher socioeconomic status: 
higher wealth brackets, formal employment and higher education. The Rwandan model is 
an integrated approach to poverty reduction which benefits from a high level of political 
commitment.  On the contrary political branding of Ghana’s NHIS overshadows its 
relevance as development strategy given the public perception of political motivation in 
NHIS as a tool to gain political votes.  In addition, Rwanda has inbuilt performance 
evaluation and monitoring with a client-based component which helps to reduce principal-
agent problems. Ghana lacks an integrated client-based evaluation component but rather 
emphasizes provider focused evaluations such as clinic audits. These measures have not 
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proven to be adequate to deter considerable fraud in provider claims. Institutional 
accountability is the critical factor for financial sustainability both in Ghana and Rwanda. 
The implication for policy is that Ghana NHIS should incorporate a mandatory component 
which is essential to the successful expansion in coverage to levels commensurate with 
universal coverage. Also, Ghana could improve equity in coverage by determining 
household contributions according to ability to pay, and even though this proves to be a 
difficult challenge in Ghana, the search for a means-tested approach to premium 
contributions must continue.   
1.4 Relevance of the study 
In Ghana, as in most developing countries, studies on health expenditures have 
often addressed issues related to national health accounts, aid effectiveness, and health 
financing reforms and poverty reduction but fewer studies have focused on household 
health expenditures. Where household expenditures are concerned the studies often focus 
on specific services such as the demand for maternal health services or the cost of specific 
diseases such as malaria. Studying the structure and determinants of health expenditures 
by households in Ghana contributes to knowledge about the key risks and financial barriers 
to accessing health care.  The results from this study are useful for effectively targeting 
households most at risk, improving the design of benefit packages given the relevant 
weight of health services in out of pocket payments. The study provides a baseline by which 
to measure progress in reducing financial barriers to health care since the establishment of 
Ghana NHIS.  
While a number of studies indicate that health care utilization rates increase with 
implementation of the NHIS, the quality of care and out of pocket payments have not been 
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studied as much (Makinen et al 2011; Brugiavini et al 2011; Gaddah M 2010). Increased 
utilization of health care services is not a sufficient indicator of access to quality health 
care. Examining overall quality from the client’s perspective sheds more light on how 
health services and consequently NHIS benefits have been perceived. The narrower focus 
on the group of insured individuals gives an insightful perspective to the problems (such 
as perceived quality of health services or equity gaps) that persist even after financial 
barriers to health care are eliminated in the context of NHIS. Similar to Ghana, most impact 
studies on Rwanda’s approach to health insurance have focused on particular districts, 
regions or schemes, or have addressed specific issues such as enrollment, health care 
utilization and out of pocket payments. The innovation in this study is the cross-country 
comparison of effectiveness in community-based approach to reducing financial risks in 
health care. The set of comparative indicators developed may be relevant for other country 
case studies, too. Overall the findings from this study can help policy makers improve 
access to health care and the health of people in Ghana and Rwanda, as well as in Africa 
and the developing world.  This dissertation is organized as follows: After this introductory 
chapter, chapters two, three and four are essays one, two and three, respectively. The final 
chapter summarizes the findings from the study and provides policy recommendations and 
suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 HOUSEHOLD HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES DETERMINANTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GHANA LIVING STANDARDS SURVEY V 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Countries may finance health with a combination of out of pocket expenditures, 
general taxation and mandatory social insurance but the relative importance of the funding 
sources varies.  Musgrave, Carrin and Zeramindi (2002) have, for example, observed an 
inverse relationship between out of pocket expenditures and country income even when a 
large proportion of the variation could not be explained.  While countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tend to rely heavily on 
public financing through fiscal allocations or mandatory payroll taxes, for middle income 
and low income economies out of pocket payments are the most significant. In African 
countries development assistance and donor funds comprise between 3% and 40% of total 
health spending and 7% on average while out of pocket expenditures make up to 80 percent 
of total health spending (World Bank 2007).   
Ghana’s case is not an exception despite the reforms in establishing some 
semblance of a social health insurance program over the past decade. According to national 
health accounts estimates, private spending comprised 51 percent of total health care 
spending for the period of 2000-2009 (World Health Organization 2002, World Bank 2009 
and World Health Organization 2011). Out of pocket payments have averaged 78.4 percent 
of private health spending from 2006 to 2009 and by 2013 the share stood at 91.85% 
(World Bank World Development Indicators). The share of out of pocket payments may 
have improved alongside the expansion in health insurance coverage through the National 
Health Insurance Scheme since 2005 as may be seen in Figure 2-1. Yet the trend has 
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reversed since 2011 and in 2013 out of pocket payments comprised 39.19 percent of the 
total expenditures on health. Moreover, households finance medical expenditures by up to 
80% with borrowed funds from sources outside the household (deGraft-Aikins 2007, 
Ofori-Adjei 2007, Tagoe 2010). In some cases, the long process of acquiring funds to 
finance health care leads to seeking intervention too late (Kruk et al 2009; Adu-Oppong et 
al 2010). One may question whether out of pocket health expenditures include also 
overconsumption of health services and not only necessary services. In other words, to 
what extent is the relative size of health expenditures a reflection of consumption levels 
and wealth endowments? O, to what extent are they a reflection of catastrophic spending? 
One thing is certain, however, that when health expenditures are a necessity, out of pocket 
payments increase the likelihood that households would incur catastrophic costs, even for 
those that have ability to cope in the long run.   
 
Figure 2-1: Share of out of pocket payments in the total health expenditures in Ghana 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators databank. 
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Out of pocket payments for health care include not only payment for health 
services, purchase of drugs and medical supplies but also payments for related travel, 
special foods and fitness programs, and costs may be curative or preventive, direct or 
indirect, financial or economic (Diehr et al 1999, Folland, Goodman and Stano 2000, Rice 
and Unruh 2009). The cost of health care includes opportunity costs such as the value of 
time used in seeking care or time lost due to ill health, hence economic costs (Berman, 
Kendall and Bhattacharyya 1994, Diehr et al 1999, O’Donnell et al 2007). Similarly, the 
cost of ill-health may include quality of life measures such as dissatisfaction from pain, 
disability and ostracism (Berman et al 1994, McIntyre and Thiède 2003, deGraft-Aikins 
2005). Counting all these costs, one easily appreciates that health shocks could be 
catastrophic for households that have a limited ability to cope. Health shocks occur when 
an illness episode causes changes in quality of life, intra household resource allocation, 
labor productivity, household structure and others. Health shocks may be temporary or 
permanent depending not only on the intensity of the illness (morbidity, disability or 
mortality) but also on the coping strategies available to households. Ample evidence in 
developing countries show that coping strategies often include selling off assets such as 
animals, farmlands or tools, cutting down on food spending, taking children out of school 
and sending children off to work (Asenso-Okyere et al 1998, Kruk et al 2009; Adu-Oppong 
et al 2010).  An extensive literature review of household health expenditures in low and 
middle income countries show that health care financing strategies place emphasis on out 
of pocket payments at the point of service and these strategies impoverish households 
(McIntyre et al 2006). 
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In spite of the expansion in health insurance coverage in the recent decade, one 
might suspect the catastrophic potential of out of pocket health care expenditures for 
households in Ghana may be unaffected. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
excludes coverage of the cost-intensive treatments associated with chronic illnesses such 
as in most cancers, renal dialysis and HIV/AIDS anti retroviral therapy. Moreover, most 
households that want health insurance coverage are unable to afford it and the NHIS has 
of yet to succeed in incorporating needs-based targeting of insurance subsidies (Joint NGO 
2008, Apoya et al 2011, Gobah and Zhang 2011, Jehu-Appiah 2011, Witter and Garshong 
2011). An analysis of out of pocket expenditures to shed light on the factors that influence 
the likelihood that households experience catastrophic spending has potential to yield 
information that could improve identification of critical needs and effective 
implementation of health reforms (Gaddah and Munro 2011, Aryeetey et al 2011).  
In addition, Ghana is undergoing epidemiological transition whereby chronic non-
communicable diseases such as cardiovascular disorders and cancers are becoming 
prevalent. Hypertension, diabetes and stroke rank in the top ten leading causes of morbidity 
and mortality, especially among adult females and in some cases the leading causes of 
maternal mortality (Ministry of Health, Ghana 2009, and Ministry of Health 2011). The 
national prevalence of diabetes and hypertension is estimated at 28% or more as most cases 
are suspected to be undiagnosed or under-reported (Hill and Douptcheva 2011, deGraft-
Aikins 2007). These problems are in addition to pervasive infectious and parasitic diseases 
hence the double burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases characteristic 
of developing countries, or a triple burden if one takes into account physical injuries 
resulting from accidents and violence (Russel 2004, Rossier et al, 2011). Non-
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communicable disease interventions would emphasize preventive approaches such as life-
style and nutrition changes (a direct link to household living standards) and the associated 
cost outlays, whereas Ghana’s health system is better acclimatized to acute treatment 
interventions (deGraft-Aikins 2007, Hill and Douptcheva 2011, Tagoe and Dake 2011). 
Data from living standards measurement surveys confirm the fact that inpatient services 
drive extreme out of pocket payments for health care by households irrespective of poverty 
status (Ghana Statistical Service 2008).  
 
Table 2-1: Summary statistics on health care expenditures by individuals in Ghana 
Who is responsible 
for the greatest 
proportion of the 
expenses Head of household Other individual 
Employer, 
government or 
health insurance 
Observations 31,207 (85.67 %) 3820 (10.38%) 1399 (3.98%) 
 In nominal 2006 US$   
Mean payments 6.0 7.7 16.4 
Std Dev of mean 17.9 28.3 178.8 
Median 2.0 2.0 2.4 
75th percentile 5.3 5.9 6.7 
99th percentile 67.3 84.0 82.7 
Maximum 872.0 476.7 3,520.0 
     Total  423,255.8 (96.21%) 10,284.2 (2.34%) 6,385.1 (1.45%) 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005/2006 . 
Note: US $1 = old cedi ₵7,500 (2006 nominal exchange rate). 
 
Additionally, in 96 percent of cases where health expenditures are made, a 
household head, a member of household or other individual is responsible for majority of 
the payments as demonstrated in Table 2-1. One may also observe that for individuals 
whom government, insurance or private employer pays the majority of expenditures, 
reported expenditures are on average more than twice that of individuals for whom 
household head (₵45,236) or other individual (₵53,037) bore the majority of expenditures. 
Similarly, individuals who report very high expenditures as well indicate sponsorship by 
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government or employer, or health insurance coverage. Inadequate or nonexistent social 
safety nets coupled with strategies that are heavily dependent on household savings implies 
that health shocks would have greater consequences for households that are disadvantaged. 
The predominance of out of pocket payments for health care in Ghana gives impetus to 
investigating the impact on households.  An important aspect of such an investigation is a 
study of the structure and the determinants of health expenditures and the variation across 
different socioeconomic levels. A case in point is Akazili,, Aikins and Binka’s (2007) 
finding that the cost of care in treating a malaria case in Ghana is on average 1% of income 
for higher income households but 34% for poor households. Alternately, policy reforms 
for example in maternal and child health at the forefront of health care challenges in Ghana 
may emphasize price subsidies and increased awareness in the use of skilled services. Yet, 
if an investigation into the structure and determinants of the cost of health care indicate for 
instance that travel costs or time costs are the most significant deterrent to seeking timely 
care such information becomes critical for policy focus and a more effective allocation of 
cost subsidies. Similarly, an analysis of household health expenditures provides an 
assessment of the catastrophic potential of health shocks on individuals and households in 
particular to determine which households are more at risk. 
2.1.1 The research goal, questions and hypotheses 
Studies on household health expenditures with emphasis on variations within or 
across demographic and socioeconomic groups have potential to improve information 
about the nature of out of pocket expenditures, how they may be irrelevant, welfare 
improving or catastrophic, and the policy interventions that may be efficient even as Ghana 
pursues reforms toward social health insurance. The relevance of household health 
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expenditures analysis notwithstanding, empirical studies of such nature are sparse in the 
case of Ghana as in Sub-Sahara Africa in general given the challenges of inadequate 
databases on household health expenditures. The goal of this study is to fill some of the 
knowledge gap by identifying the key determinants of health care expenditures and the 
incidence of catastrophic health care expenditures in households in Ghana. In explaining 
the key determinants of health care spending in a predominantly out of pocket payments 
system, the level of health needs and the role of income or ability to pay is critical, 
especially where impoverishing or catastrophic out of pocket payments are concerned.  
Myriad factors, whether exogenously or endogenously determined of income, could 
influence the decision to spend and the amount of health care expenditures. The challenge 
in this analysis is to identify some key income versus non-income determinants of 
household health expenditures.   
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following:   
i. Does income have a comparable influence as health needs in the household’s 
selection into health care expenditures?    
ii. Does the amount of health care expenditures reflect household income and 
welfare?   
iii. What proportion of households and which type of household is more likely to 
experience catastrophic health spending?  
One may question if out of pocket health expenditures reflect demand for necessary 
health care given relative prices and intensity of use of services, or whether they are a 
reflection of household consumption levels and wealth endowments. When relative prices 
are accounted for (as the expenditures data employed in this study is considered to have) 
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one may consider that if household health care expenditures are made out of necessity, 
unaffordable out of pocket payments plunge households in poverty or transitory poverty 
even when households have ability to cope over a longer term.  Hence this study assumes 
the following, that is, the hypotheses are:  
i. Morbidity is the strongest influence in the decision to spend on health care  
ii. Household income has a weak correlation with amount of health expenditures 
because health care behaves as a necessity. 
iii. Households with greater health needs are the most likely to fall into catastrophic 
health spending irrespective of income status.  
In a health system where households make health care expenditures out of pocket 
at the point of service it is expected that the incidence of catastrophic expenditures would 
be negatively correlated with ability to pay (measured in proportion to consumption 
expenditures) for a given level of health need. Households with higher perceived needs 
(measured in terms of reported illness or injury episodes) would have a higher probability 
to seek health care than households with lower perceived needs all things being equal. 
Hence health needs should be the strongest influence in the decision to spend in a system 
of out of pocket payments at the point of service delivery.  
A lack of statistically significant evidence showing health care expenditures vary 
with income would mean health care is income inelastic for households in Ghana, hence 
health expenditures are non discretionary or health care is a necessary good, which is the 
usual finding in other countries (Wagstaff et al 2007, Wagstaff et al 2009, Okinade et al 
2011, Xu et al 2011). The negative implications are greater for households with higher 
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health risks or with smaller financial protection in the context of an out of pocket payments 
system.     
Alternatively, a statistically significant positive coefficient on income would mean 
that health care demand behaves as a normal good.  In the context of an out of pocket 
payments system the implications include: (i) entrenchment of inequity in access to health 
care based on ability to pay rather than level of need especially if the level of need is higher 
for less resourced households (ii) if health care expenditures are discretionary then the 
possibility of overconsumption by better resourced households for a given level of health 
need. The stronger the positive relationship, the greater the implication that health care is 
a luxury.  A statistically negative relationship with income in the results would be an 
anomaly because there is no theoretical explanation against health care being a normal 
good.   
Beside health needs and household income measures, other factors expected to be 
of significant influence in the decision to spend and by how much to spend include health 
provider and access to health services (estimated by distance to facility conditional on 
consultation with a provider, rural or urban location), access to information and social 
networks (estimated by education, religious status). Higher educated households are in 
general expected to have better access to information and studies have found a statistically 
significant relationship exists between educations and health care demand although the 
sign is not assumed apriori. Better access to, or better use of health information could imply 
better health outcomes (Grossman 1976, Anderson 1995, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006), 
hence lower needs and therefore a lower demand for health care. At the same time, it could 
imply better participation in health care market and hence higher demand for health care.   
 25 
 
The key findings from the empirical analysis are that incidence of illness has a 
strongest influence on the decision to seek care while taking into account income and other 
household characteristics.  The decision to spend is influenced positively by household 
income given the statistically significant though small coefficient. Interestingly wealthier 
households have a lower probability to indicate health expenditures than poorer households 
even after controlling for differences in health needs. When households have made the 
decision to spend, illness and the severity of it (as measured by hospitalizations) are strong 
determinants of the level of expenditures much more than income is, after taking into 
account household size and other factors.  Though income indicators are significant, the 
degree of responsiveness to health expenditures is low given the small coefficient of 
elasticity ranging between 0.03 and 0.08. In comparison household income as measured by 
the ratio of food to total household expenditures shows a significant but negative elasticity 
coefficient of -0.36. The evidence therefore suggests that health expenditures are 
nondiscretionary and poorer households who are the most likely to make them are most 
vulnerable to catastrophic out of pocket payments. Findings from the analysis of the 
incidence of catastrophic health care payments buttress this conclusion because illness and 
hospitalizations are statistically significant factors in the chances of catastrophic payments 
but the two bottom quintiles have higher probabilities than the upper quintiles. Health 
expenditures vary significantly with the number of years of school of head of household 
but there is no difference in impact on the decision to spend by the education status of 
households. The implication is that education may have a weak influence on health 
outcomes but has importance in terms of the socioeconomic influence on ability to pay. 
Old age has an interesting influence: having senior members (age 60 or more) in the 
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household significantly reduces the likelihood of spending and has no influence on the 
amount of spending.  In contrast, the presence of young children strongly predicts health 
spending and has a positive influence on the amount of spending. Locality of residence, 
gender, religion and other household control variables have important influence as might 
be seen in the detailed discussions that follow.  
2.1.2 Source of data 
This study uses information from household living standards measurement surveys 
to estimate health costs in terms of health care expenditures and productivity losses. Living 
standard measurement surveys have been conducted in Ghana in several waves over the 
period 1984-2006. Most of the empirical analysis in this study is based data from the fifth 
round of the Ghana Living Standard Surveys (GLSS5, 2005-06). The Ghana Living 
Standard Surveys are the most comprehensive, nationally representative household surveys 
in Ghana. The surveys have been administered by the Ghana Statistical Service with 
assistance from the World Bank. The GLSS5 survey was conducted from September 1, 
2005 through August 31 2006. Details of the sample size are shown in Table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2: The Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005/2006 Sample  
 Percent of sample  
Sample 
(N=37,128) 
Percent 
female 
Minors (0-14 years) 40.3 14,985 49.0 
Working age (15-59 yrs) 52.9 19,637 52.8 
Elderly (60 years or more) 6.8 2,506 54.3 
Household members 100.0 37,128 51.3 
Head of household 23.3 8,687 28.0 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data, Ghana Statistical Service, 2008. 
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This survey collected information from over 8680 households and 37128 
individuals in 148 communities (enumeration areas).  A multistage stratified sampling 
method was used to select households; each household had an equal chance of being 
selected. For sampling purposes, the country was divided into three ecological zones: 
Coastal in the south, Forest in the middle and Savannah in the north. The ecological zones 
for GLSS5 were divided into enumeration zones based on the GLSS4 (1998-99) 
stratification. A random selection of the enumeration zones was made with a probability of 
being included directly proportional to the population size. Hence the numbers selected 
differed per administrative region and ecological zone based on the population size 
represented. At the final stage of sampling a fixed number of households were randomly 
selected from each enumeration zone. The GLSS4 used similar methods to collect 
information on 26411 individuals in 5998 households. 
Topics covered in GLSS include demographic characteristics, education, health, 
employment and time use, income, nutrition, food expenditures, non-food expenditures, 
subsistence production, housing conditions, household enterprise, migration and income 
transfers, credits, assets and savings. The health component captures information on the 
incidence of illness and injury, the range of health care provider choices available in Ghana, 
payments made for pharmaceuticals, health practitioner consulting fees, the length of time 
spent in seeking care, the distance travelled and cost of travel, payments for health 
insurance and the amount of benefits received, immunizations, fertility and reproductive 
health. Information is collected on all household members including children. The GLSS 
is not longitudinal in nature since respondents are not followed in subsequent surveys.  
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Consequently, any discussion of trend is based on observations of different population 
samples at different periods in time.  
This study makes a critical assumption that insurance coverage for households in 
Ghana is insignificant hence majority of reported health expenditures are made out of 
pocket. This is a reasonable assumption given that just about 7% of respondents were 
covered by any health insurance according to the GLSS5 data. The National Health 
Insurance was in the very early stages of implementation at the time of the survey from 
September 2005 to August 2006. Most importantly less than 4% of the sample indicated 
that government, employer or insurance pays for the greatest portions of health expenses.  
2.1.3 Outline of the study 
The theoretic framework, data and empirical analyses and discussion of the results 
that confirm or refute our assumptions about health care expenditures by households in 
Ghana are discussed in the sections that follow. A detailed description of the theoretic 
framework on which this study is based is presented in section two. Section three presents 
a description of the empirical models for the data analysis and section four discusses the 
data and the results. Section five provides a summary of the work, the important 
conclusions and the policy implications.   
2.2 Theoretic framework  
This section provides a background to the determinants of health care expenditures 
by looking at the theoretical framework for health care demand and some observations in 
the empirical literature. Thus the discussion provides some reasons for the theoretical 
approach and the empirical methods adopted in this study.  
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2.2.1 On the demand for health care 
The traditional economics approach to health views the demand for health care as 
derived from an underlying demand for health (Grossman 1972, Wagstaff 1986a) and that 
health care is but one component of the factors that influence health.  Grossman’s (1972) 
seminal work on a theory of demand for health and health care postulates that individuals 
consume health care as an input in the production of health subject to a budget constraint.  
The basic premises of the theory are that: health is desirable hence a good but not 
necessarily the ultimate; at the margin, health is determined by the consumption of ‘health 
inputs’ and inputs include, but are not exclusive to, health care; health care and other 
commodities consumed have positive costs; the consumer has limited resources hence a 
budget constraint is taken into account (Wagstaff 1986b) 
The approach is to treat the household as a decision-making unit whose decision is 
based on an interconnected, inter-temporal utility model (Becker 1965, Grossman 1972, 
Becker 1976, Pollak 2002); this presents some caveats. The household is expected to 
choose behaviors such as healthy lifestyles, preventive and curative care, in a way that will 
maximize total utility from health with respect to available resources. The interconnection 
of individual utility functions is an added complication. Other household members’ 
perceptions of a member’s health need and its severity, the prices and opportunity costs 
facing the household but not just the individual's own perception and purchasing power 
potentially influence decisions about when and how much to demand.  It is simplistic to 
assume that individual choices are coordinated to maximize the welfare of everyone. This 
may be the special case where the interconnected utility functions of all members are 
identical and conflicts of interest are absent regardless of unequal power or control over 
resources. Ideally conflict of interests, unequal control and choice over resources should 
 30 
 
be accounted for. For instance, cultural norms that influence the relative value placed on 
the life of an adult or child, or of males versus females, may be significant influences on 
the level of household resources devoted to health of each member, and depending on the 
choice set and who makes final decisions, total utility may not be maximized. While these 
challenges are acknowledged in this study observations of household dynamics such as the 
conflicts of interest and resource control and the implications for health demand and 
consequently health expenditures determinants are not adequately captured given data 
limitations. The paternalistic state where the household head makes decisions in the interest 
of all members is assumed for this study.  
Much of the literature based on the traditional model of demand for health 
(Grossman 1972) and therefore health care considers the consumer as the sole decision 
maker of when and how much to consume. A more complex view of health care demand 
is taken by those that incorporate principal agent models and take into account, for 
example, the role of the health care provider in the decision process, the associated 
information asymmetries and conflicts of interest (Zweifel, 1981; Polheimer and Ulrich; 
1995; Nguyen 2011).   
Based on the theory of demand and optimization the determinants of health 
expenditures would include income, relative prices, consumer tastes and preferences 
(Grossman 1972, Wagstaff 1986a&b; Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995). Households would 
make expenditures to the level where the marginal rate of substitution between health 
(consequently health care) and other consumption goods equal the ratio of their prices. 
Expect less demand for health care if consumers derive little satisfaction or the efficacy is 
below expectation. Given that the health production function is an increasing function of 
 31 
 
health care consumption, better-informed consumers would supposedly be more efficient 
at transforming health care inputs into health (outcomes) hence education plays key role in 
health care behaviors (Grossman 1976, Anderson 1995, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Aging would have an increasing impact in health care demand in that a faster depreciation 
of one’s stock of health (health status) may imply more health care consumption to 
maintain desired health status. Relative increases in the price of health care might imply 
less demand, all things equal. Income has an increasing effect on health care demand, all 
things being equal.  However, empirical evidence suggests that while higher income is 
linked to better health status, health care is income inelastic (Getzen 2000; Okunade et al 
2010). Health care may behave as a basic necessity; alternately health care demand may be 
induced by the decision of the provider especially where consumers face information 
asymmetry and uncertainty about treatment outcomes. Health care demand (consequently 
health care expenditures in a predominantly out of pocket payments system) determinants 
may follow predictions of the (Grossman’s 1972) health demand model under stringent 
conditions. Koç (2002) illustrates, for example, that Grossman’s (1972) demand model 
would explain income inelasticity only if one imposed a restriction that health care and 
other consumption goods are complements rather than substitutes, in utility.  
Aside the theory of demand, the Anderson and Newman model on health care use 
(Anderson 1995) has opened up much discussion about the factors that determine 
household health care utilization (consequently health expenditures in an out of pocket 
payments system in this study).  The model categorizes environment, population 
characteristics, health behavior, and health outcomes as four major determinants of health 
care use. This model incorporates a dynamic and recursive nature through feedback effects 
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among the factors to further impact health care use and outcomes. Environment describes 
the health care system and external environment of the family unit or individual. Population 
characteristics imply predisposing factors, enabling resources and need. Health behavior 
implies personal health practices and the use of health services. Outcomes describe 
perceived health status, evaluated health status and consumer satisfaction that results from 
health care use. 
With respect to health care expenditures, the central theme is that an individual’s 
(or household unit’s) access to and use of health services is considered to be a function of 
their predisposing, enabling and need factors.   
Predisposing factors imply the socio-cultural characteristics that exist prior to 
illness: social structure (education, occupation, social networks, etc); health beliefs 
(knowledge and attitudes toward health care); demographic (age and gender).  
Enabling factors imply the logistics of obtaining care: personal or family (income, 
health insurance, travel, knowledge of the health care system); community (availability of 
health personnel and facilities, waiting times). 
Need factors imply the most immediate cause of health service utilization: 
perceived or evaluated. Perceived need implies how the household views their own health, 
experience illness and pain, or judges their problems to be sufficient enough to seek help. 
Evaluated need implies a professional judgment about one’s health status and the need for 
medical care. According to Anderson (1995) perception of need determines care-seeking 
while evaluated need determines the kind and amount of treatment to be provided. In other 
words, this framework accommodates decisions about health expenditures as different 
 33 
 
processes: the individual is the central decision-maker in whether or not to seek, but the 
care provider is the central decision maker of how much care is required. 
Summing up from the theory of demand for health and health care, and from 
Anderson’s (1995) Model of health care utilization, the theoretical determinants of 
household health care expenditures may be categorized as follows: perceived needs, 
sociodemographic characteristics, economic resources and environmental factors. It may 
be observed that much of the empirical literature on health care utilization or expenditures 
have included one or more measures in all four categories (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
2003, Xu et al 2003, O’Donnell et al 2007, Sen et al 2009, Okunade et al 2010).  
2.2.2 Empirical evidence in the literature 
Household expenditures research have been propagated following Ernst Engel’s 
(1857 as cited in Anker 2011) empirical work in which he formulated a law that implies 
the share of food diminishes as income increases. Accordingly, household expenditures 
research often relates income as a core determinant of expenditures whether on food, 
housing, sundries and consequently health expenditures. Most empirical studies on the 
determinants of health care expenditures have drawn on household surveys or family 
budget data of developed countries and have relied on self-reported current (transitory) 
income as the core determinant.  As Okunade (2010) points out, the theoretically correct 
concept of income, however, should be permanent or long run income (according to 
Friedman’s (1957) income hypothesis) which gives a better estimate of the household 
resource constraint. Permanent income is especially important in the developing country 
context because households draw on assets and savings in the event of health shocks 
especially where safety nets are lacking. However, transitory income has been the most 
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widely used in health expenditures research in both developing and advanced country 
contexts due to the inadequacies of the data in capturing permanent income.  
Empirical findings suggest that income level (whether transitory or permanent) is a 
significant determinant of out of pocket expenditures. Van Doorslaer et al (2007) estimate 
the magnitude and the distribution of OOP expenditures for health care for fourteen 
countries that make up 81% of Asia’s population and discover that the better offs are the 
most likely to spend a large fraction of total household resources on health. The authors 
considered this as a reflection of the situation where the poorest of the poor are unable to 
divert resources from basic needs to finance health care. Alternately some poor households 
receive health care subsidies and would therefore appear to spend less on health care. 
Mukherjee, Haddad and Narayana (2011) find similar results after analyzing per capita 
expenditures on health care consumption from 543 households in Kottathara Panchayat, 
India. The authors conclude that lower caste households have higher health care needs but 
spend lower on health care even when the health care needs and other influential 
confounders had been taken into account.  
Empirical evidence suggest also that household health expenditures are highly 
income inelastic in comparison to findings based on macroeconomic data in which health 
expenditures are more responsive to national income (Getzen 2000).  Okunade et al (2010) 
find that while income and assets are significant determinants of out of pocket payments 
by households in Thailand, payments behave as a technical necessity across income 
quintiles and household sizes (Okunade et al 2010).  
To the extent that health care is considered a basic need one would expect that the 
level of need would be a core determinant of demand (consequently expenditures) ceteris 
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paribus. Closeness to death by a household member (the aged) for example has been shown 
to correlate positively with health care expenditures by households (Okunade et al 2010). 
In a similar argument health expenditures are expected to be influenced by education in the 
sense that more education would imply better information and self perception of health 
needs and consequently the use of health care, ceteris paribus. Nketiah et al (2009) find, 
for example, that education level of mothers corresponds positively with health care 
seeking for children.  
Health expenditures may be categorized in different ways: according to the 
different types of care such as curative or preventive, allopathic or homeopathic, 
ambulatory or inpatient; according to the method of financing such as copayments, facility 
user fees or full coverage; or according to level of aggregation such as such as national, 
market, household or individual (McIntyre and Thiede 2003; Folland, Goodman and Stano 
2004; Rice and Unruh 2009). These classifications are not mutually exclusive and may 
overlap regardless of the focus of analysis. Health expenditures data commonly exhibit the 
following features: highly skewed due to a few patients incurring disproportionately high 
costs relative to the majority and point masses (lumpiness) at lower costs due to many zeros 
and low expenditures (Deihr et al 1999; Grisworld et al 2004; Stanton and Rutherford 
2005).  In the GLSS% for example a grand total of ₵553,594,564.25 were made in 
payments over the two weeks preceding interview. Of this amount a total of ₵145,901,600 
(26.4%) were made by the top 1% spenders alone whereas the bottom 75% spenders made 
₵102,477,816 (18.5%). Hence the top quartile of health care spenders made more than 
80% of the total health care expenditures. Similar wide variations occur elsewhere; for 
instance, in the Unites States, 5% of the top health care spenders made 49% of the total 
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health care expenditures in 2002 but the lower 50% took up only 3% (Stanton 2004). The 
United States is among the top per capita health care expenditures in the world (Stanton 
and Rutherford 2006) and may not be directly compared to Ghana. The relevance of these 
statistics is to emphasize the wide variations characteristic of health care payments, and 
how such distributions present challenges in making generalizations and comparisons 
among the population.  
Arguably a sizable portion of health expenditures tend to be nondiscretionary and 
incurred based on a perceived (critical) need for care; a person injured or lying unconscious 
from an auto accident or cardiac arrest would most unlikely ask the ambulance operators 
for a list of prices to make rational choices, so to speak. Not surprisingly nondiscretionary 
expenditures also tend to involve intensive care, hence costly. On the other hand, while a 
group of the population may have a low need of health care and demand less (for example 
younger people generally of better health status than the aged), another group may 
constantly need and demand larger amounts of care due, for example, to chronic illness. 
Then also perceived needs do not necessarily result in health care demand for reasons such 
as affordability, preferences and inequities in access. For similar reasons it is possible for 
persons with lower perceived needs to have higher demand for health care. These and any 
number of reasons could explain wide variations in health expenditures.  
Given large standard deviations and very large variances the difference in sample 
means, for example, is inefficient and sensitive to sample sizes especially when the sample 
sizes are different (Deihre et al 1999, Grisworld et al, 2004) and the median may be a better 
measure of central tendency. The non normality of the distribution alludes to the challenges 
of applying statistical models that have underlying assumptions of normality and zero 
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expected errors; these challenges are further discussed in the section on empirical 
modeling. Our analysis would nonetheless use the standard measures of central tendency 
but with caution to the interpretation of means, medians and other statistics used in studies 
of this nature. Expenditure categorizations and within and between group comparisons 
would include sufficient controls to the extent permitted by the available data.  
The empirical analysis of household health care expenditures in this study is based 
on the hypothesis that health needs, income and education are core determinants of health 
care expenditures by households in Ghana, ceteris paribus. The relative significance of 
household demographics, access to health care and location is as well examined.  The study 
is based on data from the fifth wave of the Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(GLSS5) conducted from September 1st, 2005 to August 31st, 2006.  
2.3 Modelling the determinants of health care expenditures 
Given the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis of household health care 
expenditures in this study is based on the hypothesis that health needs, income and access 
to information are core determinants of health care expenditures by households in Ghana, 
ceteris paribus. The relative significance of household demographics, access to health care 
and location is as well examined.  However, peculiar features of health expenditures and 
the underlying data generation process create challenges for statistical analysis. The 
skewed (right-tailed) distribution of health care expenditures, possible interdependence 
between health care expenditures and explanatory variables and possible heterogeneity in 
the error structure may render ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator biased or inefficient 
(Su et al 2006, Nketiah-Amponsah et al 2009, Mackinen et al 2011, Escobar et al 2011). 
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Health expenditures data tend to be highly skewed as is characteristic of highly 
selective expenditures as on tobacco and ostentatious goods to name a few. The usual 
observation is a large number of zeros (especially in the developing country context where 
the added challenges of data such as inadequate survey response rates or incomplete data). 
Furthermore, very high expenditures occur in a small proportion of households such as for 
critical but expensive health care or even selective, sophisticated expensive procedures that 
may be demanded by the wealthy. For instance, in 33% of the total 8686 households the 
GLSS5 have on record zero health expenditures in the two weeks preceding interview, the 
remaining 67% have an average of ₵85,305(US $11.4) but the average for the top ten 
health care spending households averaging ₵5.96 million (US $795). Similarly, per 
individual, the 27% for whom health care expenditures exceed zero have an average of 
US$7.4 with the top ten expenditures averaging US $790.   
The other challenge is the identification problem. Unobservable and unidentified 
characteristics of households and individuals may make OLS estimator biased and 
coefficients very large due to low variances in the explanatory variables. For instance, 
households that have members who recently experienced an illness or injury, chronically 
ill or closer to death, or have very young children are more likely to make non-zero 
expenditures (Okunade et al 2010). Such common characteristics may not be observed or 
identified and controlled for. Also, perceptions about illness or health needs are likely to 
influence the decision to demand health care and therefore health expenditures and at the 
same time the choice of health care provider and therefore the decision to seek care may 
be determined by the cost involved, in other words the health expenditure budget. 
Similarly, unobserved community, household and individual characteristics that influence 
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health behaviors and perceptions of illness may also be influential in provider choice and 
the level of health expenditures (Nketiah-Amponsah et al 2009, Mackinen et al 2011, 
Escobar et al 2011). The challenge is to identify an appropriate instrument variable whose 
impact on the variable of interest is solely through its impact on the endogenous regressors.  
One approach to counteract the identification problem is a two stage decision 
modeling where the first stage concerns the decision to spend or not and the second 
concerns the level of spending (Tobin 1958, Heckman 1979, Sigelman and Zeng 1999, 
Bellemare and Barret 2006, Powers 2007). This approach suggests a probit binary model 
at the first stage and a Tobin truncated model where the zero observations are dropped in 
a second stage. Tobin’s probit (Tobit) was developed in a seminal study (Tobin 1958) to 
address limited dependent variables, the situations in which the variable of interest is 
observed only if it takes on a positive value, the classical example being household 
expenditures on durable goods where a sizeable number had no expenditures on durable 
goods.  
The standard Tobit may be specified as follows: 
yi
∗ =  Xi𝐛 + ei        2-1 
 
yi   =  yi
∗ if yi
∗ > 0        2-2 
 
yi   =  0 if yi
∗ = 0        2-3 
 
ei  ~ N(0, σ  
2)        2-4  
 
 
where for the ith household 𝑦𝑖
∗  is some unobserved latent variable describing 
desired expenditures on health and 𝑦𝑖 is the actual observed expenditures on health, and 
the assumption that 𝑦𝑖
∗ does not exist if no health care expenditure is observed. Xi is a 
vector of independent variables and b is a vector of coefficients, ei is assumed to be 
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normally distributed errors hence 𝑒𝑖 ~ N (0, σ), and  𝑦𝑖  ~ N(𝐗i𝐛, σ) is also normally 
distributed. The probability that yi
∗ is positive, as well as the probability that yi
∗ is zero 
must be solved. Following Powers (2007) these probabilities can be jointly expressed as 
follows:   
 
L =  ∏ [1 − Φ (
Xβ
σ
)]y∗≤0 ∏
1
σ
∅ [
Y−Xβ
σ
]y∗>0         2-5 
 
 
where Φ (. )and ∅(. ) respectively represent the cumulative standardized normal 
distribution function and the standardized normal density function. Due to the many zeros 
observed in health care expenditures data the OLS estimator for  𝑦i = Xib would be biased 
downward given that E(y|y∗ > 0) = Xβ + E(ε|ε > −Xβ)  where the last term in the 
equation is not necessarily zero. Based on the assumption that the error terms have a normal 
distribution, E(y|y∗ > 0) = Xβ + σλ (
Xβ
σ
) and  λ(. ) =
ϕ(.)
Φ(.)
.    The standard Tobit model 
however assumes that zero expenditure necessarily corresponds to a decision of 
nonparticipation in health care demand (Sigelman 1999, Powers 2007, StataCorp 2011). 
Yet zero expenditure may be a recording error, or represent households with subsidized 
health care or any number of reasons. Another problem of the standard Tobit is that the 
choice to participate in health care demand and the decision about how much to spend are 
determined by the same vector of parameters (β). This implies, for example, that the sign 
of the marginal effect of a given determinant (of health care expenditures) would 
necessarily be similar for the probability of making positive expenditures, and the expected 
amount of expenditures (conditional on positive expenditures being observed).  
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Heckman’s (1979) sample selection model is an adjustment to the Tobit to 
overcome the sample selection bias. This explicitly models the correlation between the 
probability of an outcome and the level of the outcome (Manning et al 1987). The 
assumption for household decision-making about expenditures is that households first 
decide whether to spend or not, and next decide how much to spend. Hence 𝑦𝑖
∗ is a two 
stage decision-making process where in the first stage it is a binary decision and the second 
stage is governed by different set of factors (X2). The error terms in both stages are assumed 
to be correlated hence the errors are dependent.  
 
First stage decision whether to spend (selection equation): 
 
di
∗ =  X1𝑖𝐛 + 𝑢𝑖        2-6 
 
di   = 0 if di
∗ ≤ 0        2-7 
 
di   =  1 if di
∗ > 0        2-8 
 
ui ~ N(0, 1) 
 
 
Second stage decision about how much to spend (primary equation):  
 
yi
∗ =  X2i𝐛 + εi        2-9 
 
yi   =  yi
∗ if yi
∗ > 0        2-10 
 
yi   =  0 if yi
∗ = 0        2-11 
 
εi  ~ N(0, σ  
2)        2-12  
 
and  
 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ( u i εi ) =  𝜌 ≠ 0       2-13  
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where di* is a binary indicator which equal 1 if health care expenditures are 
observed and zero otherwise and the other variables are as described. Probit or logit 
regression estimation for the first stage, with standard OLS 1  (ordinary least squares) 
regression for the second stage is possible. Probit is preferred because it produces estimates 
for marginal effects. Alternately, full information maximum likelihood estimation methods 
(e.g. single-step Heckman model in STATA) involving pooled regressions yield consistent, 
asymptotically efficient estimates for all parameters on condition that the model is correctly 
specified (Manning et al 1987, StataCorp 2011).   
2.3.1 Specification of the empirical models 
The two-stage probit and OLS, as well as a (single-step) full information maximum 
likelihood Heckman selection model are estimated for the purposes of comparison.  The 
probit model is specified as follows: 
 
prob(di) = prob(α+ ∂Ii + βHi + δXi + ϕSi + γZi + 𝑒𝑖 > 0)   2-14    
  
 
where for the ith household: 
di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if health expenditures are observed and 0 
otherwise. 
I𝒊 is a vector of income related variables: household income, food expenditures, 
quintile of welfare 
H𝑖 is a vector of household characteristics: age, gender, education, religion and size 
of household. 
                                                 
 
1 OLS results may be biased if 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ( 𝑢 
𝑖
 𝜀𝑖 ) =  𝜌 ≠ 0 holds.  
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X𝑖 is a vector of household health need indicators: incidence of illness or injury, 
hospitalizations, number of days incapacitated due to illness or injury.  
Si is a vector of indicators for household access to healthcare: health practitioner 
consultations, distance to health facility (time travelled), government-, employer-, or 
private insurance coverage.   
Z𝑖 is a vector of community variables: district health profile (disease burden, health 
care provision), ecological zone, rural urban location. 
𝑒𝒊 are normally distributed errors.  
The second stage is an estimation of the primary equation that determines the levels 
or amount of health care expenditures. The variables include a subset of variables in the 
selection (probability) model, with additional indicators of household income and 
socioeconomic status. The model is as follows: 
 
yi = α + βHi+ ∂Ii + δXi + ϕSi + γZi + 𝑢𝑖     2-15  
  
where for the ith household 𝑦𝒊  is the total amount of household health care 
expenditures which is the sum of payments for medicines and medical supplies, consulting 
fees, travel and inpatient services for all household members, and 𝑢𝒊  are normally 
distributed errors. Definitions of the remaining vectors are as previously described. 
Specifically, equation 2-16 is the estimated selection equation and the definitions for the 
variables are as described in Table 2-3:   
 
prob(di) =
(α+ ∂1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐i+ ∂2𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒i+ ∂3𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑠i+ ∂4𝑑𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑠i + b1𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑖𝑙𝑙i +
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b2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑑i + d1𝑑ℎ_𝑠𝑐ℎi + d2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑i  + d3𝑑ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛i + d4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑑5i +
d5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑑60i + ϕ1𝑙𝑜𝑐2i + 𝑒i > 0)        2-16     
 
Table 2-3: Definition of vectors and variables  
I is a vector of income and affordability related variables selected from: 
lgincomec log of household income 
lgfexpendc log of household food expenditures 
foodshare the share of food in total household expenditures 
quintile an indicator variable for quintile of welfare  
dgovpays an indicator variable for government-, employer-, or health insurance as the main 
financier of household health expenditures  
drelpays an indicator variable for an individual other than household head as the major 
financial of health care expenditures 
𝐇𝑖 is a vector of household health need indicators selected from:  
propill proportion of members ill or injured 
propipd proportion of members hospitalized 
𝐗𝑖  is a vector of household characteristics selected from: 
age years in age of head of household 
ageheadsq the square of age  
gender binary variable indicator for gender of head 
educhh number of the years of school attendance by household head 
dh_sch binary variable indicating if household head has ever attended school 
dh_religion indicator variable of religion of household 
hhsize the number of household members 
Si  indicates access to health facility 
dtravelt binary indicator variable for length of time to health facility exceeding the average 
Z is a vector of community variables selected from: 
loc5 indicator variable of the locality of household’s community of residence in terms 
of five rural, urban and ecological regions 
loc2 binary indicator variable as for rural or urban locality of residence  
𝑒𝑖  are assumed to be normally distributed errors 
  
Similarly, equation 2-17 is the specific estimated second stage decision (primary) 
equation for the determinants of the level of health care expenditures: 
 
𝑙𝑔ℎ𝑒ℎi = α+ ∂1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐i+ ∂2𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑠i+ ∂3𝑑𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑠i + b1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙i +
b2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑑i + d1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐ℎℎi + d2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑i  + d3ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒i + d4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑑5i +
 ϕ1𝑙𝑜𝑐5i+ γ1𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡i + 𝑒i         2-17     
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where for the ith household lgheh is the log of total household health care 
expenditures and the other variables are as described in Table 2-3. Here, slight variations 
to the model, specifically with respect to the income measure variables, are estimated for 
the purposes of comparison and robust results. Hence lgfexpendc, quintile and foodshare 
respectively replace lgincomec in the different iterations of the model. In the developing 
country context, consumption expenditures are more reliable than reported income given 
the challenges of inadequate employment data records, and the likelihood of recall and 
measurement errors.  
The choice of explanatory variables to include is arbitrary but one may not include 
the same set of regressors in each stage because of difficulty in correctly identifying the 
selection parameters (Jones 1992; Yen et al 1996, Newman et al 2003, Okunade et al 2010, 
Nguyen et al 2011). However, it is useful to have some assumptions about the sample 
selection criteria and what variables are most likely to be the sample selectors. Technically, 
sample selectors are confirmed if they are statistically strong and positive in the decision 
equation but are statistically weak in the primary equation. In this study, household age 
indicators (age of head, proportion under age five, and proportion over age 60) are chosen 
apriori as sample selection indicators for two reasons. First, while very young age and very 
old age are expected to be associated with higher level of health need, the cost of health 
care is assumed to be influenced by the severity of illness and the health care provider 
rather than the age of patient. Second, the head of household being the primary financier 
of health care for majority of respondents implies that the head’s preferences dominate the 
decision to spend after controlling for the influence of income and other factors. Age of the 
household head is an indicator of experience (wisdom of age) and the likelihood of having 
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household dependents (by default). Household head being the primary financier of health 
care demand implies that as far as the head is concerned, the ability to pay, hence 
socioeconomic status (rather than the age of the head) is the important determinant of 
amount of expenditures.  
Though price is theoretically a core determinant of demand price is it not explicitly 
modelled in this study. The GLSS expenditures data has been adjusted for general price 
differentials across regions and so we may assume relative prices for health care are 
insignificant in the data as used. In this predominantly out of pocket health care payments 
health system one may consider observed expenditures as a reflection of the level of 
demand for health care hence the empirical analysis in this study views observed household 
health care expenditures as an approximation of the demand for health care. Also, the 
GLSS does not collect data on the quality or quantity of the health services demanded; 
quality differences and intensity of use are not controlled in this study. Given the skewed 
distribution of expenditures and income date in levels (see tables and histogram in 
appendix) log transformations are preferred. The normality assumption required for OLS 
to be best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) assures that the p-values for tests of 
significance will be valid.  
2.3.2 Choice of explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables cover household health needs, socioeconomic, 
demographic and community characteristics. The demographic and socioeconomic 
variables adopted are assumed to be a crude measure of preferences underpinning the 
decision-making about health care demand, the income variables a measure of ability to 
pay and community variables as indicators of the environment as it affects access to health 
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care (Grossman 1972, Wagstaff 1986, Anderson 1999, Okunade et al 2010, Nguyen et al 
2011). Specifically, the explanatory variables for the first stage (probit) analysis are: 
2.3.2.1  Morbidity  
If health care is considered a basic need, or is critical in the case of illness or injury 
then the occurrence of illness or injury is expected to be a significant influence on the 
likelihood that households demand care. Hence propill is the proportion of the household 
members that were reported ill or injured; propipd is the proportion of members that had 
had one or more overnight stays at a health care facility and may indicate a critical level of 
health needs. Being ill or injured is likely to influence the household to seek care, while 
the amount of expenditures may be most likely to be influenced by the care provider who 
decides the treatment. Hence propipd (overnight admissions) is here assumed to capture 
more of the treatment effect and would have a greater influence on health expenditures 
than propill, while propill would have a greater influence on the probability of health care 
expenditures.  
2.3.2.2 Income measures 
The variable incomec is the log of the weighted total nominal household income as 
reported in the GLSS. Similarly, fexpendc is the log of the weighted total nominal 
(including imputed) household expenditures on food as reported in the GLSS. The variable 
foodshare is the share of food in total household expenditures. The food expenditure 
indicators would each be alternated with incomec (to compare results) in the sense that 
income aggregates are suspected to be more prone to recording errors than expenditures 
aggregates. The income data in the GLSS5 has a sizable number of negative observations 
and it not clear whether these are a measure of net debt holdings of the household or a 
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recording error. Alternately, household expenditures data are recorded for each household 
and include imputed values for household production and non-purchased items and 
expenditures on remittances.  The GLSS5 data shows a more complete record for food 
expenditures unlike reported income. Therefore, food expenditures as a ratio of total 
household expenditures (hence consumption expenditures) is the preferred measure of 
household capacity to pay for health care. Food share is treated as an income measure to 
estimate health care expenditures. One would expect that the higher the food share 
(foodshare) the less affordable health care expenditures would be and vice versa, all things 
being equal. Alternately, the amount of food expenditures (fexpendc is the log of the 
weighted total nominal and imputed household expenditures on food) is used as a measure 
of consumption expenditures and hence income. However, using amount of food 
expenditures rather than the share in total expenditures presents more challenges for 
interpreting the results: a higher level of food expenditures may correspond with higher 
income, higher household size, relative prices or any number of reasons. Hence it is not 
certain apriori how to interpret the relationship with health care expenditures. However, 
the evidence from the literature suggests that the responsiveness of the food expenditures 
to health care expenditures is low hence the coefficient on the level of food expenditures 
(fexpendc) is expected to be small, hence inelastic. Thus health expenditures behave as a 
necessity. A positive coefficient suggests that expenditures on health care complement 
food and do not necessarily displace food expenditures.  
Household welfare status as estimated by household consumption and poverty is 
another income measure, an indicator of the likelihood and ability to purchase health care. 
The GLSS5 data reports quintiles of welfare (welfare is measured as the real total 
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household expenditures adjusted for household size by the consumption equivalence scale 
and the poverty line). An indicator, quintile, is a dummy variable for household quintile 
and takes on the value 1 for the lowest and the reference group against which the other 
(successively higher numbered) quintiles are compared.  It is expected that quintile 
captures the poverty level of household and relative affordability of health care. All things 
being equal one would expect quintiles to correlate positively with amount of health care 
expenditures. On the contrary the welfare indicators may be of little significance in the 
decision to spend if health care behaves as a necessity and therefore quintile could be 
expected to be insignificant as a predictor of health care expenditures.  
Who pays for the ‘greatest proportion’ of health care expenses of a household 
member may have significance for total household health care expenditures. The dummy 
variable drelpays takes the value 1 for households that had at least one member for whom 
an individual other than the household head paid the greatest portion of expenses and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variable dgovpays is 1 in the case of one or more members for 
whom government, insurance or employer covers the greatest proportion of expenses, and 
zero otherwise. The results are compared to the reference case of households where the 
head of household is the financier of the ‘greatest proportion’ of health care expenses for 
at least one member. It is expected that the coefficient on dgovpays would have a negative 
sign, and prove statistically significant as a determinant of the amount of expenditures.  
2.3.2.3 Education  
The head of household is expected to have significant influence on household 
health care expenditures especially as majority of respondents to the GLSS5 indicated that 
the head pays ‘the greatest proportion’ of their health care expenses.  The level of education 
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of household head, educhh, is measured as the total years of schooling. Education, as a 
measure of access to health care information (literacy), is here considered a core 
determinant of health care demand. Alternately access to information may be considered 
to influence behaviors that lead to favorable health outcomes. On the one hand better 
information would be expected to vary positively with likelihood to demand care in the 
sense of a higher awareness of health care needs. On the other hand, health outcomes may 
be more favorable hence lower incidence of health needs. The sign of education in the 
probability to demand care is not a priori decided, though it is expected to be positive in 
the amount of health care use and consequently expenditures given the assumption of 
higher awareness in the event of health needs. A confounding factor of years of schooling 
is the probable influence on earnings potential and consequently purchasing power. Higher 
education may imply higher purchasing power and therefore years of schooling is expected 
also to be a positive influence on the actual amount of expenditures. However, in the 
developing country context as in Ghana, years of schooling may not strongly correlate with 
earnings given unemployment rates and the prevalence of informal employment and 
underemployment. For instance, based on the GLSS5 data, similar ratios for employed 
(53%) versus unemployed (47%) occur for household heads who had never been to school 
and those that had some years of schooling: 53% of heads who had had some university 
education had not worked for pay in the two weeks preceding interview.  
2.3.2.4 Age as sample selection indicator 
The indicator agehead represents the age in years of the head and ageheadsq is the 
age square to capture any non-linearity in the influence of age. Age is chosen as a selection 
variable in the sense that the head being a predominant health care financier (in terms of 
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frequency) is more likely to choose to demand care the older she is, with the likelihood of 
more dependents, more years of wisdom, experience and employment, hence income and 
savings, ceteris paribus. In addition, older age may imply depreciating health and higher 
probability of health care use. Similarly, other indicators of household needs are 
representations of the very young or very old: propd5 is the proportion of household 
members that are four years or less in age; propd60 is the proportion aged 60 or more. It is 
expected that infants, toddlers and members closer to death would, in all things being equal, 
have a greater risk of illness or injury, or use of health care (preventive or curative) than 
the general population because of lower immunity. The age distribution of household 
would expectedly influence probability of demand while not directly determining 
affordability and use levels (consequently variations in amount of expenditures) assuming 
that quantity, quality and nominal price of health care is not age discriminatory. Median 
age would have served a similar purpose but it correlates significantly with other regressors 
like household size, while agehead, propd5 and propd60 all correlate strongly with median 
age and much less with household size.   
2.3.2.5 Community indicators 
Analysis is carried out to measure the likelihood of expenditures with respect to 
geographic location. A dummy variable, loc5, indicates rural or urban locality among the 
three ecological zones (Coastal, Forest and Savannah) in Ghana, each spanning a number 
of administrative regions.  For example, the Forest zone holds a significant proportion of 
total population, and would have a higher burden of malaria especially given the physical 
geography more conducive to mosquitoes. It is expected that urban localities would have 
a higher likelihood of health expenditures than rural localities. Given rural-urban patterns 
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in distribution of economic infrastructure such as higher tier health infrastructure and 
transportation networks in favor of urban localities, one would expect urban to have greater 
geographic access to conventional health care.  Chronic illness such as heart diseases and 
hypertension (also associated with nutrition and sedentary lifestyles characteristic of urban) 
are easier diagnosed with greater access to skilled care and so the probability of using 
health care more often is expected to be greater in urban localities. In addition, higher unit 
cost for higher tier health care may result in higher expenditure outlays by urban 
households. As far as transportation costs, mean tests do not indicate statistically 
significant differences across rural and urban localities. The dummy variable, loc5, 
indicates which locality the household belongs to in reference to the omitted reference 
group, Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (GAMA); lo5 takes the value 2 for other urban 
areas, the value 3 for rural Coastal, the value 4 for rural Forest and the value 5 for rural 
Savannah. Accra is relatively better resourced given the largest tertiary health care 
institution, as well as the largest concentration of health care providers and facilities. Hence 
households would have better physical access to care and may spend relatively more than 
other localities, all things being equal.  
 Also access to health care (crudely measured by the length of time spent travelling 
to health facility or provider) is measured by a dummy dtravel which indicates whether the 
average amount of total time travelled by all household members that sought care is greater 
than the average amount of time for those that visited a health facility or provider. It is 
expected that this variable would also capture difficulty in accessing desired health care 
such as trekking longer hours from rural remote locations to access better quality or 
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advanced care; or transportation difficulties, whether inner city or remote locations, 
increasing the cost of reaching otherwise available health providers.  
2.3.2.6 Other variables acting as control 
Socio-demographic characteristics could be important predictors of health 
expenditures, by reflecting constraints, needs or tastes of the household. One may expect 
that expenditures increase with household size and therefore health expenditures would 
tend to be higher for bigger households. Similarly, more members may imply a higher 
probability of ill or injured individuals all things being equal. Another variable included is 
hhsize which measures the number of household members. Expect household size to be a 
significant influence on the probability and as well as the actual amount of expenditures.  
Gender of the head may reflect different probabilities of seeking care and consequently 
demanding health care. Therefore, gendhead2 is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
1 if household head is male and zero otherwise. Gender may reflect differences in economic 
capabilities where male heads generally have higher incomes and a consequently greater 
ability to pay. While male heads may have more earnings and consequently higher 
purchasing power, female heads may be more likely to seek health care, as primary care 
givers of the family. Hence being male is expected to be less significant than the case of 
females in the likelihood of positive expenditures while as a determinant of the actual 
amount of health care expenditures, being male is expected to be more significant. 
Religion may also have an influence in the Ghanaian context given beliefs and 
practices about health; dh_religion is a dummy variable that indicates the religious status 
                                                 
 
2 Omitted group is the households with the head being female 
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of the head of household with Christian as the reference group, compared to traditional 
African religion, Muslim and atheist.  One may expect a higher probability in orthodox 
Christianity associated with ‘Western’ religion which has had a significant history 
(missionary health posts and ‘Western’ medicine) in the development of conventional 
health system in Ghana. Use of conventional (allopathic) care is more likely captured in 
the health expenditures data compared to homeopathic care and spiritualist interventions 
and a lower likelihood of conventional market-based care more associated with other 
religions. Alternately religion may reflect geographical distribution of the population, with 
corresponding differences in patterns alongside infrastructural development such as in 
better resourced urban localities tend to be more Christian, rural localities likely tend to be 
more traditional, and northern localities tend to be more Muslim and have predominantly 
rural localities. These patterns are similarly exhibited in urban enclaves of migrants from 
the north and rural localities. In other words, religion is expected also to capture the 
different socio-cultural factors that influence differences in conventional health demand 
and consequently health expenditures. 
An important observation is that preferences and spending on spiritual healing 
(Christian or otherwise) and other non-conventional or homeopathic health services might 
not be explicitly identified as market-based and therefore not captured in reported health 
expenditures but their influence could be important especially in analyzing catastrophic 
spending. Admittedly the religious status indicator does not adequately capture some of 
these influences that may be important in determining household health expenditures in the 
Ghanaian context.  Household preferences for homeopathic versus allopathic care, 
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including the role of religion would be an interesting study on its own and admittedly 
outside the scope of this study.  
Similarly, one would expect coping strategies for health care and consequent health 
expenditures (especially with implications for catastrophic spending) to be of some 
significance and differentiated alongside sociocultural, economic and other practices (for 
example, mutual help groups be it in microfinance, emergency savings, quid pro quo 
physical care and emotional support groups as in women movement organizations in local 
communities, churches or trades). Also, socio-cultural practices as in home care for the 
sick (as may be captured by the time use patterns of household members) that complement 
or substitute health care expenditures and the consequent health outcomes would be 
important determinants of health spending. While coping strategies are important to the 
discussion about household health expenditures, this area of research is considered for 
further study and is not addressed in this study given the limit of the data and the scope of 
the study.   
2.4 Data and stylized facts 
This study is based on data from the fifth wave of the Ghana Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (GLSS5) conducted from September 1st, 2005 to August 31st, 2006. 
This section is a description of the components of household health care expenditures and 
their relative sizes in the household budget. Typically, four categories of reported 
expenditures on health care are available in the GLSS:  (a) consulting fees (b) travel costs, 
(c) overnight stays hence inpatient services (d) medicines and supplies.  For Each 
household that is surveyed provides information about incidence of illness or injury, health 
care seeking and related expenditures in the two weeks preceding the interview. For each 
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household member information indicates the number of days one had been ill or injured 
and for how many days one had stopped usual activities due to illness or injury. Information 
also indicates whether an individual had consulted a health practitioner, who was consulted 
(e.g., doctor, nurse, chemical seller, traditional healer), for what reason (e.g., illness, injury, 
follow-up, check-up, prenatal), where consultation took place (e.g., hospital, clinic, 
pharmacy, chemical store, consultant’s home) and whether the facility was public or 
private-owned irrespective of whether the individual reported an illness or injury 
(Appendix B provide further details).  For each household member visiting practitioner 
information is available on how much was paid in consulting fees and how much was paid 
for travel to and from the provider or health facility, the distance and length of time 
travelled as well as the length of time spent in consultation. Also, the amount of 
expenditures on medicines or medical supplies for each household member irrespective of 
illness, injury or provider consultation is reported. Consequently, the total health care 
expenditures per household is an aggregation of the health expenditures reported for each 
member of household irrespective of illness status or health facility visit.  
2.4.1 Patterns in morbidity, care-seeking and payments 
The patterns in self-reported health status and health care-seeking indicates closing 
gaps over the years in successive rounds of the living standard surveys, in terms of the 
different household welfare quintiles (household welfare as reported in the GLSS data is 
calculated as total household expenditures weighted by a consumption equivalence scale 
and poverty threshold). As may be seen in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 the gaps in health care 
seeking have improved in the GLSS5 where the proportion of the ill or injured in the lowest 
quintile seeking care (57.5%) is less than four percentage points lower than the proportion 
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form the highest quintile (60.8%) whereas the difference has been twenty-one percentage 
points in 1991/92 and nineteen percentage points in 1998/99. The worst performances in 
reported health status and health seeking rates in 1998/99 might be partly explained by 
cumulative effect of challenges in the health sector reforms and public health care delivery 
stemming from reforms in cost recovery measures and declining public provisioning that 
accompanied economic reforms and structural adjustment programs.  Though the data are 
cross sectional rather than longitudinal and though measurement errors might vary for the 
different survey rounds such that comparability may not be precise it is reasonable to 
suggest that wide disparities in health care provider contacts across different income groups 
may be a factor of smaller significance in health care expenditures analysis with the GLSS5 
(than the case is for the earlier rounds of GLSS).   
The gaps in the rates of self-reported illness or injury in the two weeks preceding 
interview has similarly reduced between quintiles. Here is it observed that rates of illness 
and injury are higher for higher quintiles and vice versa hence and as rates have reduced 
for the highest income group (27.7% in 1991/92, 31.1% in 198/99, 20.2% in 2005/06) 
smaller changes in the rates have occurred for lowest quintile (17% in 1991/92, 22.6% in 
1998/99, 18.7% in 2005/06).  On the contrary, with respect to incapacitation due to illness 
or injury the lowest quintile is the most affected:   61.7% of those reporting an illness or 
injury had had to stop usual activities compared to 59.6% on average in 2005/06 (see Table 
2-5). The number of days incapacitated has similar averages and variations across income 
groups. It is reasonable to assume that on average small disparities occur in morbidity rates 
and health care provider contact rates across income quintiles and this is an important 
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condition to consider in this study where ability to pay for health care is a key factor of 
investigation.  
 
Table 2-4: Illness and care-seeking by quintile of welfare, 1991-2006 
 GLSS3 1991/92  GLSS4 1998/99  GLSS5 2005/06  
Househ
old 
welfare 
Quintile  
Numb
er of 
individ
uals 
Percent 
reporting 
illness or 
injury 
Percen
t of ill 
or 
injured 
seekin
g care 
Numb
er of 
individ
uals 
Percent 
reportin
g illness 
or 
injury 
Percent 
of ill or 
injured 
seeking 
care 
Numb
er of 
indivi
duals 
Percent 
reporting 
illness or 
injury 
Percent 
of ill or 
injured 
seeking 
care 
1 4,038 17.0% 40.6% 5,115 22.6% 35.4% 9,798 18.7% 57.5% 
2 4,036 19.2% 42.6% 5,103 24.6% 37.6% 7,070 19.4% 60.2% 
3 4,014 21.6% 46.0% 5,126 25.4% 40.2% 6,289 21.5% 60.9% 
4 4,035 24.3% 49.5% 5,113 27.2% 46.3% 6,247 20.6% 60.1% 
5 4,037 27.7% 61.5% 5,124 31.1% 54.4% 7,025 20.2% 60.8% 
All 20,160 21.9% 49.3% 25,581 26.2% 43.5% 36,429 19.9% 59.7% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, various rounds. 
 
 
Table 2-5: Indicators of health risk by quintile of welfare, 2005/2006 
Household 
welfare 
quintile 
Individuals who 
stopped usual 
activities as a 
result of illness 
or injury in the 
two weeks 
preceding 
interview (% of 
the ill or injured) 
Average number 
of days had to stop 
usual activities Standard Deviation 
Percent of individuals 
hospitalized in past 
year as a result of 
illness or injury 
1 61.7% 5.0 3.6 4.6% 
2 59.4% 5.4 3.9 4.7% 
3 57.4% 5.5 3.9 4.8% 
4 59.3% 5.6 4.0 5.6% 
5 59.7% 5.6 3.9 5.3% 
All 59.6% 5.4 3.8 5.0% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey V, 2005/06. 
 
 59 
 
The reported total health care expenditures by individuals over the two weeks 
preceding interview ranged between ₵0 and ₵26,400,000 3  for the 36,249 (of 37212) 
individuals for whom data was obtained for the health questionnaire in GLSS5. One 
quickly observes that the data exhibits characteristics typical of health expenditures: highly 
skewed due to a few patients incurring disproportionately high costs relative to the majority 
and point masses (lumpiness) at lower costs due to many zeros and low expenditures (Deihr 
et al 1999; Grisworld et al 2004; Stanton and Rutherford 2005).   
Of the total sample less than 27% made any health care payments in the two weeks 
preceding the interview. Skewness measures at 129.2 compared to the benchmark of 0 for 
a normal distribution and the kurtosis is 21064.3 compared to the benchmark of 3 for a 
normal distribution (StataCorp 2011 and Stata 2013).  While skewness improves when the 
data is truncated at greater than zero health care expenditures health care payments are still 
not normally distributed. The average total is ₵47,023.77 and the median is at ₵13,850, a 
large standard deviation of ₵298,085.6 and a very large variance. A similar distribution 
occurs where the individual expenditures are aggregated into household units (hence 
household health care expenditures). Sixty percent (5218 of 8687) of households have at 
least a member for whom a positive (nonzero) expenditure is recorded.   
Four categories of health care related expenditures based on the GLSS5 data are: 
payments for consultation, payments for travel to and from a health facility or provider, 
payments for overnight admissions at a facility and payments for medicines and medical 
supplies. Payments for medicines and medical supplies form the largest proportion of total 
                                                 
 
3 The Ghana Statistical Service stipulates the exchange rate for GLSS5 (2005-06) as ₵7500 to US $1. 
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health care expenditures as shown in Table 2-6. This may imply that medicines are 
relatively costly, or perhaps, they are used more intensively. Alternately the size may imply 
a popularity of self-prescribed medication whether as an alternative or a complement to 
health practitioner consultations. Spending on medicines and medical supplies is at least 
89% of the health care budget of households that reported no incidence of illness or injury 
and 66% for the households that had an illness or injury episode. In either case rural 
households spent relatively more in proportion on medicines. The average payment by 
individuals per expenditure category indicates, however, that inpatient services (referring 
to persons that made one or more overnight stays at a health facility) are the costliest 
expenditure category which is not surprising. The average is higher if one excludes 
overnight stays for who zero health care payments were reported. Individuals who reported 
making payments for hospitalizations also reported ₵193,838 on average on medicines and 
those reporting zero payments for overnight stays still spent ₵40,642 on medicines. 
Associating medicines and medical supplies with facility visits and inpatients in particular 
is to be expected as theoretically speaking health care providers play key role in the demand 
for health care or demand or health care may be supplier-induced (Zweifel, 1981; 
Polheimer and Ulrich; 1995; Nguyen 2011). Persons that visited a facility or practitioner 
but had no overnight stays (outpatients) paid more on average (₵51,089) than non-visiting 
persons (those that reported no provider or facility visit) which made the least payment (₵ 
21,149) on average for medicines and medical supplies. 
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Table 2-6: Distribution of household health care expenditures 
Service category, 
location and illness 
status Households reporting no illness Households reporting an illness 
 Mean  Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
 Urban households 
Total payments (₵) 61,622.2 183,609.2 136,566.5 726,232.8 
 Percent of total health care expenditures 
Consulting  5 2 7 1 
Inpatient  1 1 21 9 
Medicine 89 4 66 8 
Travel 5 2 6 1 
 Rural households 
Total payments (₵) 28,548.8 84,330.57 89,446.63 185,253.2 
 Percent of total health care expenditures 
Consulting  4 1 10 1 
Inpatient  0 0 11 2 
Medicine 93 2 72 2 
Travel 2 1 7 1 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data.. 
 
When expenditure categories are summarized by location or locality interesting 
patterns emerge. The mean, median and percentile distributions show that payments for 
medicines and supplies are consistently higher in urban locations while average inpatient 
payments are higher in rural locations (. To better compare household health expenditures 
across localities the total expenditures are deflated into 1999 Accra prices as some measure 
to account for medical cost inflation and price differentials. Greater Accra Metropolitan 
Area (GAMA) made the highest per capita expenditures for each category of service and 
exceeds all averages for the total sample while rural Savannah reported the least 
expenditures in each category. These patterns may be due to price differences or intensity 
in use of services or a combination of both. Urban residents are better resourced with 
secondary and tertiary health care facilities.  
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Table 2-7: Health care payments by type of patient and expenditure category 
Variable  Sample size  Mean (old ₵)  Std. Dev.        Maximum 
Persons reporting one or more overnight stays (inpatients) 
Consult                  236         21,718.2                        109,700.3             1,500,000.0  
Transport                  244         20,099.2                           43,826.1                500,000.0  
Inpatient                  233       296,502.2                     1,633,308.0          23,600,000.0  
Medicine                  189       138,739.5                        259,143.7             2,500,000.0  
Inpatients reporting nonzero payments for overnight stays 
Consult                  144         22,274.3                           64,800.5                700,000.0  
Transport                  151         20,455.6                           34,033.8                300,000.0  
Inpatient                  140       493,464.3                     2,086,783.0          23,600,000.0  
Medicine                  121       193,868.3                        303,934.5             2,500,000.0  
Inpatients reporting zero payments for overnight stays 
Consult                    92         20,847.8                        156,452.4             1,500,000.0  
Transport                    93         19,520.4                           56,428.1                500,000.0  
Inpatient                    93                      -     -                               -    
Medicine                    68         40,642.7                           87,926.2                432,000.0  
Persons that visited facility or provider but no overnight stays (outpatients) 
Consult              4,361           7,563.0                           25,508.7                500,000.0  
Transport              4,437           5,482.7                           20,355.4                800,000.0  
Medicine              3,880         51,088.9                        120,115.5             3,000,000.0  
Persons that did not visit a facility or provider (non-visiting) 
Medicine              5,438         21,149.4                           52,455.7                900,000.0  
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
Note: An exchange rate of US$ 1 = ₵7,500 in 2006 prices. 
 
Not surprisingly inpatient services where they occur drive extreme health 
expenditures regardless of rural-urban location or poverty status. Expectedly health shocks 
would have greater consequences for households that are less capable of coping. More than 
60% of hospital stays were three or more nights. The extreme expenditures may therefore 
not be considered a recording error.  But are observed higher health expenditures a good 
reflection of ability to pay? Or are they instead a better reflection of intensity of use of 
service or access to care? And do expenditures reflect household consumption levels and 
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wealth endowments? These questions are of legitimate concern and further analysis using 
multivariate regression models are attempted to provide some answers.  
2.4.2 Summary statistics of regression variables 
The information in Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 give summary statistics of the outcome 
and predictor variables for the regression models.  About two-thirds of households made 
some health care expenditure. On average ₵106,100 was spent by these households. A 
small number of households (0.54%) reported making consultations with health care 
provider or visits to a facility, and some reported overnight admissions yet had zero health 
expenditures. This subset of households compared to households that made some health 
expenditure, has statistically significant higher coverage by government, insurance or 
employer and lower responsibility for expenses by the head at the 1% level. The education 
of the head is statistically significantly lower at the 10% level based on the Student t test 
statistic.  Otherwise all other variables have no statistically significant differences of means 
among these two groups. The means for food expenditure, income, household size, propd5, 
male head as well as urban location are significantly higher for households that made some 
expenditure compared to those that made no expenditure. On the other hand, the 
households that reported no expenditure had significantly lower proportion of 60 or more 
year olds. These differences are all at the 1% level of significance, based on the Student’s 
t test statistic. The means for food expenditure, income, household size, propd5, male head 
as well as urban location are significantly higher for households that made some 
expenditure compared to those that made no expenditure. On the other hand, the 
households that reported no expenditure had significantly lower proportion of 60 or more 
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year olds. These differences are all at the 1% level of significance, based on the Student’s 
t test statistic.  
 
Table 2-8: Summary statistics of household income and health care expenditures 
By 
household 
All Nonzero 
reported health 
care spending 
Zero health care 
expenditure 
reporting 
households 
Zero reported 
health care 
spenders who 
consulted 
provider 
Household 
Sample 
8687 5218 3469 44 
 Me
an SD Mean SD 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 In US$ (nominal) 
Health care 
expenditures 
in two-weeks 
                            
13  
               
40.0  
                            
13.3  
                            
53  
                                
-    
                                
-    
                                
-    
                
-    
Total income 
(annual) 
                      
1,573  
               
2,853  
                      
1,747  
                      
2,933  
                      
1,293  
                      
2,707  
                      
1,333  
                
1,667  
Food 
expenditures 
(annual) 
                      
1,253  
                  
947  
                      
1,373  
                         
987  
                      
1,067  
                         
840  
                      
1,240  
                   
813  
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data.   
Note: The exchange rate for GLSS5 monetary values is US$1 to 7500 old cedis… 
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Table 2-9: Summary statistics of household indicators 
 
All households 
Nonzero health 
care expenditure 
households 
Zero health care 
expenditure 
households 
Zero health care 
expenditure but 
consulted 
provider 
Sample of households 8687 5218 3469 44 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Household size 4.2 2.8 5.0 2.9 3.0 2.3 4.8 3.4 
Proportion ill 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.32 0.33 
Proportion inpatient 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0 0 0.02 0.8 
 Proportion of households by who pays the greatest portion of healthcare 
expenses Household head 0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  
relative 0.2  0.3  0.1  0.2  
Government/employe
r/insurance 
0.7  0.1  0.1  0.4  
 Proportion of household members who are very young or aged 
Proportion <5 years 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.20 
Proportion >59 years 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.28 0.07 0.20 
 Characteristics of head of household 
Gender of the head 
(male) 
 0.7     0.7     0.7      0.7     
Years of schooling 4.1 4.5 4.1 4.5 4.0 4.5 3.2 4.5 
Age in years  45.4 15.6 46.1 14.7 44.3 16.8 45.1 15.9 
Age squared 2300.6 1592.7 2337.9 1512.9 2244.4 1704.5 2281.2 1653.7 
 Proportion of households by locality of residence 
Greater Accra§ 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Other Urban  0.3    0.3    0.3    0.3   
Rural Coastal  0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1   
Rural Forest  0.3    0.3    0.2    0.1   
Rural Savannah  0.2    0.2    0.3    0.4   
 Proportion of households that exceed the average travel time of 2.37hour 
Travel time >2.37-hr 0.1    0.15    0.0    0.2    
  
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data.  
§ Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (GAMA), Ghana’s capital, is the base group. 
 
2.5 Results and discussion 
The empirical analysis in this study is an investigation into the key factors that 
influence a household’s decision to spend on health care and by how much they, with the 
expectation to generate information about the likelihood of catastrophic health spending 
by Ghanaian households. Statistical regression analyses are carried out with the objective 
to identify key determinants of health care expenditures by examining the relative 
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significance of health needs and ability to pay while also accounting for several factors that 
may influence health care utilization such as the demographic, socio-cultural and 
community characteristics of households.  
2.5.1 The predictors and the determinants of household health care expenditures  
A probit model and an OLS model are first estimated to determine the statistically 
significant predictors of health expenditures and the statistically significant determinants 
of the amount of expenditures respectively. Next, the full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML, single-step) Heckman selection model is estimated. A robust standard error version 
of the FIML model is estimated.  Two other robust FIML models are estimated by replacing 
the log of food expenditures with the log of income, and again with the share of food in 
total household expenditures for the purpose of comparison. Results from these estimations 
are summarized in Table 2-10 and Table 2-11.  
The different versions of the health care expenditures model regression produce 
similar results from the regression as demonstrated in Table 2-10and Table 2-11. The 
Heckman full information maximum likelihood (FIML) models each show a statistically 
significant Wald (chi square) test statistic therefore rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
selection (probit) equation and the primary (expenditures) equation are independent. The 
estimate of rho is statistically significant in each case suggesting a significant correlation 
between selection decision equation and health care expenditures equation. The coefficient 
on Lambda is also significant and negative in all cases. These results imply that some 
(unobservable) factors that increase the likelihood that health care expenditures would be 
made also cause a decrease in the amount of overall household health care expenditures 
and vice versa. 
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Table 2-10: Predictors of household decision to spend on health care  
 I II III IV V  VI VII VIII 
 Probit model Heckman FIML selection models 
Coefficients  
 Predicted change 
in probability 
95% confidence 
interval 
Income measure used in the  
primary model  
 Log of income Log of food quintile food share  
Log of income 
log of income 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***  0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)     
          
Welfare indicator (reference group is 
households in the lowest quintile)  
         
2nd quintile -0.076 -0.066 -0.071 -0.073 -0.064  -0.02 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
3rd quintile -0.135** -0.106 -0.113* -0.123* -0.104  -0.03 -0.05 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
4th quintile -0.130* -0.111* -0.120* -0.125* -0.109  -0.03 -0.05 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
5th quintile -0.274*** -0.254*** -0.266*** -0.260*** -0.252***  -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
Illness indicator (reference group is 
households reporting no illness) 
      
   
illness in household 2.356*** 2.366*** 2.363*** 2.364*** 2.363***  0.47 0.45 0.48 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)     
Education indicator (base group has 
head ‘never’ been to school) 
         
head ever been to school -0.008 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.019  0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
gender indicator (reference group has 
female head ) 
         
male head 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.041  0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)     
indicator for locality of residence          
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 I II III IV V  VI VII VIII 
 Probit model Heckman FIML selection models 
Coefficients  
 Predicted change 
in probability 
95% confidence 
interval 
Income measure used in the  
primary model  
 Log of income Log of food quintile food share  
Log of income 
(reference group is urban households) 
rural -0.034 -0.032 -0.034 -0.032 -0.031  -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)     
Indicators for who pays majority of 
health care expenses§  
         
relative pays 0.189*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178***  0.04 0.02 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)     
          
government/employer/insurance pays 0.019 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025  0.00 -0.02 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)     
          
religion indicator (base group has 
Christian head) 
         
traditionalist -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.152**  -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)     
          
moslem -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132***  -0.03 -0.05 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)     
          
other -0.014 -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.038  0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     
          
age in years of head 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***  0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
          
age in years squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
          
proportion under 5years 0.693*** 0.667*** 0.663*** 0.666*** 0.666***  0.14 0.09 0.19 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)     
          
proportion older than 59years -0.305*** -0.315*** -0.308*** -0.312*** -0.313***  -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 
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 I II III IV V  VI VII VIII 
 Probit model Heckman FIML selection models 
Coefficients  
 Predicted change 
in probability 
95% confidence 
interval 
Income measure used in the  
primary model  
 Log of income Log of food quintile food share  
Log of income 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)     
          
_cons -2.936*** -2.878*** -2.903*** -2.919*** -2.926***     
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)     
          
N 8271 8271 8271 8271 8271     
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey V. 
Note: Binary dependent variable dheh=1 if total reported health care expenditure by household is greater than zero; dheh=0 if health care expenditures are 
zero. 
§Households for whom the head pays majority of expenses is the base group that has been omitted. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 2-11: Determinants of household health care expenditures in Ghana 
 I II III IV V 
 OLS Heckman FIML 
Income measure in the 
primary model 
Log of income Log of income Log of food Quintile Food share 
      
log of income 0.046*** 0.033**    
 (0.02)  (0.02)    
Indicators for who pays 
majority of health care 
expenses§ 
     
relative pays 0.089** 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.059 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
government pays -0.118* -0.129* -0.128* -0.130* -0.127* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
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 I II III IV V 
 OLS Heckman FIML 
Income measure in the 
primary model 
Log of income Log of income Log of food Quintile Food share 
proportion ill 1.290*** 0.799*** 0.802*** 0.788*** 0.788*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
      
proportion hospitalized 4.005*** 4.044*** 4.042*** 4.057*** 4.065*** 
 (0.29) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
      
household size 0.142*** 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
years in school of head 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
gender of the head (base is 
female) 
     
male head 0.062 0.057 0.060 0.070 0.067 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
indicator of residence (base  
group is Accra) 
     
Other urban -0.680*** -0.713*** -0.708*** -0.721*** -0.696*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
      
rural coastal -0.597*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.633*** -0.569*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
      
rural forest -0.588*** -0.622*** -0.612*** -0.637*** -0.589*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
      
rural savannah -1.284*** -1.313*** -1.287*** -1.308*** -1.269*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
indicator for travel time 
(base group travelled less 
than average of 2.37 hr) 
     
traveltime ≥2.37 hr 1.217*** 1.190*** 1.184*** 1.187*** 1.184*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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 I II III IV V 
 OLS Heckman FIML 
Income measure in the 
primary model 
Log of income Log of income Log of food Quintile Food share 
      
proportion of members 
under age 5 years 
0.345*** 0.216* 0.219* 0.200 0.223* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
      
log of food expenditures   0.077**   
   (0.03)   
quintile of welfare (base is 
lowest quintile) 
   .  
2nd quintile    0.066  
    (0.06)  
      
3rd quintile    0.146**  
    (0.06)  
      
4rd quintile    0.130**  
    (0.07)  
      
5th quintile    0.071  
    (0.07)  
      
foodshare     -0.361*** 
     (0.13) 
_cons  9.596*** 8.899*** 10.011*** 10.288*** 
  (0.27) (0.48) (0.12) (0.12) 
N 5052 8271 8271 8271 8271 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey V. 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of total health care expenditures by household. 
§Households for whom the head pays majority of expenses is the base group that has been omitted. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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As the results in Table 2-11 indicate the OLS model (which ignores the risk of selection 
into health care participation) tends to overstate the impact of the explanatory variables on 
the overall amount of health care expenditures. The evidence leads to the conclusion that 
Heckman FIML is a robust option to the ordinary least squares in modeling household 
health care expenditures with the GLSS5 data. 
2.5.1.1 Age of household members as sample selection variable  
As indicators of the health expenditures sample selection, age of household head 
and the proportion of members age under five or the proportion age sixty and above 
perform as a sample (households that fall into the group of health care spenders) selector. 
An important expectation of a sample selector is that it significant in the decision equation 
but not significant in the primary (expenditures estimation) model. The coefficient on the 
age of the head is statistically significant and suggests a year older in age results in a 
percentage point change in the probability that a household would spend on health care, 
holding all other variables constant. The coefficient on age squared is zero implying a lack 
of evidence to suggest non linearity in the impact of age of the head. The proportion of 
household members under age 5 similarly has a positive influence on the chances of health 
care expenditures. A unit change in the ratio would increase the probability by 0.14. On 
the contrary the proportion age 60 and over reduces the chances of health care expenditures 
in the sense that when all variables are held constant at their means, a unit increase in this 
proportion reduces the chance of health care spending by 0.07. It is worth noting that 
persons over age 59 are relatively fewer in proportion compared to persons under age 5. 
The median age of the whole sample of 8687 households is 25.6 years, or smaller at 22.4 
years for households that reported (greater than zero) expenditures.   As shown in the 
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proportion of children under 5 (or seniors above age 59) is 0.12 (0.07 for seniors) for health 
spending households but 0.08 (0.12 for seniors) in non health care spending households.  
Even among households that indicated consulting a health care provider but reported zero 
health spending, the proportion of children under age 5 exceeds proportion over age 59. In 
addition, age of the head of household as well as the proportion over age 59 turn out to be 
statistically insignificant determinants of the amount of health care expenditures if included 
in the primary equation (not shown in tables). In contrast proportion under 5 turn out as 
statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.216 meaning a unit increase in the proportion 
leads to a 21.6% increase in health care spending all things being equal. These observations 
lead to the conclusion that the presence of the very young in the household is a strong 
predictor of both the likelihood and a higher amount of health care expenditures whereas 
the importance of an older head of household in predicting health care expenditures is the 
influence in the likelihood of being a parent or guardian of young children. The negative 
effect of the very old is likely a reflection of smaller proportions of the very young and 
consequently a smaller chance of health spending.  
2.5.1.2 Morbidity as the strongest effect on health care expenditures 
As expected household members ill or hospitalized at any time in the two weeks 
preceding interview significantly increased the likelihood that health expenditure would be 
made. The strongest average marginal effect (predicted change in probability) occurs in the 
case of households that reported an illness or injury episode (dummy_ill =1) as shown in 
Table 2-10. For such households the chances of health expenditures increase by 0.47 (with 
a 95% confidence interval of 0.45-0.48), assuming all other variables are held constant. 
Similarly, morbidity has an increasing effect on the amount of health care expenditures as 
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shown in Table 2-11: regardless of which income measure is used a unit change in 
proportion of household members who are ill (propill) or hospitalized (propipd) 
respectively leads to about 80 % or 404% increase in the amount of health care 
expenditures, all things being equal. These results suggest that illness has a significant 
impact on the decision to seek care but treatment or the health care provider (as reflected 
in proportion hospitalized) has the stronger influence on the level of health expenditures 
after the household has made the decision to seek care. It is obvious that hospitalization 
would have a significant impact on amount of expenditures given that it is relatively the 
costliest component of health care expenditures as shown in Table 2-7 and similarly in 
empirical studies elsewhere (Van Doorslaer 2007, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2008).   
Moreover, among expenditure categories, medicines are the most recurring and the greatest 
proportion of health spending regardless of locality or health care seeking behavior, and 
the strongest correlation (0.7) is between medicines and inpatient services (see Table 2-6 
and Appendix B). Considering that over 93% of cases that visited a provider did so for the 
reason of illness or injury () rather than for prenatal services, follow up or check up, the 
GLSS data portrays a fact that for households in Ghana, health care expenditures are 
synonymous with curative services even though the GLSS does not survey direct costs on 
preventive services. In other words, the evidence indicates that household health care 
expenditures are in fulfillment of critical health care needs. Given the critical role of health 
care expenditures, for a given level of health care needs, variations in ability to pay (income 
measures) has significant implications for access to critical health care. Further analysis of 
the responsiveness of household ability to pay (income measures) to health care 
expenditures follows. 
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2.5.1.3 Health care expenditures as a necessity  
The household income measures (log of income, log of food expenditures, quintiles 
of welfare and the share of food in total expenditures) are alternated to compare the 
robustness of the responsiveness of the level of health care expenditures to ability to pay. 
In predicting the decision to spend, however, the log of income as well as quintile (as a 
measure of inequality) is considered important. As previously explained, food expenditures 
(the most significant component of total household expenditures) may be a better measure 
of household consumption than income, but food expenditures are correlated with welfare 
(expenditure) quintiles, hence food expenditures are avoided as a co-regressor with quintile 
in order to minimize the problem of collinearity. Overall, the degree of responsiveness of 
health expenditures to the income measures is small and the evidence suggests also that 
food expenditures complement health care rather than displace health care given the 
positive coefficients. This meets the initial assumption that food and health are basic needs 
and complement each other. The results confirm also that among households in Ghana 
higher income households likely to afford larger food budgets are as likely to afford higher 
health care budgets all things being equal, similar to findings for households in fourteen 
countries in Asia (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). These conclusions about income 
measures are supported by the findings as follows.   
In the simple probit model as well as the robust Heckman full information 
maximum likelihood models, the evidence point to income being significant in the decision 
to spend (see Table 2-10). Specifically, in the FIML with log of income as the measure of 
ability to pay, a percentage increase in income increases the probability of health care 
spending by 0.02 (with a 95% confidence interval of 0.01-0.02) while holding all other 
variables constant. The coefficient on log of income is significant also in the amount of 
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expenditures conditional on positive expenditures (see Table 2-11): a one percent increase 
in income results in a 0.03% increase in health care expenditures. This observation implies 
that health care is a normal good but is income inelastic for households in Ghana given that 
the coefficient which also measures income elasticity is less than. Similarly, food 
expenditures turn out to be statistically significant as a determinant of the amount of health 
care spending. The coefficient on log of food expenditures (lgfexpendc) is positive, at 0.08. 
Using the ratio of food expenditures to total household expenditures (foodshare) as the 
measure of income similarly produces a significant but negative coefficient of -0.36 (see 
Table 2-11). The negative sign is to be expected as health care expenditures are defined in 
the non-food expenditures component of total household expenditures. However, the 
statistically significant negative influence on amount of health care spending reveals 
another dimension of the responsiveness of food expenditures meaning while food 
expenditures are increasing in health care spending it may not be concluded as welfare 
improving in the sense that higher food shares signals lower ability to afford health care 
expenditures or vice versa.  Alternately the results may lead to the conclusion that low 
income households are likely to have larger food shares according to Engel’s law (1857 as 
cited in Anker 2011) would have lower disposable incomes, therefore spend lower amounts 
on health care. What the results do not show is whether health care or food expenditures 
are more income inelastic, in other words, at which threshold of critical (curative) health 
care health care expenditures needs do displace food expenditures. What is evident is that 
among households in Ghana, food share is a good indicator of ability to afford health care 
and households with higher shares are the most likely vulnerable to health shocks.  
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Interestingly a household being in the upper quintiles of welfare would have a lower 
probability of spending on health care compared to the lowest quintile as shown in Table 
2-10. The difference is more pronounced for the upper quintile of welfare: the predicted 
probability is 0.06 lower (in the FIML model with log of income in the primary equation). 
The probability is 0.03 lower for the fourth quintile in reference to the lowest quintile. 
Looking at the results in Table 2-10, the evidence indicates no difference in probability for 
the lowest and second quintile (as well as the third quintile in the simple probit model or 
the FIML model where log of income or food share is the income measure). With respect 
to the amount of expenditures, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
amount of health care expenditures by a household in the lowest quintile and a household 
of similar characteristics in the highest. The same observation could be made between the 
lowest and second lowest quintile, but a similar household in the third or fourth quintile 
respectively has spent 15% or 13% more on health care expenditures than the lowest 
quintile, all things held constant. This observation is consistent with the probability results 
indicating a statistically strong decrease in the chances of health care spending by the 
highest quintile in comparison to the lowest quintile (see Table 2-10). But what may 
explain this observation? One explanation would be that the incidence of illness and injury, 
therefore critical health care needs, may be lower for higher quintiles. The summary 
statistics in Table 2-4 show that higher quintiles have higher rates of self-reported illness 
or injury and consultations with health care provider. As could be seen in Table 2-5 there 
are similar rates of health risk as measured by hospitalizations in past twelve months.  A 
plausible explanation would be that households in the upper quintile have significantly 
higher government or employer support than the case is for the lowest quintile. While this 
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difference is not directly observed in the regression results, summary statistics indicate that 
3% of households in the lowest quintile had such support compared to 9%, 8.4% and 7% 
of households in the third, fourth and fifth quintile respectively as demonstrated in 
Appendix B.   
Who pays the greatest proportion of health care expenditures has influence on both 
the probability of expenditures and the level of expenditures. The probability is higher 
(0.04 more) when an individual other than the household head, employer, government or 
insurance is the financier of the greatest majority of health care expenditures, assuming all 
other variables are held constant. As one would expect, however, the level of health care 
expenditures is smaller only in the case where government/employer/insurance is the 
financier of the greatest proportion of the expenses. Evidently government, insurance or 
employer coverage has significant impact on the expenditures burden on households. This 
observation suggests household out of pocket health care expenditures burden would 
improve in the context of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana. Hence an 
analysis of subsequent survey data (following the GLSS5) should expectedly indicate a 
larger coefficient on the government /insurance/employer indicator variable in 
confirmation.  
2.5.1.4 Education as a socioeconomic indicator but not a deciding factor 
The evidence may support the theory that education is a key determinant of health 
care demand through its influence on ability to access or use information. Years of 
schooling of the household head is of statistically weak influence in the likelihood of a 
household demanding health care but a strong determinant of the level of demand once the 
decision is made. There is no difference in the chances of health care spending whether 
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household head has ever been to school or not (dh_sch). Concerning the amount of 
expenditures, however, the number of years of schooling has an increasing effect. The 
results are the same regardless of which multi-stage model or income measure is used (see 
Table 2-11).   Each additional year of schooling increases the predicted average health care 
expenditures of the household by 1.9% when all other variables are held constant. One 
explanation could be education does increase enabling factors of the household such as in 
having better networks or knowledge about the health care system to gain easier access in 
the event of need.  Alternately higher educated households tend to use health care more 
intensely, or use higher tier care, which might then correspond to higher expenditures. 
Households may have peculiar characteristics in years of schooling affecting health care 
demand:  for instance better access to information and opportunities to seek timely care, or 
to adopt healthy lifestyles, or to produce health care within the household or a combination 
of these reasons. This is plausible because the data indicates that the average proportion of 
members that reported illness or injury was 0.54 in the case of household head having no 
formal education, but 0.11 for households whose head had some formal education. In 
contrast, one may not conclude (in the case of households in Ghana) that the influence of 
education is a reflection of differences in ability to pay. This is because the years of 
schooling do not strongly correlate with the income indicators, and this condition in itself 
is an advantage in minimizing collinearity between the regressors. Moreover, as previously 
indicated, there are similar ratios for employed (53%) versus unemployed (47%) household 
heads who had never been to school and those that had some years of schooling. For 
example, 53% of heads who had had some university education had not worked for income 
in the two weeks preceding interview.  
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2.5.1.5 Travel time and residence as important indicators  
While information on time travelled to visit a health care facility or provider would 
involve a subset of health care users and therefore reflect a higher likelihood and amount 
of expenditures, the time factor may also be considered as an indicator of the differences 
in the ease of access to health facility or provider of choice. Even considering transportation 
costs alone, one may still expect health care to be costlier the longer the time travelled 
therefore households that have a longer than the average 2.37-hour travel time are 
associated with more expensive care. The simple probit regression results meet this 
expectation: time travelled exceeding the average perfectly predicts success, hence dropped 
from the selection equation. In all versions of the health expenditures equation as shown in 
Table 2-11 time travelled exceeding the average has strong statistical significance. In the 
robust log of income measure equation for instance, the average health care expenditure of 
a household that collectively has a higher than average time travelled is 119% more than 
the case of an otherwise comparable household. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
average time travelled significantly varies across locality of residence based on a Wilks’ 
lambda F-test F value of 2.53 (upper and lower degrees of freedom 4 and 8682 respectively) 
which fails to reject the null hypothesis that the average time travelled is equal among all 
five localities at 5% level of significance. A similar test fails to reject the hypothesis that 
average time travelled varies across quintile groups, based on an F value of 3.85. The 
implication then is, for whatever reason time travelled may be longer than average, the data 
does not indicate a pattern that varies by locality of residence or the income status of a 
household.  In that case the influence of proximity to health care (in terms of time needed 
to reach provider) on household health care expenditures could be assumed to be similar 
across localities for otherwise comparable households that visited a health care provider. 
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What the analysis shows is that, with other variables held constant, health expenditures are 
significantly higher for households that spent longer than average time travelling to consult 
a provider and this observation may not necessarily be a rural or urban, rich or poor 
household phenomenon. However, locality of residence has significant effect on the level 
of household health care expenditures as further discussed.    
Being in an urban locality does not improve the chance of household spending on 
health care: as shown in Table 2-10 the difference in predicted probability is not significant 
and results are the same regardless of which model is used. However, once the decision is 
made to spend on health care, the amount of expenditures is significantly lower for all 
localities compared to Accra. As shown in Table 2-11 the greatest difference occurs with 
the rural Savannah zone where average expenditures are 131% less than that of an 
otherwise comparable household (results from the robust FIML with log of income 
measure). 
2.5.1.6 Influence of the social and demographic characteristics of the household 
The size of household is a significant determinant of the amount of expenditures 
with: one additional member increases average household health care expenditures by 12% 
holding other variables constant. The coefficient on gender of the head of household is not 
statistically: holding all other variables constant, there is neither a significant difference in 
the likelihood nor the amount of health care expenditures between male headed and female 
headed households. However, a test on the equality of means indicates households for 
whom health care expenditure have been reported have a significantly higher proportion of 
male heads than households that have zero health care expenditures. On the contrary there 
is lack of evidence to suggest a difference between the gender proportion (of household 
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heads) of non-paying households (visited a health care provider but reported zero health 
care expenditures) and that of households that reported health care expenditures. While 
previous studies have indicated that being female is associated with a higher likelihood of 
seeking health care (Nketiah et al 2009, Burgiavinni and Pace 2011) the analysis here does 
not indicate a difference in expenditures. The explanation may be that such studies had 
more focus on child health and had more equal proportion of males and females in the 
sample. The analysis in this study is not specific to a type of health care or a subset of the 
population but to the household in general, and the influence of gender is gauged in terms 
of the household head, in which group females are a small (20%) minority. What the results 
show is that, when the set of socioeconomic and demographic and community indicators 
used in this study are taken into account, the gender of the head of household makes no 
difference in household health care expenditures in Ghana.   
Religion has the expected influence; holding all other variables constant, a 
traditionalist or Muslim household is less likely than a Christian household to spend on 
health care.  Religion could be a reflection of lifestyle choices or social networks that 
influence the decision to use formal health care in Ghana. Private non-profit (quasi public) 
health facilities form the second largest provider of health care in Ghana (see table in 
appendix) and these facilities have strong religious affiliations or originated as missionary 
posts. Religion may also be reflecting patterns in geographic distribution of health care and 
therefore access to care, and may be reflecting poverty distribution as well. Observe that 
Christian is the majority in southern regions (74% Christian household heads) which also 
have a higher concentration of health care facilities, northern regions are dominantly 
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Moslem (32%) and Traditionalist (42%) and have also higher concentrations of rural 
(82.67% versus 51.53% southern) or poor (61.29% versus 14.63% southern) households.   
2.6 Incidence of catastrophic health care expenditures  
In this section, estimates of the proportion of households that potentially face 
catastrophic expenditures are calculated in terms of ability to pay for the reported health 
care expenditures measured in terms of household consumption expenditures. A further 
analysis is made to describe the key determinants of catastrophic payments and their 
incidence across location and income groups.  Analysis of the determinants of household 
health care expenditures suggest they are responsive to health needs but less to income 
measures except in terms of relative income as estimated by the share of food expenditures. 
Some of the variations in household health care expenditures may be due to relative prices 
or intensity in the use of services although these factors are not directly observable in the 
data and have not been analyzed in this study. While it is not explicit which of intensity in 
use of services or price differentials is the stronger factor in expenditure levels, this 
distinction is fortunately of little relevance in regards to investigating observed health care 
expenditures and their implications for household ability to cope. Ability to pay is 
essentially an assessment of the catastrophic potential of health shocks on households 
particularly when health insurance or safety nets are weak. One would agree that to the 
extent that health expenditures are nondiscretionary the potential exists to plunge 
households in at least transitory poverty even for those that have ability to cope over time. 
Further analysis of the data is done to compare the relative ability to pay for the reported 
health care expenditures in terms of total household consumption expenditures.  
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In the literature catastrophic health spending describes the scenario where a 
household must reduce its basic expenditure over a period of time in order to cope with 
health costs. The threshold is set as a share of total income (or consumption expenditures 
where income data is less accurate such as in the developing country context). This is based 
on the assumption that households should have some minimum consumption level and 
therefore health expenditures that potentially reduce this consumption level are 
catastrophic in the sense that they plunge households into poverty or make existing poverty 
worse. The threshold is somehow arbitrary since no standard has as yet been developed in 
the literature for setting the catastrophic threshold. Some have labelled 10% or more of 
consumption expenditures as catastrophic (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003), others have 
suggested 40% is conservative enough (Xu et al 2003) while others have varied thresholds 
from 25% to 40% for theoretical analysis (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2008).  
Alternatively, a cross sectional study of over 68 advanced and low income countries 
suggests that economies would have to have 15% or lower share of private spending in 
total health care spending to reduce chances of catastrophic health spending by households 
(Xu et al 2003). Catastrophic health spending may be synonymous with household 
vulnerability to economic shocks. Vulnerability to shocks has several dimensions: (1) 
ability to cope with shocks when they happen; (2) exposure to shocks (e.g. poor households 
may be exposed to more shocks than rich ones); and (3) frequency and magnitude of 
shocks. Ability to cope may be estimated as the ability to pay for the cost of health care 
while exposure to shocks looks at the likelihood of tipping over into poverty or going 
deeper into poverty and the frequency and magnitude of shock would include a 
combination of the illness incidence and the recovery rate from the costs involved. This 
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study focuses on the ability to cope with health shocks in terms of the proportion of health 
care expenditures in total household consumption expenditures, in other words disposable 
income. Expenditures data are preferred since they tend to be more reliable than income 
data in the developing country context (Xu et al 2003). 
However, the reported health care expenditures cover the two week preceding 
interview. The measures of ability to pay are similarly scaled to the two week (adult 
equivalence scale weighted) consumption expenditures of the household. The noted caveat 
is that health care expenditures are more random than consumption expenditures and that 
a smoothed out consumption expenditures (over two weeks) are theoretically not 
comparable with health expenditures that randomly occur over the same period. The 
emphasis here is that these expenditures are hypothetical estimates of what a household 
could afford in health care assuming resources were fixed in the short term, given the real 
risk of a health shock. Also, in respect of ability to pay and therefore out of pocket 
payments at the point of service, the cases where government, employer or insurance is 
responsible for the greatest proportion of household health care expenditures are excluded 
from the estimate of total household health care spending for want of a correct weight.  
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures is estimated as a headcount of 
households who fall below a calculated threshold (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2008, Xu 
et al 2011). The household is the focus of analysis in this study therefore household 
expenditures are simply an aggregate of reported health care expenditures for each 
member. As noted by Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2008) this approach obscures the 
distribution of catastrophic payments experienced by individual members. This study 
makes a simplifying assumption that income transfers are made across household members 
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to absorb health expenditures. This assumption may pass in the context of the Ghanaian 
household if one assumes that as in meal sharing and lodging financial bonds are as strong 
in health care spending although member composition typically extends beyond the nuclear 
family. Another caveat in this study is that over the long term health expenditures coping 
mechanisms may be different than the short term; the household may liquidate or build 
wealth to cover health expenditures, or deplete resources and worsen ability to cope, for a 
given health shock. As such a snapshot (as in cross section data) ignores long term ability 
to cope but at least, transitory hardship is assumed by catastrophic measures in this study.   
Following Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2008), two measures of ability to cope are 
adopted for this study. First, the ratio of health care to total household consumption 
expenditures. Second is the ratio of health care to total non-food expenditures. The total 
household consumption expenditure estimates are gross of total health care payments, 
hence prepayment expenditures. Two thresholds are chosen for the purpose of comparison: 
25% and 35% of total household consumption expenditures gross of health care payments 
is used as a measure for catastrophe.  As a measure of ability to pay, 65% and 85% of total 
consumption expenditures gross of health care expenditures but net of food expenditures 
(as proxy for capacity to pay income) are compared.  Although the thresholds are arbitrary 
the choice was informed by the average share of food and non-food in total consumption 
expenditures as illustrated in see Table 2-12. Unlike health care expenditures food 
expenditures show a normal distribution; the distributions are similar across quintiles of 
welfare or localities. Given the average food share of 60% and 57% for GLSS4 and GLSS5 
respectively, a share of 35% for health expenditures would imply more than half the 
equivalent of subsistence expenditures and almost all nonfood expenditures. A similar 
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reasoning governed the choice of 85% of non-food expenditures as the ability to pay 
measure. The lower thresholds are chosen for comparative analysis.  
 
Table 2-12: Household food and non-food expenditures ratios 
 1998-99 (GLSS4) 2005-06 (GLSS5) 
 Food Housing Other Food Housing Other 
Mean 0.60 0.03 0.37 0.57 0.03 0.35 
Median  0.62 0.02 0.54 0.58 0.02 0.34 
SD 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.14 
Source: Calculations based on data from the fourth and fifth rounds of the Ghana Living Standards 
Surveys.  
 
One may consider also that information on indirect costs such as loss of labor 
income, cost of special foods and lifestyle changes due to health care seeking are not 
provided in the survey therefore these thresholds could be an underestimation of 
catastrophic health costs. A measure for the extent to which catastrophic expenditures 
overshoot the threshold is also derived, hence a measure of the excess gap (Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer 2008). The catastrophic overshoot, Oi, is measured as the distance by which 
household i exceeds the threshold. Suppose Si represents the expenditures share for 
household i and T represents the catastrophic threshold. Then catastrophic overshoot for 
household i, is as follows:  
 
 𝑂𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 − 𝑇 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒      2-18  
 
This is a measure of the catastrophic payment gap (analogous to the poverty gap in 
the poverty literature). This gap is summed up and divided over all households that 
demanded health care, hence to get the mean excess gap, Ge, as follows:  
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𝐺𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑂𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝜇𝑜            2-19 
 
where 𝜇𝑜 is the mean of the overshoot, hence the overall mean catastrophic gap.   
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures is calculated as the proportion of the 
population that fall above the threshold.  The catastrophic head count, Ch, of the population 
is as follows:  
 
𝐶ℎ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑢𝑒 
𝑁
𝑖=1           2-20 
 
where Ei = 1 if Si>0, and 0 otherwise and 𝑢𝑒 is the average of Ei across the sample.  
The average catastrophic gap among only the households with a positive gap, the 
mean positive gap GH is therefore: 
𝐺𝐻 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑂𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐸𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝜇𝑜
𝑢𝑒
         2-21 
 
2.6.1 Patterns in the incidence of catastrophic household health spending in Ghana 
Results of the catastrophic measures for both GLSS4 (1998-99) and GLSS5 (2005-
06) are presented in : Table 2-15 and Table 2-16.  A higher threshold results a lower 
incidence, mean excess gap and mean positive gap across each quintile of welfare but 
incidence remains concentrated among the lowest welfare quintiles even when the 
threshold is raised. Incidence consistently increases with a decrease in welfare status; the 
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highest quintile has the lowest incidence on average while the worse offs consistently show 
the highest rate of incidence for each year at every threshold level.  
The mean catastrophic headcount is lower in 2005-06 (16.69%) than in 1998-99 
(18.31%) at the threshold of 25% share of total expenditures. Overall, the incidence 
increases for 2005-06 at the threshold of 35%. However, the reduction in incidence is due 
to the lower headcount in the top three quintiles of welfare while incidence rates worsen in 
the two lowest quintiles. In 2005-06 28.9% health care expenditures of some 28.9% of 
households in the lowest quintile exceeded 25% of their two-week equivalent total 
expenditures gross of food; for some 22.72% of households, health expenditures exceeded 
35%. At the threshold of 65% and again 85% of non-food expenditures the incidence of 
catastrophic health expenditures is higher in 2005-06 compared to 1998-88 for all quintiles 
of welfare. Again lower quintiles are the worse off with as many as 32% of households 
spending more than 65% the equivalent of two-week non-food expenditures on health care 
alone. Even at the higher threshold of 85% more than 24% of the lowest quintile is affected. 
Generally, the incidence rates are higher in terms of non-food expenditures than in terms 
of total expenditures, and differences in incidence rates between quintiles are smaller. The 
incidence rates are dismal if one considers the share of non-food expenditures. While health 
expenditures may be a smaller proportion of household total expenditures for higher 
welfare quintiles, in terms of the capacity to pay, a greater proportion do fall short.  In 
2005-06 the average food expenditures share is relatively lower (55%) than in 1998-99 
(60%) yet 65% to 85% of non food expenditures are not enough to cover health 
expenditures for a greater proportion of households. Relative demand for health care may 
have increased, perhaps because health care is more accessible, or that the need or desire 
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for health care has increased.  Alternately the relative prices of health care have increased 
hence a greater share of the household non-food budget.  
The extent to which households exceed the catastrophic thresholds is observed in 
the gap measures. Not surprisingly the overshoot of expenditures above the threshold is 
steeper among poorer households. Mean positive gap estimates indicate that households 
that exceeded the 25% threshold did so to the extent of 147% (over the threshold) of two-
week equivalent non-food expenditures in 2005-06. The mean positive gap increases from 
1998-99 to 2005-06 at both 65% and 85% thresholds and for every quintile except for the 
poorest quintile. An explanation may be that the poorest are simply not able to afford more 
health care and can no longer exceed their thresholds any farther.   
2.6.2 Predicting catastrophic household health spending 
What these catastrophic ratios indicate is the real risk for households that are unable 
to adjust to short term health care expenditures. At the given expenditure shares higher 
mean positive gaps imply a greater potential for catastrophic expenditures where health 
care needs or health care demand extend to the longer term. One would agree that such 
factors as recurring morbidity (as in chronic illness) and the intensity of morbidity (as in 
hospitalizations) for a given expenditures level would have greater risk for catastrophic 
expenditures. The following probit model is estimated to relate the incidence of illness 
(measured by proportion of household members that are ill), income and location to the 
probability for catastrophic payments:  
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑐2𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖+𝑒𝑖 > 0)   2-22  
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where for the ith household: catai is a categorical variable which takes on value 1 
if the share of total health expenditures exceeded a threshold of 25% of total expenditures 
gross of food and 0 otherwise, loc2i is a categorical variable for location of household and 
equals 1 if rural and 0 if urban, daysilli is the number of ill days of all household members 
that reported illness or injury, incomei is the household total nominal income reported, and 
ei are normally distributed errors. 
The results are presented in Table 2-13. Being in a rural locality increases the 
probability that a household has catastrophic health expenditures by 0.024 over the case of 
the urban household when all other factors are held constant. The size of household income 
is of no significance to the probability of making catastrophic health expenditures. As 
expected illness has an impact on the incidence of catastrophic payments. A unit increase 
in the total number of ill person days in the household increases the probability of 
catastrophic expenditures by 0.009.   
 
Table 2-13: Probability of catastrophic household health care expenditures, GLSS5 
 Estimated coefficient 
Predicted increase in the 
probability 
p-value 
    
loc2 (base group is urban) 0.107** 0.024 0.018 
daysill  0.041*** 0.009 0 
income 0.000 0.000 0 
constant -1.370***  0 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
Note: Dependent binary indicator variable = 1 if household catastrophic health expenditures. 
N = 5, 249. 
**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.   
 
A second model is estimated to control for differences in welfare or poverty status 
and consequently location given that rural locations have greater proportions of households 
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in the lower welfare quintiles and vice versa for urban locations. This model looks at the 
intensity of morbidity and the share of food expenditures as determinants of the probability 
of a household making catastrophic expenditures. The probit model is as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖+𝑒𝑖 > 0)          2-23 
 
where for household i:catai is a binary variable which takes on value 1 if the share 
of total health expenditures exceeded a threshold of 25% of total expenditures gross of food 
and zero otherwise, ipdaysi measures the total number of inpatient days reported for all 
affected household members, and foodexpi is the share of food in total household 
expenditures.  Separate estimations are here made for each quintile of welfare as a way to 
account for differences in income; Table 2-14 contains the results. The probability that a 
household incurs catastrophic health expenditures increases in the number of days of 
hospitalizations, holding all other factors fixed. The predicted increase is greatest at 0.116 
for the worst of households and decreases successively for the better offs up to a low of 
0.020 for the highest quintile group, all statistically significant at the 1% level.  The share 
of food is not statistically significant at the 5% level for quintiles two, three and four 
although the coefficient on food has a negative sign for quintile two as it is for quintile 1. 
At the 1% level of significance the probability that a household in the lowest quintile of 
welfare would make catastrophic health expenditures decreases with the share of food in 
total expenditures whereas the probability increases for households in the highest quintile, 
at the five percent significance level. A possible explanation is that the poorest households 
have had to shift expenditures from food to health even in the short term. The better offs 
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on the other hand appear to be able to meet both catastrophic health expenditures and food 
expenditures. In other words, the two types of expenditures are not substitutes or do not 
compete against each other. Clearly the poorest households experience more challenges in 
meeting both their food and health care needs. For the middle households spending on food 
is not related to catastrophic expenditures.  
Once could conclude therefore that household health care expenditures are 
nondiscretionary and regressive. Possibly, health care subsidies are not effectively being 
targeted to households with the least capacity to pay. The relatively low levels and mean 
differences of consulting fees observed across different locations (akin to welfare quintiles) 
and type of health service is an example of such evidence that uniform subsidies may have 
been applied in the case of consulting fees. The incidence of hospitalization and the 
consequent higher health care payments, on the other hand, have significant influence in 
the likelihood that a household makes catastrophic expenditures regardless of their welfare 
status. An effective approach to reducing catastrophic health expenditures would involve 
better coverage for hospital facilities, especially on medicines and supplies. Even in the 
present era of implementing a National Health Insurance Scheme towards attaining 
universal access in Ghana, the implementation, logistical as well as quality of care 
challenges, out of pocket payments especially on medicines and supplies have been little 
reduced. Policies that would reduce the risk for catastrophic expenditures necessarily have 
to be discriminatory in targeting the types of health care and households with the least 
capacity to pay out of pocket.   
 
  
9
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Table 2-14: Likelihood of catastrophic health spending, by welfare quintile 
 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 
Predicted 
increase in  
probability 
p-value 
Predicted 
increase in 
probability 
p-value 
Predicted 
increase in  
probability 
p-value 
Predicted 
increase in 
probability 
p-value 
Predicted 
increase in 
probability 
p-value 
ipdays 0.116*** 0.000 0.070*** 0.000 0.051*** 0.000 0.050*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.000 
Food share -0.319*** 0.002 -0.096 0.264 0.20 0.795 0.031 0.639 0.080** 0.043 
N 986 978 981 1064 1240 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.064 0.048 0.057 0.066 
Log 
likelihood 
-552.360 -464.920 -402.870 -394.330 -287.110 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
**P<0.05  ***P<0.01.   
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Table 2-15: Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures in percent of total household expenditures 
 1998/1999 GLSS4 2005/2006 GLSS5 
 Incidence Excess gap 
 
Mean 
positive gap Incidence Excess gap 
 
Mean 
positive gap 
Threshold level (% total 
household expenditures) 25 35 25 35 25 35 25 35 25 35 25 35 
Welfare quintiles 
Percent of 
households 
exceeding the 
threshold 
Health care spending in excess of 
the threshold (%) 
Percent of 
households 
exceeding the 
threshold 
Health care spending in excess of the 
threshold (%)           
1 28.35 20.70 19.02 16.58 67.09 80.12 28.90 22.72 17.84 15.28 61.73 67.24 
2 18.64 14.53 7.62 6.03 40.88 41.52 20.55 14.11 8.91 7.19 43.33 50.95 
3 19.71 13.10 9.79 8.19 49.69 62.57 15.49 10.81 8.24 6.94 53.17 64.27 
4 16.29 11.18 5.94 4.57 36.46 40.92 13.35 7.89 4.57 3.53 34.27 44.77 
5 14.06 8.50 5.19 4.11 36.93 48.39 6.77 4.35 2.67 2.10 39.37 48.21 
All 18.31 12.57 8.54 7.03 46.63 55.92 16.46 11.55 8.11 6.72 49.27 58.20 
Source: Calculations based on data from GLSS4 and GLSS5.  
 
 
  
9
6
 
 
 
Table 2-16:  Incidence of catastrophic health care spending in percent of non-food expenditures  
 1998-99 (GLSS4) 2005-06 (GLSS5) 
 Incidence Excess gap 
 
Mean positive 
gap Incidence Excess gap 
Mean positive 
gap 
Threshold level (% non-food 
expenditures) 65 85 65 85 65 85 65 85 65 85 65 85 
Welfare quintile 
 
Percent of 
households 
exceeding 
threshold 
Health care expenditures in excess 
of the threshold (%) 
Percent of 
households 
exceeding 
threshold 
Health care spending in excess of the 
threshold (%) 
1 30.63 24.95 17.84 15.28 198.30 232.39 32.00 24.87 63.46 57.80 184.34 203.99 
2 20.55 16.36 8.91 7.19 112.62 123.50 22.59 17.38 25.44 21.46 139.90 153.33 
3 16.62 13.05 8.24 6.94 157.82 181.59 20.77 16.01 32.78 29.06 133.81 148.52 
4 12.69 9.12 4.57 3.53 119.52 132.28 17.72 13.67 21.18 18.09 103.45 119.72 
5 6.45 4.67 2.67 2.10 115.70 130.72 14.06 10.56 16.27 13.81 130.05 157.28 
All 16.78 13.12 8.11 6.72 142.79 163.00 19.93 15.31 28.46 24.95 147.55 166.14 
Source: Calculations based on data from GLSS4 and GLSS5. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Results from the empirical analysis indicate that morbidity and the severity of it are 
significant determinants of the likelihood and as well the amount of household health care 
expenditures.  Health care behaves as a necessity given the low degree of responsiveness 
of total household health care expenditures to total household income in a two-week period. 
The results suggest that health care and consumption expenditures do not behave as 
substitutes. However, consumption (food) expenditures are more responsive than total 
income, indicating that affordability is important. It is noteworthy that health care is 
responsive to ability to pay given the positive sign on the coefficient of the income 
measures. This is buttressed by the observation that food share responds negatively to 
health care expenditures. Therefore, the initial assumption that income status is a 
significant determinant of amount of out of pocket health care expenditures is substantiated 
by the empirical analysis.  
The small but positive elasticity of health care spending with respect to food 
expenditures indicates that health care expenditures by households in Ghana are 
nondiscretionary and that health expenditures and food expenditures do not behave as 
substitutes. Health expenditures being nondiscretionary is supported also by the 
statistically stronger impact of health needs and the relatively weak impact of household 
characteristics as education and gender of head of household on the probability of health 
care expenditures. Years of schooling have a positive effect on health care expenditures, 
and so does being a male head correspond to a higher amount of expenditures than the case 
of the female headed household. Hence while health care is non discretionary the extent of 
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demand (as measured by the volume of expenditures) is driven by socioeconomic status of 
households.  
The non discretionary nature of health care expenditures is also supported by the 
fact that the likelihood and amount of expenditures do not vary with welfare quintile with 
exception of the middle quintiles that have higher expenditures than the lowest quintile. 
Health care needs are indeed a strong determinant of both the likelihood and the amount of 
expenditures, with the amount of expenditures more responsive to the severity of need and 
provider influence (as measured in the proportion of inpatient days). Moreover, the ease of 
access to health care facility or provider as measured by the time travelled indicates that 
household health care expenditures are significantly more the longer (than average) the 
time travelled. This observation does emphasize the role that health care provider 
influences amount of expenditures given that time travelled as well reflects households that 
sought care from a provider or facility. The strong significance of time travelled as a 
determinant of both probability and amount of expenditures indicates also that households 
that have longer travel times are most likely to be the farther from health care but in greater 
need of it.  
Locality is important and suggests, yet again in support, that while health care needs 
may be nondiscretionary, access to care is a strong determinant of the amount of 
expenditures: being in a locality outside Greater Accra has no difference in the probability 
of making expenditures (except in the case of relatively significant lower probability in the 
rural Savannah which is arguably the least resourced compared to Accra) whereas all 
localities outside Accra show significant lower amounts of expenditures.  Accra having a 
higher concentration of the nation’s health infrastructure and resources is arguably different 
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in structure of health care supply and consequently demand and may not be directly 
compared to other localities. A similar argument may be made in comparing health 
expenditures in rural and urban localities without direct controls for differences in health 
care supply, a caveat in this study. Nonetheless this empirical exercise has been useful by 
highlighting the non discretionary nature of health expenditures and the relative 
significance of household characteristics in determining variations in household health 
expenditures in Ghana. Results from the robust full information maximum likelihood 
(Heckman selection) procedures suggest that the decision processes that influence the level 
of health expenditures the household makes are not necessarily the same as those that 
influence the decision to spend but a strong correlation exists between the two types of 
decisions. 
This study suggests that Ghana has to adopt policy strategies that improve targeting 
of health care to households with critical health care needs. Moreover, these efforts would 
be most effective if accompanied by effective education programs that increase access to 
quality health care and health behaviors. The health care system theme of improving equity 
in health care through equal access for all would be most effective if emphasis is laid on 
effective targeting of quality health care to those in critical need while also improving 
universal health care provision at the basic level of health care.  In the same vein, reducing 
regional resource gaps and poverty gaps has strong potential to improve health care needs 
of citizens and the associated benefits that may feed back into equity in economic growth 
and consequently real progress in development.  
This study has several limitations. The study falls short of analyzing the supply-
side issues that would provide more insight into what drives household health care demand 
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and the resulting impact on health expenditures. Also the absence of panel data means the 
results lack the time trend that is essential in differentiating random shocks and predicted 
behaviors regarding health expenditures. Survey data from secondary sources means a lack 
of control on data generating processes; it is not possible to reduce biases due to unknown 
factors that are significant but not accounted for. 
This study suggests a follow up that would empirically investigate the 
interrelationships between education status, health seeking behavior, access to health care 
and poverty to throw light on the direction of impact on health care expenditures and 
poverty status in Ghana. In particular, more recent data may throw light on the impact that 
universal access policies, notably the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana, may 
have had on reducing the potential for emphasis on the role that education may be playing 
and to focus attention on the linkages to health care behaviors, accessibility and 
expenditures, and poverty.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 INCIDENCE OF OUT OF POCKET PAYMENTS AND PERCEPTIONS 
ABOUT QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES BY THE INSURED: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GHANA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY 
V 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In September 2003 the parliament of Ghana passed the National Health Insurance 
Act (Act 650) into law and by this Act the National Health Insurance Scheme was 
established and its implementation fully began in 2005. The goal of the NHIS is to ensure 
equity in access to health care of acceptable quality for all residents in Ghana without the 
necessity to pay out of pocket at the point of service. The New Patriotic Party government 
in power from 2000 to 2008 had promised in its pre-election manifesto to abolish out of 
pocket payment for health care at the point of service, popularly known as ‘cash-and-carry’ 
in Ghana. Out of pocket payment is a subject that most Ghanaians care about so much as 
to make it a winning manifesto of the New Patriotic Party, the first democratically elected 
new government in decades (H. Wahab 2008). Indeed, the issue of ‘cash and carry’ has 
featured prominently in manifestos of political parties of both incumbent and succeeding 
governments (Agyepong 2010). Political commitment may be considered as the key 
element in sustaining the NHIS even as the Scheme faces logistical, financial, actuarial and 
systemic challenges but it has not been abandoned by succeeding governments.  
Eliminating ‘cash-and-carry’ is the means to achieve the ultimate goal of equity in access 
to quality care as stated in the government’s white paper on universal access to health care 
(Republic of Ghana Ministry of Health MOH 2004). The stated objectives are equity, risk 
equalization, cross-subsidization, quality of care, solidarity, efficiency, community or 
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subscriber ownership, partnership, reinsurance and sustainability (MOH 2004).  Indeed, 
the political objective to eliminate cash and carry has evolved into a higher objective to 
attain universal access to health care. Consequently, the NHIS has been described as the 
means to “attain equity in access to health care in an efficient way and to foster solidarity 
which is critical in attaining universal access to health care” (MOH 2004 p4).  
3.1.1 The National Health Insurance Scheme in context   
The Health Insurance Act (2003) stipulates three distinct health insurance schemes 
that may be operated in Ghana: District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) that 
collectively make up the NHIS, private mutual schemes and private commercial schemes. 
By law membership in a scheme is mandatory although citizens are free to choose any 
number of schemes to join, but in practice this law is not enforced and health insurance 
subscriptions have been voluntary. As of December 2010, 8,163,714 people representing 
38.4% of the population were active members of the DMHIS (NHA 2010). Senior citizens 
age seventy and above, children below age eighteen, individuals who contribute to the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pension scheme, retirees receiving 
pension from the SSNIT scheme and individuals identified as indigent are exempt from 
paying annual insurance premiums.  About 31.8% of NHIS members pay premiums in 
addition to the 4.7% of members who are SSNIT contributors.  Therefore, fewer than half 
the members make direct contributions to the scheme. Also, the distribution of NHIS 
membership across the ten administrative regions Table 3-1 indicates that lower income 
regions such as the Upper West and Upper East have higher enrollment rates than higher 
income regions such as the Greater Accra. To the best of our knowledge no study has 
empirically identified the reasons for the regional differences in enrollments. With the 
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relevant data, some reasons that may be put forward for empirical testing may include the 
emphasis of NHIS on the poor hence targeting of NHIS to regions with higher poverty 
rates; the higher tendency of at-risk (higher morbidity and lower income) groups to self-
select into insurance scheme; perceived quality of services from private health care 
providers outside the NHIS; the prevalence of informal employment in urbanized regions.  
The slow growth in membership and in particular, the retention of premium paying 
enrollees is a major problem facing the Scheme. As of 2010 cumulative enrollments had 
reached 64% of the population and yet 34% were active membership (National Health 
Insurance Authority 2010; Apoya and Marriot 2011; Jehu-Appiah et al 2011). The National 
Health Insurance Authority has singled out re-enrollment barriers as a problem in critical 
need of research (Duku, Fenenga, Alhassan and Nketiah-Amponsah 2012; SEND-Ghana). 
Certainly several other conditions such as efficiency in administration, reduction in 
perverse incentives to service providers, and the control of moral hazard behavior by 
beneficiaries are necessary for the successful operation of an insurance scheme. Evidence 
suggests the NHIS faces problems in all these areas, too (see for instance NHA 2010; 
Apoya and Marriott 2011; Jehu-Appiah et al 2011; Carapinha, Ross-Dengene, Desta and 
Wagner 2011; Gobbah and Zhang 2011; Yilma, van Kempen and de Hoop 2012).  Another 
critical factor for sustaining any health insurance scheme is the provision of benefits of 
acceptable quality, especially quality as perceived by client. Patient satisfaction is very 
much a dimension of health care outcome and may influence health care utilization, 
consequently the survival of the health care organization or program (Maxwell 1984) and 
by association, the health insurance scheme.  Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that 
patient dissatisfaction is a potential threat to the survival of the NHIS. Findings from 
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several case studies in selected districts suggest that dissatisfaction with health care tends 
to be worse for NHIS members due to complaints of unequal treatment and discrimination 
by providers favoring clients paying out of pocket (SEND Ghana 2010, R. A. Atinga 2012, 
Dalinjong and Laar 2012). Health care providers have been known to consider NHIS 
beneficiaries as ‘opportunistic’, receiving ‘free’ care and deserving blame for the increased 
workloads.  
Another challenge that NHIS faces is that the larger population in the private and 
especially informal sectors is yet to be adequately tapped into the NHIS. Achieving such 
an expansion in membership could expectedly improve financial sustainability. Presently, 
the revenue generated from premium payments and payroll taxes is obtained from a small 
membership base.  Expansion in the client base is particularly desirable to minimize the 
adverse selection problem and attain objectives of the NHIS while assuring its 
sustainability. However, the necessary conditions that may assure an adequate client base 
include patient satisfaction whereby the perceived quality of services is an important input. 
Alternatively, improvements in out of pocket payments would be unrealized without the 
necessary emphasis on quality, and perceived quality for that matter. Regardless of the fact 
that free health services at the point of service improves accessibility to available health 
care, better resourced households and individuals may price out individuals who may not 
afford better quality uninsured services. In other words, elimination of ‘cash-and-carry’ (as 
the main objective of the NHIS) at the cost of quality is not a sustainable approach to 
minimizing gaps in access to necessary health care.  
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Table 3-1: Regional distribution of Ghana NHIS subscribers 
Region Active members Percent of population 
Western 947,976 41% 
Central 492,717 23% 
Greater Accra 961,455 25% 
Volta 581,305 28% 
Eastern 930,343 23% 
Ashanti 1,585,097 34% 
Brong Ahafo 1,014,554 44% 
Northern 771,335 31% 
Upper East 517,867 50% 
Upper West 361,065 53% 
   National 8,163,714 34% 
Source: National Health Insurance Authority, 2010. 
 
While a number of empirical studies about the impact of NHIS have been carried 
out, to our knowledge, few have focused on out of pocket payments and the quality of 
health care.  The evidence suggests a positive effect on health care seeking and utilization 
rates by the insured (Sulzbach, Garshong and Banahene 2005, Health Systems 20/20 
Project 2009, Brugiavinni and Pace 2011, Gobah and Zhang 2011, Ngoyen, Rajkotia and 
Wang 2011, Dalinjong and Laar 2012). For instance, enrollment in a district health 
insurance scheme is a good predictor of affordability of hospital care in Ghana (Sulzbach 
et al 2005) and insured women are more likely to receive prenatal care, have a skilled 
professional attend birth, or have a lower likelihood infant deaths (Mensah, Oppong and 
Bobbi-Barimah 2010; Brugiavinni and Pace 2011). Other studies have found on the 
contrary that patterns in maternal care seeking are largely unchanged while insured women 
are more likely to have a caesarean delivery (Sulzbach 2005, Health Systems 20/20 Project 
2009). In some cases, the average out of pocket expenses by NHIS insured patients were 
20% in proportion to the amount paid by the uninsured (Sulzbach et al 2005, Health 
Systems 20/20 Project and GHS 2009).  Other findings suggest that while insured people 
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still make out of pocket expenses on drugs and services that are not covered by insurance 
and on health care from informal sources, they still spend less in comparison to the 
uninsured (Nguyen et al 2010). Others suggest, on the contrary, a weak effect of NHIS on 
out of pocket payments (Brugiavini and Pace 2011). In some cases, the evidence suggests 
that non affordability of premiums is a deterrent to enrollment but that NHIS beneficiaries 
are less likely to be satisfied with quality than the general client population (Mensah et al 
2010, Jehu-Appiah et al 2011).  
3.1.2 Research goal, questions and hypotheses 
While a number of studies about the NHIS have focused on enrollments in relation 
to health care utilization rates, there is more to be learned about the value of out of pocket 
expenses as well as the quality of care received by the insured (Witter and Garshong 2009, 
Apoya and Marriot 2011, Gobah and Zhang 2011, Makinen et al 2011). NHIS aims to 
reduce equity gaps in access to quality health services but utilization rates are not 
necessarily indicative of bridging gaps in access to quality care. In addition, most of the 
studies have been based on a few districts in selected regions, usually carried out as case 
studies. The need for nationwide assessments has been well acknowledged especially 
because national study samples are scarce (NHA 2010, Duku et al 2013). Regional 
comparisons would be relevant, at least, to provide to provide some explanations for the 
significant disparities in enrollment rates across regions increasing and retaining 
enrollment is an important challenge for the NHIS. The aim of this study is to examine the 
occurrence of out of pocket payments for services, and the sources of dissatisfaction with 
quality of health services by groups of the insured population based on a nationally survey 
data. This study in addition examines the significance of regional variations in 
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socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics that influence the likelihood of health 
insurance coverage and thereby infer about the significant factors that determine 
differences across regions. National surveys specific to evaluating the impact of health 
insurance are needed however the financing and logistical challenges involved are beyond 
the scope of this study. Therefore, this study relies on the fifth round of the Ghana 
Demographic and Health Surveys in 2008 which make it possible to include regional 
comparisons.  
The following are the specific questions to be answered in this study: 
(i) What are the key determinants of health insurance, and how do these differ 
across administrative regions in Ghana?   
(ii) Do out of pocket payments by the insured depend on need for uncovered 
services, ability to pay, or dissatisfaction with quality?  
(iii) What are key determinants of dissatisfaction with quality of health services 
among insured individuals?  
From the outset this study assumes that health insurance provides a broader access 
to a range of health services than in the absence of health insurance consequently health 
insurance is desirable.  Given this assumption, ability to pay or affordability is expected to 
be significant determinant in the likelihood of being insured, all things being equal. In 
addition, access and use of information about health insurance and benefits are expected to 
be significant determinants of insurance coverage. On regional differences, the assumption 
is that regional differences in household socioeconomic and socio-demographic factors 
belie region-specific differences in the administration and delivery of health insurance 
benefits (such as management of insurance schemes and the availability of health care 
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provider networks) as the significant determinants of differences in insurance coverage 
observed across administrative regions.  If the evidence shows otherwise insignificant 
influence of socioeconomic and socio-demographic factors in the likelihood of insurance 
coverage, and minimal differences in these factors across regions then one may conclude 
that significant regional differences in health insurance coverage are largely a systemic 
problem that is independent of health insurance.  
This study also assumes that by providing access to a broader range of health 
services, insurance implies a better choice set, hence quality in health care than in the 
absence of health insurance. Also, based on the underlying assumption that health 
insurance provides a broader access to a range of health services, ability to pay is expected 
to be a significant determinant of out of pocket payments but the need for services not 
covered by insurance is expected to be the most significant determinant of out of pocket 
payments among the group of insured individuals. Alternately, one may not assume a priori 
that dissatisfaction with health services is the more significant determinant of out of pocket 
payment in the context of health insurance.  Similarly, the assumption that insurance 
provides access to a broader range of health services would imply a higher chance of access 
to quality than in the absence of health insurance, all things being equal.  Hence ability to 
pay, as well as the incidence of out of pocket payments are both expected to be significant 
determinants in the likelihood of perceiving better quality care than otherwise comparable 
individuals.   
Explaining differences in perceptions (a subjective concept) about quality across 
different socio-cultural groups of the population is outside the scope of this study. 
However, categorizing quality measures into human factors versus non human is useful for 
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identifying the sources of dissatisfaction, as this has implications for approaches towards 
improving sustainability of the National Health Insurance Scheme and consequently 
universal access to health care.  
The key results in this study are that community of residence, ability to pay and 
gender are the key predictors of the likelihood that an individual or household would be 
insured: poorer regions, rural communities and females have a higher probability of being 
insured and so are households in higher wealth brackets. When insured individuals have to 
make out of pocket payments the need for service not covered by insurance is the driving 
factor. Wealthier households have significantly higher probability of paying out of pocket. 
The implication is that NHIS expands the set of attainable desired health services for 
wealthy households but does not eliminate catastrophic out of pocket payments, especially 
for the poor in the event of critical need of services that are not insured.  Attitude of health 
workers has a significantly negative effect on perceived quality of care, more so than the 
adequacy of information or communication about the treatment process. The implication 
for policy is that improving perceived quality of health services may be less of a technical 
issue than a behavioural approach. A revamping of customer services and training health 
workers to approach clients with a favorable demeanor is an effective strategy to improve 
access to health care.  
3.1.3 Source of data 
The fifth round of the Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) is the main 
source of data for empirical analysis in this study.  The DHS is a survey series conducted 
in over 80 countries. These surveys are sponsored by the United States Agency for 
International Development in partnership with the domestic government agencies in the 
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relevant countries. The American based ORC Macro Group provides the technical 
assistance and training for the local implementing agencies in all stages from survey design 
to data management. The core topics include maternal and child health, nutrition and 
mortality but for each survey additional modules and country-specific questions cover 
topics such as occupation, wealth, gender violence, access to mass media, malaria, health-
seeking behavior and health expenditures.  To date, Ghana has had five waves of the DHS 
with the first conducted in 1988 and subsequent ones at five year intervals. These surveys 
are not cross sectional in nature therefore the data may not be constructed as a panel. As of 
year 2014, the fifth round of the standard survey conducted in 2008 is the most recent that 
has been published. Multistage stratified sampling method was used to select households 
for each round of survey; the DHS is considered nationally representative.  The DHS 
Program granted permission to use the data (http://dhsprogram.com/data/) and provided 
electronic access to the relevant databases.  
3.1.4 Outline of the study 
The second section presents a review of selected theoretical and empirical literature 
on client perceived quality of health care and on the value of health insurance and out of 
pocket payments. The section thus provides a framework for the empirical analysis carried 
out in this chapter. Section three provides details about the empirical models used for the 
data analysis. The data and the results from the empirical analysis are discussed in section 
four. Section five concludes the chapter with a summary of the key findings from the study 
and the implications for policy.  
 111 
 
3.2 Theoretic framework  
Before delving into the analysis of the data some background literature is presented 
to provide the theoretic framework and empirical evidence that supports the analysis, the 
discussion of results leading to the conclusions and the economic and policy implications 
from this study.  This section proceeds with a review of selected literature on client-
perceived quality in health care, the value of health insurance and out of pocket payments.  
3.2.1 Client-perceived quality of health services 
Perceptions about the quality of a service play a key role in client satisfaction and 
consequently influence demand. Likewise, the perceptions about the quality of benefits, 
hence health services received, would directly or indirectly influence the demand for health 
insurance and out of pocket payments for health care. But what constitutes quality from 
the perspective of the client in regards to health care? Do health care consumers look for 
the same things when making assessments about quality, in the same way health care 
providers would? This section presents a review of some of the literature on client 
perceptions pertaining to quality of health care especially in the developing country 
context.  
It may be taken for granted that patient satisfaction is important as a dimension of 
the outcome from the health care delivery process (Maxwell 1984). This observation holds 
even if quality of care and satisfaction in the developing country context is not as well 
researched as in the developed country context (Abiola 2010, Newhouse et al 1998). The 
literature on health care quality (often in the advanced country context) often distinguishes 
between clinical quality and service quality (Baker et al 2008). This distinction is based on 
the idea that patients are better at predicting service quality than clinical quality as patients 
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do not typically have the technical knowledge about clinical processes (Gronros 1984, 
Bowers et al1994, Devebakan 2005). Empirical work is generally based on Parasuraman 
et al’s (1985) SERVQUAL framework for measuring organizational service quality, or 
some version of it.  The SERVQUAL framework describes a list of indicators for 
evaluating client satisfaction: reliability, responsiveness, customization, courtesy, 
competence and access, security, tangibles, communication and understanding of the 
customer.  A basic list includes responsiveness, assurance, empathy, tangibles and 
reliability (Parasuraman et al 1988). Empirical researchers modify or augment this 
SERVQUAL framework to reflect case specific quality variables.  While SERVQUAL 
provides a good starting point as a framework for research on the quality of health care a 
specific set of quality measure or design is not advocated in the research literature. The 
common practice is to tailor the quality measures to the peculiarities of the health care 
system, the health care delivery process and the population concerned.  Edvardson et al 
(1994) for instance find that patient perception of quality is better predicted by the care 
provider’s experience, knowledge, commitment, trustworthiness and empathy, and his 
control over critical situations as important factors in assessing service quality.  Gross et al 
(2006) identify health care accessibility, structure, atmosphere and interpersonal relations 
as determinants of quality of services perceived by care recipients. Hassin et al (2001) 
identify interpersonal relationship as critical and especially finds that communication, 
responsiveness, courtesy, cost of services and cleanliness are significant predictors of 
perceived quality of service.  Rose et al (2004) measure quality in terms of physical, 
psychological and social needs of the care seekers, and Baker et al (2008) suggest 
accessibility, amenities and interpersonal relations as important determinants of quality.  
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In the case of Ghana, empirical findings portray that client perception about health 
care quality borders on the nontechnical aspect of service delivery, and more so on the 
human dimension. Turkson’s (2004) work is one of few studies focused on client perceived 
quality of health care in Ghana. Researchers interviewed 803 patients, 70% female, and 
conducted focus group discussions with community representatives in Komenda, a rural 
district in the Central Region.  Almost 90% respondents indicated quality of health services 
received was high or very high based on the researcher’s scale and measurement criteria. 
Nonetheless the lack of information and inadequate communication in the consultation 
process by providers was the most cited problem. Patients complained about not being told 
their diagnosis and having limited discussions about how illness would be managed.  Just 
about 40% respondents were given advice or information about their condition or 43% told 
about the diagnosis. Specific concerns cited about quality included poor attitude of staff, 
long waiting times, high cost of services, inadequate staff and unavailability of ambulances.  
 Yawson et al’s (2013) objective, analogous to Turkson’s (2004), was to identify 
the key factors in perceived quality of health care delivery but at the tertiary institutional 
level and with a relatively urban sample.  Questionnaires were administered over several 
weeks to 655 participants randomly selected from the outpatient department of the largest 
tertiary facility, the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra. Focus group discussions were 
conducted in addition.  Although males were well represented (45%) in the sample, the 
findings were similar to Turkson’s (2004): 89% respondents expressed being satisfied or 
very satisfied with service quality, 86% considered their condition had been adequately 
explained by health care provider and 87% were positive about being physically examined. 
Spontaneous recurring complaints included the poor attitude of some health workers, 
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longer than average expected wait times (one hour was considered an acceptable wait time 
but 51.9% had experienced longer than an hour’s wait), uncomfortable waiting area and 
the late (compared to the posted) starting time of clinic and the lack of directional signs at 
the facility.  
Overall, these findings suggest that clients’ experiences of health care quality as 
they perceive it, for example, poor the attitude of staff or long wait times may not be very 
different between rural and urban localities even though the mix of problems may have 
different weights such as inadequate information being more prominent in rural areas and 
longer than expected wait times being prominent in urban areas.   
ii. The insured individual’s perception about quality of health services received 
As the analysis in this chapter concerns perceived quality among insured 
individuals it is interesting to know what role health insurance status may play in client 
perceptions about the quality of health care received. One study that evaluates perceived 
quality based on insurance status is Perez, Ang and Vega (2009) which examines the effects 
of insurance coverage and multiple covariates on perceived quality of care among the 
Hispanic community in the USA. Access to health care (through health insurance) had a 
substantial influence on improving perceived quality, especially for persons with chronic 
diseases, for persons that had a higher utilization of health care, and for persons who had 
more doctor visits. Patients having better information and being more involved in their 
health care management were more likely to adhere to treatment procedures and hence 
have better outcomes. Having health insurance therefore could be associated with a better 
client perceived quality of care.  
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In the case of the NHIS some evidence suggests that the quality of care has rather 
been compromised based on both client and the provider perspectives. In a survey of NHIS 
clients in two districts in the Upper East region most respondents indicated experiencing 
verbal abuse, longer waits, being denied physical examinations, and discrimination in favor 
of uninsured clients (Dalinjong and Laar 2012). In similar case studies of health facilities 
in all three northern regions, most health facility managers (63%) indicated that the NHIS 
impacts negatively on the attention given to NHIS clients because of the longer wait times 
due to cumbersome documentation and a large patient turnout (SEND-Ghana 2010). In 
some facilities (21%) most NHIS clients are refused inpatient care because of delays in 
reimbursements. Alternately, Atinga’s (2012) survey of NHIS beneficiaries in the context 
of urban Accra had findings somewhat different in the perceived quality of care.  Exit 
interviews of some 250 NHIS insured patients in public and private NHA accredited 
facilities included measures of quality categorized as interaction with service provider, 
provider demeanor, physical infrastructure and waiting time. The results suggest that 
patient’s interaction with health care provider and the attitude of the provider were 
statistically significant and positive determinants of the perceived overall service quality.  
However, waiting times had no significant association with patient perception of the quality 
of care in general.   
The evidence therefore supports the conclusion that client-perceived quality is 
better measured in terms of interpersonal interactions (human dimensions) than the 
technical aspect of health care provision. The indicators of quality of health services -
provider attitude, speed of service and communication in the health care delivery process- 
 116 
 
reported in the DHS data are useful for analyzing the determinants of service quality in this 
study.  
3.2.2 On the value of health insurance and out of pocket expenses  
Nyman (1998, 1999, 2001, 2006) proposes what could previously have been 
considered a non-conventional view of private health insurance: a redistribution of income 
since insurance is a contract to transfer income or wealth from those who buy insurance 
and remain healthy to those who buy insurance and become ill. In this respect health 
insurance becomes an issue of equity. In contrast, the conventional (neoclassical) approach 
based on expected utility theory views health insurance as a redistribution of income across 
health states for the same consumer, thereby transforming an essentially equity issue to one 
of efficiency.  The individual is assumed to know ex ante what utility he derives from an 
ill state, as well as the utility from a healthy state. The utilities are weighted by the 
probabilities associated with the different states to determine the total effect of insurance 
on the individual consumer (Friedman and Savidge 1948, Arrow 1963). Health care 
demand enters the health insurance demand argument as a financial loss. Health care 
spending (out of pocket payments) is a loss of income and therefore the marginal utility of 
income increases with illness. Consequently, the consumer, preferring certainty, would 
insure against the risk of loss of income.  
Nyman’s approach on the contrary considers out of pocket expenses, rather than 
being a disutility, increase in value with health insurance. The conventional theory that 
people purchase insurance simply to transfer risk of loss of income from one health state 
to another is inadequate for several reasons (Nyman 1998). Research experiments have 
shown that people prefer the risk of zero losses than the certainty of a smaller actuarially 
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equivalent loss that insurance promises (Kahnemn and Tversky 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). Moreover, people are more likely to purchase insurance the lower the 
premium is in proportion to the value of the coverage. The problem of moral hazard (M. 
V. Pauly 1968) and adverse selection causes increases in the price of insurance which 
would consequently reduce the likelihood of purchasing insurance.  Another issue Nyman 
grapples with is that the emphasis on certainty or avoidance of income loss downplays the 
role that health care demand plays in health insurance (Nyman 1999, 2001). The utility 
from health care consumption and consequently the demand for health care would vary 
across states of illness so that the moral hazard problem might not be significant. Healthy 
individuals are less likely to intensively consume health care simply because it is 
affordable, while ill persons would consume health care as a life-saving event which 
without the income transfers (from healthy to ill persons through insurance) may not have 
been possible. In this regard the welfare gain from health insurance is not only from the 
avoidance of loss. Hence the desire for a full range of health care could explain why people 
buy health insurance. Insurance makes it possible to afford access to an otherwise 
unaffordable full range of services people desire given the value they place on their health 
(Nyman 1999, 2001, 2006).  
3.2.2.1 Implications of affordable full range of services in the context of NHIS   
If the theoretical basis for the value of health insurance is believed to be the access 
to a desired full range of health care that would be otherwise unaffordable (Nyman 1999, 
2001, 2006) considering the value on one’s health, then one may consider also that out of 
pocket expenditures by the insured, compared to the uninsured, may be welfare improving 
and not necessarily a disutility. The assumption here is that insurance at least guarantees 
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some basic package of health care at a lower cost than available to the uninsured (‘basic’ 
is understandably case specific). In the case of the NHIS, benefits include full coverage of 
provider consulting, and a basic drugs list for a purported ninety percent of the disease 
burden in Ghana (NHIA 2010, see also Table D4, Table D5 and Table D6 in Appendix D). 
NHIS has a uniform policy in the sense that all policy holders are entitled to a similar 
package of benefits regardless of the amount paid in premiums. In practice differences are 
expected in the availability and the quality of health services to the extent that differences 
persist across health care districts and providers.   In the context of universal access such 
as the NHIS aims for the value of health insurance, out of pocket expenses may be drawn 
out in the following hypothetical model:  
 
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑂𝑃 +
𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑          3-1 
 
where the full range of health services desired by households or individuals is a 
simple aggregate of insurance benefits (insured services), services obtained through out of 
pocket expenses (OOP) and unaffordable or affordable but technically unavailable care 
(unattained) services. Uninsured but desired health services are obtained through OOP 
and otherwise unattainable. The quality of health services enters the argument as follows: 
The full range of desired services is defined over quality of life years and behaves as a 
normal good. Assume insured services are a function of quality of care and OOP is a 
function of the quality of insured services and affordability (budget net of premium 
payment). Assume also that the full range of services desired is weighted by needs versus 
wants with higher weight attached to needs. Needs may be measured by an objective or 
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subjective ranking of health state, or by some expressed needs of respondents in surveys. 
Assuming that a universal health care plan guarantees some standard basic package of care 
to all insured, the relative weight of insured services and OOP services in the full range 
basket is affected by the quality of service. Differences in access to health care may be 
modeled as such. If quality of insured services worsens and quality is neither affordable 
through OOP (assuming better quality is available through OOP) then unattainable care is 
increased.  
This simple hypothetical model would imply that without due emphasis on quality 
of care in the context of a universal access to care such as the NHIS aims for, equity gaps 
worsen. In the context of NHIS the model predicts that OOP would be welfare improving 
for insured households with ability to afford a broader range of services conditional on a 
guaranteed acceptable quality of the basic package of health care (assuming the stipulated 
zero copayments and deductibles are actually in effect). Moreover, the subsidies for the 
poor to afford premiums would lead to equity gains in access to quality health care. Subpar 
quality of insured services might be associated with worsening inequities because the better 
offs are subsidized to afford better quality care while poorer households may be priced out 
of quality health care. 
Alternately targeting the quality of service to the level of needs has greater potential 
to bridge equity gaps. Improving the quality of the insured minimum package of health 
care for all implies that health services paid for out of pocket expands the attainable range 
of desired health care while also bridging equity gaps being the goal of universal access.   
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3.2.2.2 Empirical evidence  
The Health Care Fund for the Poor in Vietnam has similar ambitions as the NHIS 
to make health care accessible for all. The program has been extended to cover the general 
population with mandatory membership based on a sliding scale of household poverty 
levels. Evidence suggests that the likelihood of seeking insurance benefits varies inversely 
with income and education of the members of Vietnam’s Health Care Fund (Sepehri, 
Sarma and Serieux 2009). In addition, respondents perceive the insured services as inferior 
quality. In fact, households that voluntarily sign up for health insurance are less likely to 
use their card when seeking outpatient care compared to low income households that are 
mandatorily insured (by default). Voluntary members are more likely to use insurance 
cared when seeking inpatient care. Evidently accessing otherwise unaffordable (inpatient) 
health care is the stronger motive for voluntary insurance.  
In the case of NHIS some evidence shows that 29% enrollees prioritize financial 
security, 60% prioritize costs (affordability of health care) as the major reason for enrolling 
and 60% express satisfaction with the scheme according to Mensah et al (2011).  In contrast 
majority of uninsured (90%) individuals cite non affordability of insurance premium as the 
main reason for not enrolling. Although satisfaction with the management of the insurance 
scheme is mediocre it is apparent that taking out insurance is desired for the main reason 
of affording (a wider range of) health care. Similarly, Jehu-Appiah et al (2011) observe 
that although uninsured respondents have a more negative perception about NHIS benefits, 
non-affordability of the insurance premium is the most cited reason for not enrolling.  
With respect to the determinants of health insurance the empirical literature 
suggests that the characteristics of individuals and their households (families) are 
important. One would expect that an individual presented with the choice of health 
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insurance would be influenced by the cost (premium and copayments) versus the expected 
benefits given a budget constraint (income, wealth or other measures of ability to pay) and 
preferences. In the literature preferences are approximated by a combination of socio-
cultural, socioeconomic, socio-demographic and environmental factors. Hence, common 
indicators used to predict health insurance status include age, gender, occupation, family 
size, ethnicity and community of residence.  In the empirical evidence on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the household socioeconomic and demographic characteristics commonly 
identified as strong predictors of health insurance demand include older age, higher 
education, female gender, formal employment and wealth (Sulzbach et al 2005, Duku et al 
2012, Kimani et al 2012). Being in a marital union and access to credit are other important 
predictors. Place of residence is also important but to a lesser extent (Kirigia et al 2005, 
Duku et al 2012, Kimani et al 2012). In Kenya, female, gender individuals in a marital 
union, formal sector employees and members of a credit union are the most likely to be 
insured (Kimani et al 2012). In South Africa, higher income, being female, post-secondary 
education, being in a marital union, safe environment, older age and smoking are strong 
predictors of insurance status (Kirigia et al 2005).  In India income, education, health risk, 
awareness about insurance benefits and organizational effectiveness of insurance operators 
are some key determinants of health insurance demand (Vellakal 2013). 
Surmising from the literature, the theoretical framework that guides analysis in this 
study is that out of pocket payments augment health insurance. The NHIS, branded as a 
program to implement universal access to health care, in effect provides access to a wider 
range of desired health care. The benefit of universal access is on the condition that the 
quality (quality as gauged from the perspective of the client) of the guaranteed package of 
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insured services is satisfactory. Also quality from the perspective of the client is more 
human centered than technical. These theoretical underpinnings would therefore guide the 
discussion of results from the econometric analysis of the key factors that determine 
insurance coverage, OOP expenses and the perceptions of the quality of health care 
received in the context of the NHIS in Ghana. The next section presents the econometric 
models and variables, and the rationale for choosing these models and variables for the 
empirical analysis.  
3.3 Empirical models and variables 
The questions of interest in the empirical estimations are: what determines 
insurance status, the incidence of out of pocket payments and the perceived quality of 
health services received by the insured and each of these are determined in a separate 
model. The explanatory variables include indicators of socio-demographic, 
socioeconomic, environment and community characteristics of the relevant sample of 
individuals.   
3.3.1 Determining the likelihood of health insurance coverage 
In order to identify the key determinants of health insurance and the differences 
across administrative regions, a multivariate probit regression analysis is used to show the 
direction and the strength of influence of several socioeconomic, demographic and 
environment indicators to determine the significant predictors of health insurance 
enrollment. Descriptive bivariate analyses are then used to examine the strength of 
association between these predictors of health insurance enrollment on one hand, and the 
administrative regions on the other hand.  
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3.3.2 Probit model and variables to predict health insurance status 
Probit regression analysis is the preferred method to determine the impact of 
selected indicators on the likelihood of being insured. This multivariate analysis involves 
maximum likelihood estimation of the following model:  
 
prob(di) = prob(α + βIi + δXi + γZi + 𝑒i > 0)      3-2 
 
where for the ith individual di is a binary variable indicator that equals 1 if 
individual i has health insurance, and 0 otherwise. The letter Ii represents a vector of 
categorical variables that indicate ability to pay or affordability and the socioeconomic 
status of the individual. Similarly, Xi is a vector of variables acting as indicators for socio-
demographic characteristics of individuals that influence the choice of health insurance. 
Also, Zi would be a set of indicators for the community and location of residence, and ei  
are normally distributed errors. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
 
prob (𝑑𝑖) = prob(𝛼 +  𝑏1𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑏3𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 +
𝑏4𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝑑1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑖 + 𝑑3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑4𝑦𝑒𝑠_𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖 +
𝑑5𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑6𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑7𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑞𝑖 + 𝑑8𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑖 + 𝑠1𝑙𝑜𝑐2𝑖 + 𝑠2𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  +
𝑒𝑖 > 0)                                 3-3 
 
where quintile describes the quintile of wealth an individual’s household falls in: 
quintile equals 1 if lowest quintile which acts as the base group, 2 if 2nd quintile, 3 if 3rd, 
4 if 4th and 5 if highest quintile. Also, occupation describes sector of employment and 
equals 1 if technical or professional, 2 if sales, 3 if services, 4 if agricultural, 5 if manual, 
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6 if other, and 0 for the base group ‘does not work’. The indicator variable educlevel equals 
1 if the highest level attained is primary, 2 if secondary, 3 if post secondary and 0 for 
reference group of individuals who describe themselves as ‘never been to school’. The 
indicator media_access describes the level of exposure an individual has to the news media: 
equals 1 if respondent watches television, listens to radio or reads news journal less than 
once a week, 2 if at least once a week, 3 if almost every day and 0 for the reference group 
‘not at all’. The gender indicator, gend, equals 1 for female and 0 for male respondent. The 
indicator agegp equals 1 if age group 19-24 years, 2 if 25-29, 3 if 30-34, 4 if 35-39, 5 if 
40-44, 6 if 45-49, 9 if unknown and 0 for the base group of teens aged 15-19. The indicator 
variable married equals 1 if respondent is married and living with spouse or 2 if living with 
common law partner, 3 if widowed, 4 if divorced, 5 if does not live with partner, and 0 for 
the base group of individuals who describe themselves as ‘never married’. The indicator 
yes_chn equals 1 if the respondent has a son or daughter living at home and 0 otherwise, 
and agehead is a continuous variable that measures age in years of the respondent’s head 
of household while agesq, the square of agehead is used to capture any nonlinear effects 
that may arise from age. The indicator tobacco equals 1 if the respondent uses tobacco and 
0 otherwise.  relnhead describes relationship to head of household and is equal to 1 if the 
respondent is the head, 2 if spouse, 3 if son or daughter; 4 if other relative, and 5 if not a 
relative of head of household. The loc2 equal 1 if community of residence is urban, 2 if 
rural. The indicator region describes the administrative region in which the respondent 
resides: equals 1 if Western, which is also the base group, 2 if Central, 3 if Greater Accra, 
4 if Volta, 5 if Eastern, 6 if Ashanti, 7 if Brong Ahafo, 8 if Northern, 9 if Upper East and 
10 if Upper West. The term 𝑒𝒊 represents normally distributed errors. This ordering of the 
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regions follows the pattern reported in survey data but in no particular order other than 
regions being ordered geographically from south to north. 
Several reasons for choosing this set of explanatory variables need mention. First, 
the descriptive statistics show that almost all (97%) insured respondents were enrolled in 
the NHIS and ninety percent of all insured respondents paid for premiums out of pocket. 
A small percentage had premiums paid for by government, employer or SSNIT (see Table 
C2 in Appendix C). Therefore, ability to afford insurance premium is expected to account 
for a significant proportion of enrolments. One’s wealth status (quintile) and employment 
status (occupation) are the indicators of ability to pay. Second, evidence suggests the 
organizational effectiveness and outreach campaigns of health insurance organizations has 
influence on enrollments patterns (Mensah et al 2010; Jehu-Appiah et al 2011; Vellakal 
2013). We expect access to information about insurance to be an important determinant. 
Therefore, information about a respondent’s frequency of listening to radio, watching 
television or reading news journals is used as an indicator of access to information. 
Although we do not have an indicator for insurance administrator effectiveness, access to 
media is useful for making inferences about the effect the publicity about health insurance 
could have on the likelihood of enrollment when the other factors such as ability to pay are 
taken into account. Arguably, one’s exposure to the news media is not a direct indicator of 
the effectiveness of insurance operators’ advertising, marketing or management strategies 
to attracting clients. Access to news media is an instrument to gauge a respondent’s 
potential exposure to social marketing, campaigns or public information about NHIS 
including enrollment procedures, the benefits package and NHIS-accredited health care 
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providers. In a similar vein, education level acts as an indicator of literacy and ease of 
access to information. 
Again on the issue of the reach of health insurance organizations in attracting 
clients, locality would be expected to have an influence on the probability of health 
insurance. One would expect rural residents to be more likely to have health insurance in 
the regions such as in Brong Ahafo, Upper East and Upper West that have had mutual 
health insurance schemes in several communities in operation in the decade or earlier 
before NHIS. Location is important also as an indicator of the economic and health 
infrastructure including network of providers, health delivery facilities and transportation 
systems that characterize a respondent’s environment. In this respect one may expect the 
likelihood of being insured to be higher for urban residents in closer proximity to 
established health care provider networks. 
Another indicator considered as key in determining the probability of health 
insurance enrollment is the health status of beneficiaries and the level of need by those 
taking out insurance. In the absence of data that directly measure ex ante health state of 
respondents, age would be used as a proxy for health status in this study with older 
respondents (approaching the average life expectancy of 57 years) considered as having 
lower health state while controlling for who finances the insurance purchase.  In addition, 
tobacco use is a crude indicator of a respondent’s healthy lifestyle behavior. The level of 
an individual’s aversion to ill health may influence the behavior towards healthy lifestyle 
and similarly the decision to secure access to health care. The assumption is that if there is 
a market for insurance it is likely that a household with a low tolerance for health risk 
would purchase insurance, all things being equal. Use of tobacco is a crude measure of an 
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individual’s healthy lifestyle behaviors and consequently health risk aversion. The 
remaining variables, used as control factors include gender and household demographics 
such as marital status, relationship to head of household, age of household head, and having 
a son or daughter at home (used as a crude measure of dependency given the age cohort of 
15-49 as the respondents).  
3.3.3  Contingency tables for analysis of regional differences  
Bivariate analysis using contingency tables is straightforward and involves Pearson 
chi-square (χ2) tests of the association between each of the categorical predictor variables 
(of health insurance status) and the administrative regions, as displayed in contingency 
tables (see Table C3 in Appendix C). The independent variables include measures of 
income, healthy lifestyle choices, location, and access to information, type of occupation, 
family status and gender. The objective is to measure the importance of each of the 
independent categorical variables in the regional variations of health insurance status. The 
Pearson χ2 test statistic (following Maxwell (1971)) test is as follows:  
 
   𝜒2 = ∑ 1𝑟𝑖=1 ∑ ((Oij − Eij)
1
Eij
)
2
𝑐
𝑗=1       3-4 
 
 
where Oij is the observed frequency for the ith row and jth column in a contingency 
table, Eij is the expected frequency and is summed over r number of rows and c number of 
columns and compared to a critical chi square value at a level of significance α=0.01 with 
degrees of freedom=(r-1) *(c-1). In the case of household wealth for example, the null (Ho) 
and alternate (Ha) hypotheses are as follows: 
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Ho: An individual’s region of residence is independent of household wealth status. 
Ha: An individual’s region of residence is dependent on household wealth. 
 
The DHS data for this study meets the necessary assumptions for minimizing bias 
in the Pearson χ2 test statistic: random sampling, nonzero observations, a large sample size 
and mutually exclusive categories (Maxwell 1971, Plackett 1983, Ruxton and Neuhäuser 
2010). A statistically significant result implies that the frequency ratios reported for each 
cross tabulation of administrative regions and the independent categorical variable in 
question should not be passed off as random though this result says nothing about causation 
or the sign of the relationship. Another note of caution is that the Pearson χ2 test is sensitive 
to sample size so the larger the sample size the more likely to reject the null even when the 
association between the two variables is weak. For this reason, a further test is necessary 
to estimate the strength of the association between region of residence and the independent 
categorical variable in question, hence the Cramer’s V test statistic computed as described 
in Ruxton and Neuhäuser (2010):  
 
𝑽 =  √(
𝝌𝟐
𝒏(𝒌−𝟏)
)         3-5 
 
where χ2 is the calculated chi square value as described in equation 3-4, n is the 
sample size and k is the lowest of number of rows or columns.  Cramer’s V provides useful 
information about the strength of association but not about the direction of the relationship. 
Cramer’s V is useful also as a guide to select relevant variables for multivariate analysis 
 129 
 
(Duku et al 2013). Hence in this study, calculated Cramer’s V statistic has been useful 
information to make inferences about socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors that 
influence observed regional variations in health insurance coverage in Ghana. Further 
details about calculated test statistics and the importance of regional differences in 
explanatory and dependent variables are shown in the contingency tables in appendix C.   
3.3.4 Probit models for predicting out of pocket payments  
The multivariate probit analysis method used in estimating the likelihood of health 
insurance coverage is again the approach to identify the key predictors of out of pocket 
payments by insured individuals. The probit model for estimating the predictors of out of 
pocket payments takes the following form: 
 
prob(yi) = prob(α + βHi + ∂Ii + δXi + γZi + ei > 0)     3-6 
 
where for the ith individual yi is a binary variable which equals 1 if insured 
individual i has to make out of pocket payments, and 0 otherwise. Hi is a set of indicators 
about the perception of the quality of health services, and need for services not covered by 
insurance. Ii is a set of indicators of the ability to pay, and the socioeconomic status of the 
individual, Xi is a set of indicators for sociodemographic and household characteristics, Zi 
is a set of indicators for respondent’s community and location of residence and ei are 
normally distributed errors. The estimated model is as follows:  
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prob (𝑦𝑖) = prob (𝛼 + 𝛼 +  𝑏1 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑣𝑠 + 𝑏2 𝑑𝑠𝑣𝑠𝑞𝑙𝑡𝑦 + 𝑏3𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑞𝑙𝑡𝑦 +
 𝜕1𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜕2𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜕3𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 𝜕4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝑑1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑2𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖 +
𝑑3𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑4𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑5𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠1𝑙𝑜𝑐2𝑖 + 𝑠2𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  + 𝑒𝑖 > 0)         3-7 
 
where needsvs equals 1 if the respondent indicated a need for services not covered 
by insurance, and 0 otherwise. The indicator dnhisqlty equals 1 if NHIS cardholders are 
erceived to receive similar services as others, 2 if worse quality than others and 0 if better, 
with ‘better’ as the base category. The indicator dsvsquality equals 1 if respondent 
considered the service quality as not good at the most recent treatment at a clinic or 
hospital, and 0 otherwise. The indicator quintile describes the quintile of wealth the 
respondent’s household falls within which equals 1 if lowest quintile (the base group), 2 if 
the 2nd quintile, 3 if 3rd, 4 if 4th and 5 if highest quintile. The indicator occupation 
describes sector of employment and equals 1 if technical or professional, 2 if sales, 3 if 
services, 4 if agricultural, 5 if manual, 6 if other, and 0 for base group ‘does not work’. 
Additionally, educlevel equals 1 if the highest level attained is primary, 2 if secondary, 3 
if post secondary and 0 for reference group ‘never been to school’. Gender is indicated by 
gend and equals 1 for female and 0 for the base group of males. The indicator yes_chn 
equals 1 if a respondent has a son or daughter living at home and 0 otherwise. Also, age is 
a continuous variable that measures age in years, and agesq is the square of age. The 
indicator relnhead describes relationship to head of household and is equal to 1 if the 
respondent is the head, 2 if spouse, 3 if son or daughter, 4 if other relative and 5 if not a 
relative of household head. The indicator loc2 equals 1 if urban and 2 if rural and region 
equals 1 if administrative region is Western, as well the base group; 2 if Central, 3 if Greater 
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Accra, 4 if Volta, 5 if Eastern, 6 if Ashanti, 7 if Brong Ahafor, 8 if Northern, 9 if Upper 
East and 10 if Upper West.  
With regards to out of pocket payment for health services among the insured, it is 
expected that need of services not covered by insurance would be a key predictor of the 
likelihood.  Service quality is expected to be a key determinant in the likelihood of out of 
pocket payment by the insured. More so, we expect that health insurance has value as an 
expansion in the attainable set of health services an individual desire. In other words, out 
of pocket payments would be considered as welfare enhancing rather than a loss of income. 
We could interpret a strong effect of need for services not insured as an indication of 
affordability of a wider set of health services. If in addition, quality of health services is 
insignificant as a predictor of out of pocket payments, this observation would strengthen 
the argument that health insurance improves affordability of one’s desired or full range set 
of health services argument. Alternately, it is expected that persons with insurance 
coverage who make out of pocket expenses would be more likely to have been disgruntled 
about health services received. Therefore, indicators of the user-perceived quality of health 
services received during a respondents most recent visit to a facility, as well as the opinion 
about the relative quality of services received by NHIS cardholders versus non-NHIS card 
holders are included as key predictors of the incidence of out of pocket payments.  The 
ability to pay is expected also as a significant predictor of out of pocket payments for health 
services by the insured. Affordability as measured by wealth status (quintile), occupation 
and who pays for insurance premium are expected to be significant predictors of the 
incidence of out of pocket spending by insured persons.  
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Gender is expected to be a significant predictor of out of pocket payment. It is 
expected that females would be less likely than males to spend out of pocket assuming that 
such services as maternal and child health typically demanded by females are more likely 
to be covered or subsidized at most facilities. Moreover, males are expected to be higher 
income earners and hence have higher affordability of uncovered services. The 
predominance of male heads of households is expected to be associated with the higher 
likelihood of the male as the incidence of out of pocket spending. Marital status, age, 
locality and region are included as the control variables.  
An important consideration for out of pocket payments by the insured concerns the 
specification of the model to take into account the likely problem of omitted variables. One 
may consider that factors that influence an individual’s selection into health insurance 
would be likely also to influence out of pocket payments and when the confounding factors 
are not accounted for, regression estimates could be biased. For this reason, the probit 
model is augmented with the Heckman probit approach whereby out of pocket payments 
are predicted conditional on the factors that determine whether an individual is insured or 
not. The simple approach we adopt is to estimate out of pocket payments by the full 
information (Heckman probit) maximum likelihood estimation techniques using the probit 
model for predicting health insurance enrolment as the selection equation. Both simple 
probit and Heckman probit regressions are included in the results for the purpose of 
comparison.    
3.3.5 Multinomial logistic models for estimating predictors of perceived quality  
This section describes the methods used to estimate the likelihood that insured 
individuals have unfavorable perception about health services received. Two opinion polls 
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about the quality of services are modeled:  first is an individual’s perception about quality 
of service received at a most recent treatment at a hospital or clinic, if good or bad, and if 
bad the main reason for the dissatisfaction. Second is the perception about quality received 
by NHIS card holders compared to others, if better, same or worse.  
The multinomial logistic regression model is suitable for determining the statistical 
significance of predictors in both cases of the ordered responses about relative NHIS 
quality and the unordered responses about quality of service at the most recent treatment 
at clinic or hospital. The multinomial logistic model described in this study is based on 
information in Jones (2000), Green (2011) and StataCorp (2011a). In this multinomial 
logistic regression approach a set of multinomial response indicators (Yij) is defined to 
determine which alternative in a set4 of j=1,2, …, k response categories is chosen by the 
ith individual, for i=1, …, n (Jones 2000).  For example, for j=2 (long wait time), yi2 = 1 if 
individual i chose indicator 2, but zero otherwise. To simplify calculations one of the k 
response categories in j is chosen as a reference group or baseline by which to calculate the 
log odds for the other categories relative to the base line. The log odds are assumed to be a 
linear function of a set of covariates (indicator variables for education, gender, locality, 
wealth quintile, out of pocket payment and others) associated with the ith individual. Also, 
pij = p(Yij=1) describes the probability that individual i falls into category j of perceived 
quality. The probability in turn depends on vector (xi) of covariates associated with the ith 
individual or group. Therefore, pij/pik (odds ratio) describes the odds that an individual i 
                                                 
 
4 In this case the set j describes perception about quality of service received where good=1, long wait 
times=2, staff not polite=3, inadequate information =4 and other reason=5. 
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falls in the jth category of perceived quality rather than the base line category (j=k). The 
multinomial logistic regression model then relates the logs odds as a linear function of the 
xi covariates as follows: 
 
log (
Pij
Pik
) =  β0j +  𝐱iβj + εij       3-8 
 
where βo is a constant and β j is a vector of regression coefficients for j= 1, 2, ..., k-
1 and j=k is the reference category. Maximum likelihood methods are used to estimate the 
model.  The probability distribution of the responses and the multinomial (k-1) equations 
are analogous to the binomial case of a logistic regression model. A separate probit 
regression is run for each of the k-1 equations. The odds ratios (also referred to as relative 
risk ratios) rather than the log odds are the estimates of interest and exponentiation of the 
linear equations return coefficients as relative risk ratios for a unit change in the predictor 
variable (StataCorp 2011). An odds ratio greater than 1 implies that the expected risk of 
staying in an outcome category is higher than the risk of staying in the base line category 
for subjects who are in the (associated higher level of the dummy) predictor variable. An 
odds ratio that is less than 1 describes the opposite.  
3.3.5.1 Variables to predict perceived quality of health services received by the 
insured 
In the Ghana DHS-V (2008), the selected respondents that had health insurance 
coverage were asked to rate the quality of services received during the most recent 
treatment at a clinic or hospital, and if quality was not good, responses indicated the most 
important source of dissatisfaction. Hence the indicator svsqlty equals 1 for the base group 
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of respondents that perceive ‘good’ quality of health services, equals 2 for the group that 
indicate the source of dissatisfaction is long wait times, equals 3 for respondents who 
indicate ‘staff not polite’, 4 if ‘did not receive enough information about treatment’, and 5 
if due to ‘other’ reason. The following are the independent variables to predict individual 
i’s choice of quality rating j: oopd takes on the value 1 if the respondent had made out of 
pocket expenditures and 0 if otherwise, which represents the base group. Also, quintile 
indicates the quintile of wealth the respondent’s household belongs to, with 1 being the 
lowest and 5 being the highest, and the lowest as the reference group. Similarly, nhisqlty 
equals 1 if the respondent perceives that NHIS cardholders receive better quality of service 
than non-cardholders, 2 if similar quality, 3 if worse quality and 4 if ‘not sure’ or ‘cannot 
tell’. The indicator loc2 equals 1 if the respondent lives in an urban community and 2 if 
rural, with urban as the reference group. The indicator gend takes on the value 1 if the 
individual is male and 2 if female, with males as the reference group. The indicator yes_chn 
equals 2 if the respondent lives with his or her child in same household and 1 if otherwise. 
Similarly, educlevel describes the highest level of education attained and takes on the value 
1 if ‘never’ attended school (the base group), 1 if primary education, 2 if secondary and 3 
if post-secondary. 
The data does not specify that a respondent’s most recent treatment at a clinic or 
hospital occurred at a time the individual had insurance coverage but this observation does 
not detract from the usefulness of the information contained in the opinions about the 
quality of health services. Arguably, OOP for health services would raise the threshold for 
expectations about quality received. One may consider that the value of health insurance 
stems from the gains in welfare through expansion in the feasible set of desired health 
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services as J. Nyman postulates (1999, 2001, 2006). In that case OOP by insured 
individuals would imply an expanded feasible set of desired health services (equation 3-1). 
If OOP turns out to be a significant predictor of favorably perceived quality, such an 
observation would be evidence that individuals value health insurance as a strategy to 
expand the feasible set of desired health services and not merely as a hedging against loss 
of income from health shocks. Alternately, if OOP significantly predicts unfavorably 
perceived quality, it would confirm that insurance expands the feasible set of desired 
quality. In other words, finding that OOP significantly predicts perceived quality 
(positively or negatively) implies the value of insurance being in the expansion in the 
feasible set of desired range of health services. A statistically significant correlation 
between OOP and quality would confirm the predictions of the model laid out in equation 
3-1 in the sense that NHIS is welfare-improving. 
Based on evidence in the literature such as in Turkson (2004), Atinga (2012) and 
Yawson et al (2013), the overall perception about quality being good or bad may not differ 
by rural or urban residence but rural dwellers might be more likely to complain about 
inadequate information while urban might more likely complain about long wait times. 
Results which portray residence as a significant predictor of perceived quality would 
demonstrate the compositional differences in perceived quality for rural and urban 
residence.    
Educational attainment, gender and respondent living with son and, or daughter at 
home are included as a control for differences in access to information and health care 
utilization rates. Due to data limitations it is not possible to control for supply-side factors 
that may have direct influence on perceived quality such as the type of health facility in 
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question, the type of provider, the case mix or type of services received, as well as clinical 
indicators of quality such as the health practitioner’s adherence to clinical guidelines for 
consultation, diagnosis or treatment procedures. Similar indicators of technical quality 
include the cleanliness in practice to minimize infection, availability of drugs and medical 
supplies. This limitation notwithstanding the information available allows a satisfactory 
analysis of perceived quality from the client’s perspective along the human dimensions of 
service quality. The model to predict perceived quality of health services involves 
maximum likelihood methods to estimate the following equations:  
 
log (
pij
pi1
) =  𝑏0j + 𝑏1ij𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏2ij𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑞𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝑏3ij𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏4ij𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 +
𝑏5ij𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝑏6ij𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖 + 𝑏7ij𝑙𝑜𝑐2𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗      3-9 
 
Where the b’s are the estimated coefficients and all other variables are as described. 
Indicator j takes the value 1 if respondent perceives health service quality as good, 2 if not 
good due to long wait times, 3 if not good due to impolite staff, 4 if not good due to 
inadequate information about treatment and 5 if not good due to ‘other’ reason.  
3.3.5.2 Variables to predict the relative quality of services to NHIS card holders 
and non-NHIS-cardholder 
Further analysis is made to describe perceptions about the relative quality of 
services received by NHIS card holders compared to non-holders. Respondents were asked 
to rank the quality received by NHIS card holders as better, same or worse than non-NHIS. 
The responses are modeled as a discrete ordered multinomial outcome dependent variable, 
yi, which indicates NHIS cardholder quality as:  better = 1, same = 2, or worse = 3. Ordered 
regression forms like ordered logistic or ordered probit models are common for data with 
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underlying ordering of preferences and would be a natural choice to obtain results that 
reflect the underlying ranking of the quality received by the insured relative to others. 
However, the proportionality of odds across response categories, the assumption that must 
hold in order to apply ordered logistic or ordered probit regressions, does not hold for the 
set of data being used based on results from the Brant test for the proportionality of odds. 
An alternative could be the robust general ordered logistic model but this approach is 
limited to binary variables not easily applied to higher order categorical variables as 
predictors (such as wealth at five different levels or service quality at four different levels). 
Nonetheless the results from the general ordered logistic regression and the ordered logistic 
regression are not very different from the multinomial regression results other than a few 
predictor variables failing to meet the proportionality assumption. Those few variables that 
fail the Brant test are ones that have inconsistent outcomes across the different models.  
The multinomial regression form is therefore the preferred method to determine significant 
predictors of the relative quality but that implies doing away with the ranking of outcomes. 
A similar set of predictor variables used for modeling the perceived quality of services 
received during the most recent treatment at a hospital or clinic (see equation 3-9) works 
for modeling the comparisons between the quality received by NHIS card holders versus 
non-NHIS cardholders. This set is augmented with an additional categorical variable which 
indicates whether the respondent needed services not covered by health insurance. The 
equations to be estimated in this case are similar to equation 3-9 and take the following 
form:  
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log (
pij
pi1
) =  𝑏0j + 𝑏1ij𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏2ij𝑠𝑣𝑠𝑞𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝑏3ij𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏4ij𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 +
𝑏5ij𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝑏6ij𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖 + 𝑏7ij𝑙𝑜𝑐2𝑖 + 𝑏8ij𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗    3-10 
 
where b’s are the estimated coefficients and all other variables as previously 
described, j takes the value 1 if NHIS quality is perceived better, 2 if same, 3 if worse and 
4 if the respondent does not know or is not sure, needsvs equals 1 if respondent had need 
of services not covered by insurance, and 0 otherwise. NHIS being favorably perceived 
would infer some welfare gains from expanding the feasible set of desired health services. 
The alternative would be an indication that quality is an important factor in the successful 
expansion of voluntary enrollments in the NHIS. This would have implications for 
attaining high enrollment rates that correspond to universal coverage while also improving 
the sustainability of a national program on health insurance. Either way, we expect the need 
for health services not covered by insurance to significantly predict a difference between 
quality of NHIS benefits and the alternatives. If need for services not covered by insurance 
turns out insignificant as a predictor of relative quality (regardless if better or worse), one 
may infer that health service quality is not an important source of the value in health 
insurance in Ghana.  
3.4 Data and results from the analysis   
The fifth round of the Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 2008 
is the main source of data for both descriptive and econometric analysis in this study. The 
survey was administered to a sample of 9484 individuals in the age range of fifteen and 
forty-nine years and a response rate of 96%. However, relevant survey modules on out of 
pocket payments and perceived quality of health care was filtered through and administered 
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only to respondents that had indicated having some insurance coverage at the time of 
interview. The narrower focus on insured individuals is relevant in extending the discussion 
to the potential outcomes of NHIS as a policy to attain universal access to quality health 
care. The problem is the limitation of the data in designing a control group to enable 
comparisons with the uninsured to make stronger inferences about the impact of NHIS on 
out of pocket payments and perceived quality of care. Also, OOP is not measured in 
absolute therefore not estimated. It is the incidence of OOP that is modeled in this study. 
The age group of 15-49 is appropriate for this study on the grounds that these are fewer 
exemptions from premium payments (children and the aged) and the sample reflects a high 
proportion of voluntary participation in NHIS, hence enabling inferences about health 
insurance demand. In addition, the sample as defined represents the majority of the 
economically active and sexually reproductive population with implications for health 
insurance demand.  
3.4.1 Summary statistics of variables   
The information in Table 3-2 shows the percent distribution of the sample with 
respect to the key variables involved in the econometric analysis.  Further information on 
socioeconomic characteristics, demographic characteristics and the regional distribution of 
the sample is provided in Appendix C. The gender distribution, with 51.8 percent of 
respondents being female, compares with the general population where females are about 
52 percent of the 14 million people in the age group of 15-65 years (GSS, 2012). More 
than 96 percent of the group of insured respondents had exclusive membership in the NHIS 
and mutual private insurance arrangements took up 2.86% more.  
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Table 3-2: Summary statistics on insurance coverage, out of pocket payments and 
perceptions about quality of health services in Ghana 
 All Female Male 
Sample aged 15-49 years selected for interview 9484 4916 4568 
% total 100 51.83 48.17 
% insured 36.84 41.70 31.61 
Of which %: 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)  96.68 96.93 96.33 
Mutual private insurance members 2.86 2.49 3.39 
Private commercially purchased  0.09 0.10 0.07 
Employer provided insurance 0.31 0.15 0.55 
Of the insured: 
Need to pay out of pocket for drugs and services (%) 18.18 16.15 21.05 
Do NHIS card holders get better service than others? (%) 
Better 50.29 46.83 55.19 
Same 35.89 39.17 31.23 
Worse 10.16 9.9 10.53 
Don't Know 3.66 4.1 3.05 
Did you receive good service last time treated at a clinic or hospital? (%) 
Yes 79.97 81.61 77.63 
No, long waiting time 9.73 8.98 10.80 
No, staff not polite 1.63 1.22 2.22 
No, inadequate information about illness and treatment 3.63 3.41 3.95 
Other 5.04 4.78 5.40 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008. 
  
In other words, Ghana’s health insurance market as largely non-profit since NHIS 
comprises District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes. The private for profit insurance 
market in Ghana is not as much discussed in this work, but the implication of the results 
for health insurance outcomes would otherwise not differ given that commercial insurance 
in Ghana is a very small percentage of the market. Alternately the implication of NHIS for 
the development of the private insurance industry, and the role private insurance in Ghana 
plays is a good question for prospective research. 
The evidence reveals a skewed distribution in the indicator variables on perceived 
quality in favor of a positive perception:  about 80 percent of the insured respondents were 
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positive5 about the overall quality of health services. With regards to perception about 
relative quality received by NHIS versus non-NHIS cardholders, half the respondents 
perceive NHIS to be better while 10% perceive worse; 35% are neutral. It is likely that the 
small proportion (3.66 %) of respondents that ‘do not know’ may have lacked the 
information to decide rather than simply being neutral. A higher proportion of males than 
females perceive subpar quality of health services received at their most recent visit; a 
similar observation holds for NHIS cardholders receive worse services than non-
cardholders.  
The next section is a presentation of results from the econometric estimations of 
the impact of gender, location and wealth status (with other control variables) on the 
likelihood of insurance coverage, and for the insured, the likelihood of paying out of pocket 
for services, dissatisfaction with services received and the perceived quality received by 
NHIS-cardholders versus non-cardholders. 
3.4.2 Who is likely to be insured 
The results from estimating equation 3, that is, the coefficients from the probit 
regression as well as the estimates of the marginal average probabilities (differences in 
probability from the base for each predictor variables) appear in Table 3-3. The marginal 
probabilities associated with each level of the predictor variables and the statistical 
significance attached is determined based on all variables being held constant at their 
means. The variables with a strong level of statistical significance are deemed the 
                                                 
 
5 This observation compares with other studies in Ghana, e.g., Turkson’s (2004) and Yawson’s (2013) 
where respectively 89% and 90% of health care users indicated a general satisfaction with services 
received. 
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predictors of health insurance and the relevance of these predictors in turn determined by 
the relative size of the associated marginal average probability.      
3.4.2.1 Effect of household wealth and employment 
The results confirm that a higher wealth status improves the chances of being 
insured and that the likelihood increases progressively at each higher wealth quintile as 
compared to the lowest quintile.  For instance, the probability that one has health insurance 
improves by 0.37 for an individual in the fifth quintile relative to that of the lowest quintile. 
For an individual in the second quintile of wealth the average marginal probability is much 
less at 0.09 while holding all other variables constant.  
The type of occupation of the individual has some influence on the probability of 
being insured. An individual in a professional, managerial or technical occupation has a 
better chance of being insured compared to an individual that is ‘not working’.  In the case 
of the former, holding all other explanatory variables constant, the probability of being 
insured increases by 0.129. Other identified occupations are worse off than persons ‘not 
working’. Persons engaged in agriculture have the worst reduced probability (-0.06), 
followed by clerical and service occupations (-0.045). Persons in sales or manual trades 
have also reduced probabilities though not statistically significant. Occupation could be an 
indication of the significance of affordability in health insurance status. The list of 
occupations may partly reflect who pays for insurance in the sense that citizens enrolled in 
the public pension scheme - the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) –  
which funds NHIS through payroll deductions, are most likely to be enrolled in the NHIS 
by default. Consequently, individuals in professional, technical and administrative 
occupations, and in particular, the public sector would most likely be enrolled in NHIS. 
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Citizens engaged in informal work arrangements such as in agriculture, sales and manual 
trades, and for whom NHIS enrollment is practically voluntary, the probability of being 
insured would be expected to differ only slightly from that of those ‘not working’. In other 
words, the formality of one’s employment arrangements is a determining factor in the 
likelihood of health insurance coverage.  
3.4.2.2 Influence of access to information 
The results confirm that accessibility of information influences the likelihood of 
being insured. Specifically, respondents who frequently listen to radio, watch television or 
read news are the more likely to be insured. The probability improves by 0.07 for 
respondents that read, watch or listen almost every day compared to respondents who do 
so less than once a week, the probability improves also by 0.05 for respondents who do so 
at least thrice a week (but not almost every day), holding all other explanatory variables 
constant. The results indicate also that education is statistically significant factor for the 
likelihood of being insured. The higher the education level attained the higher the average 
marginal probability:  the probability increases by 0.04 if primary level is the highest 
attained, 0.12 if secondary level attained and 0.21 if post-secondary level attained, when 
compared to the group of respondents who have not attained any level of education.  
Education attainment could be considered as a reflection of one’s ease of access to 
information that is relevant to health insurance demand including where and how to enroll, 
benefits, and the health care provider networks. 
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Table 3-3: Predictors of health insurance coverage among 15-49 year olds 
 Likelihood of health insurance coverage 
  
Coefficient SE 
Difference in 
probability from the 
base level SE 
dummy for respondent’s household wealth quintile; 
base group is the 1st quintile 
   
2nd quintile 0.339*** 0.05 0.093*** 0.01 
3rd quintile 0.583*** 0.06 0.169*** 0.02 
4th quintile 0.898*** 0.06 0.276*** 0.02 
5th quintile 1.168*** 0.07 0.368*** 0.02 
dummy for how often reads, listens or watches  
news media; base group is less than once a week  
At least once a week 0.349 0.28 0.114 0.09 
At least thrice a week 0.154*** 0.06 0.049*** 0.02 
Almost everyday 0.223** 0.10 0.071** 0.03 
dummy for locality of respondent; 
base group is urban 
Rural 0.134*** 0.04 0.043*** 0.013 
dummy for administrative region of respondent;  
base group is Western 
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 Likelihood of health insurance coverage 
  
Coefficient SE 
Difference in 
probability from the 
base level SE 
Central -0.374*** 0.08 -0.106*** 0.02 
Greater Accra -0.740*** 0.07 -0.188*** 0.02 
Volta -0.139** 0.07 -0.041** 0.02 
Eastern 0.268*** 0.06 0.086*** 0.02 
Ashanti 0.040 0.06 0.013 0.02 
Brong Ahafo 0.723*** 0.07 0.238*** 0.02 
Northern 0.518*** 0.07 0.169*** 0.02 
Upper East 0.851*** 0.08 0.280*** 0.02 
Upper West 0.851*** 0.07 0.280*** 0.02 
dummy for age group in years; base is 15-19 
20-24 -0.287*** 0.05 -0.093*** 0.02 
25-29 -0.285*** 0.07 -0.092*** 0.02 
30-34 -0.128* 0.08 -0.043* 0.05 
35-39 -0.168** 0.10 -0.055** 0.03 
40-44 -0.128 0.10 -0.042 0.03 
45-49 -0.254*** 0.10 -0.083*** 0.03 
Unknown -0.025 0.11 -0.008 0.04 
dummy for gender; base group is male 
Female 0.358*** 0.04 0.116*** 0.01 
Dummy for marital status;  
base group is ‘never married’  
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 Likelihood of health insurance coverage 
  
Coefficient SE 
Difference in 
probability from the 
base level SE 
Married 0.217*** 0.06 0.070*** 0.02 
living together 0.012 0.07 0.004 0.02 
Widowed -0.112 0.14 -0.034 0.04 
Divorced 0.053 0.11 0.017 0.04 
not living together -0.101 0.10 -0.031 0.03 
Dummy for respondent having a child at home; 
 base group has ‘none’ 
Has child at home 0.124*** 0.05 0.040*** 0.02 
dummy for occupation of respondent; 
 base group is ‘not working’ 
Professional/managerial/tech 0.375*** 0.08 0.129*** 0.03 
clerical and services -0.138** 0.06 -0.045** 0.02 
Sales -0.070 0.06 -0.023 0.02 
Agricultural -0.184*** 0.05 -0.060*** 0.02 
manual  -0.032 0.06 -0.011 0.02 
Other 0.127 0.11 0.043 0.04 
dummy for highest level of school attended;  
base group ‘never attended school’ 
Primary 0.136*** 0.05 0.042*** 0.02 
Secondary 0.369*** 0.05 0.118*** 0.02 
post secondary 0.631*** 0.09 0.208*** 0.03 
dummy for relationship to head of household;  
base group is ‘head of household’  
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 Likelihood of health insurance coverage 
  
Coefficient SE 
Difference in 
probability from the 
base level SE 
Spouse 0.049 0.05 0.016 0.02 
son/daughter -0.021 0.08 -0.007 0.03 
other relative -0.177** 0.08 -0.056** 0.02 
not related -0.315* 0.17 -0.097** 0.05 
Age in years of head of household 0.027*** 0.01 0.009*** 0.00 
Head of household age squared  -0*** 0.00 0.000*** 0.00 
dummy for tobacco use; base group is tobacco users 
does not smoke 0.239*** 0.08 0.075*** 0.02 
_cons -2.60*** 0.20  
N 8,996.000 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008.  
Binary dependent variable: insured=1 if respondent has health insurance and 0 otherwise. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.4.2.3 Influence of region of residence   
When the Western region is the basis for comparison the pattern that emerges is 
that the marginal probability increases in magnitude and statistical significance the farther 
away (to the north) the region.  Residents to the north (Upper East, 0.28; Upper West, 0.28; 
Northern, 0.17) and middle belt (Brong Ahafo, 0.23) of the country have positive average 
marginal probabilities of high magnitude and strong statistical significance. Comparatively 
regions lying on the Atlantic coast (Central, Greater Accra, Volta) similar to Western have 
lower and negative average marginal probabilities: -0.03 for Volta, -0.1 for Central, -0.19 
for Greater Accra. Ashanti is the only region that is similar to the Western Region in the 
likelihood of health insurance.  These observations could in part be a reflection of the level 
poverty in the respective regions relative to Western region (see Ghana poverty headcount 
and Regional maps in appendix).  Table C4 in appendix C gives further details about the 
regional differences in the important socioeconomic indicators of health insurance. The 
Cramer’s V test shows statistically significant correlation between regions and the 
predictor variables except in the case of gender. This means the percent distributions in the 
explanatory variables reflect the strengths and weaknesses, and the differences across 
regions, though the sign of the correlation is not given. The evidence in Table C4 would 
suggest that some regions are more alike than different such as the case is with quintile of 
household wealth, rural-urban location and education level of respondents among the 
Northern and Upper regions, than the case is in comparison to Western, Ashanti and 
Eastern.   
It becomes obvious that (in comparison to the Western region) regional differences 
in the likelihood of being insured are in favor of the poorer regions (see maps in appendix 
B) and may at face value suggest that NHIS is pro-poor. However, if one compares the 
 150 
 
poverty-adjusted distribution of NHIS it becomes obvious that NHIS is not pro-poor. For 
example, Upper West has more than 50% of population coverage of NHIS, but the poverty 
rate is 70.7% in 2012/2013 (GSS 2014). Northern region similarly has more than 31% of 
population covered by insurance whereas the poverty rate is 50.4%. Greater Accra has one 
of the lowest population coverage (25%) but then poverty rate is 5.6%. In fact, all the other 
regions except Volta have higher rates of population coverage than poverty. Similarly, as 
to how equitable NHIS is, especially with regards to access to health services, further 
information about the regional distribution of realized benefits in access to health care - 
availability of insured services, quality of services, out of pocket payments - would have 
to be considered. Comparing enrollment rates with the distribution of the insurance benefits 
would be a good area for prospective research. The probit results provide evidence that 
rural residents are more likely to have insurance coverage as indicated by the 
statistically significant marginal average probability of 0.04 compared to an urban 
resident. This is another observation that corroborates the patterns in regional distribution 
since poverty distribution patterns is in tandem with distribution of the rural population. 
3.4.2.4 Differences by gender  
With regards to gender females are more likely to be insured; the marginal 
probability is 0.12 and it is statistically significant when all other independent variables are 
held constant.  The finding that females are more likely than males to be insured is common 
in the evidence on Sub-Sahara Africa. This observation has been made in studies in both 
developing countries and advanced countries (Sulzbach et al 2005, Duku et al 2012, 
Kimani et al 2012).  With regards to NHIS, pregnant women have since July 2008 been 
exempt from premium payments (NHA 2010). In the case of NHIS, some information 
 151 
 
gathered from key informant interviews author conducted in January 2013 provide some 
explanation about the female effect.  For instance, the Onwe District Clinic (Ashanti 
Region) administrators recount incidents where some households, members who are 
ineligible for premium subsidies (for example adult males) typically would not enroll for 
NHIS but still access NHIS benefits by proxy. What happens is, in the event that a non-
NHIS cardholder member of the family needs health services, the NHIS eligible household 
member (usually primary care givers who are also female) would present themselves to the 
health care provider as the patient (describing symptoms the real patient may have 
exhibited at home) expecting to obtain a diagnosis and prescription. The medical 
practitioner not knowing, the presenting ‘patient’ (NHIS card bearer) receives the treatment 
plan including NHIS covered prescriptions for the real patient who is at home. Information 
from author’s interviews of physicians in two different health facilities explaining 
challenges faced with NHIS provided accounts that inadvertently corroborate the 
complaints about individuals receiving NHIS benefits by proxy. Physicians recounted 
cases where repeat visits and consequently numerous prescriptions were made within 
relatively short periods, whereas the patient appeared to show little improvement or had 
recurring unrelated problems.  In these narratives the presenting cases were female.  
Another explanation why women are more likely to be insured could be the 
observation that men tend not find NHIS benefits worth the cost of premium payments, 
which might be in part a failure in the national effort to effectively communicate to men 
about NHIS. In an interview with a young man in the waiting area of a health facility while 
his partner was seeing the physician, the respondent requested to know about the real 
benefits of NHIS. In his opinion he had heard a lot but learnt little about NHIS. His partner 
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had often implored him to register them both in the NHIS but he had refused.  However, 
accompanying his pregnant partner to the clinic for the first time and realizing what savings 
out of pocket he could have made just in the cost of hospital registrations and physician 
fees piqued his interest in NHIS.  He had heard mostly negative reviews about NHIS 
benefits from passengers on the bus routes he works as a bus conductor. He had often been 
advised by his clients to avoid NHIS and he had been conflicted because his partner thought 
otherwise.  In an interview with yet another male respondent, himself a patient waiting to 
see the physician at the health facility, there was indication of a determined choice to not 
register with the NHIS.  The respondent indicated willingness to pay whatever it would 
cost to have effective treatment. Effective treatment in his opinion would require 
substantive payments out of pocket and NHIS would be irrelevant. In another interview 
with a 40-year-old chauffeur, the respondent indicated his distrust of NHIS, that it was 
more of a political project, designed to siphon benefits to sympathizers of the political party 
in majority government. In his opinion the NHIS was a good thing depending on who was 
asked.  More interestingly this man indicated he had never registered for and did not plan 
to register for NHIS because he had never really needed to use the health care benefits. 
What was garnered from these interviews was that women, especially those visiting health 
facilities, would tend to be better informed about NHIS and the benefits, and more likely 
to have received benefits through the tangibly lower out of pocket payments when using 
accredited health facilities.  
3.4.2.5 The influence of household composition and age  
The evidence from the probit analysis suggests that household composition has 
significant influence on the likelihood of being insured. Persons living with spouses are 
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7% more likely to be insured than others who have never been in marital relations. 
Individuals in other relationship statuses cannot be said to have probabilities that differ 
from those of persons who have never been in a relationship. With respect to relationship 
to the head of household, being a spouse or son or daughter means one’s probability of 
being insured is not statistically different from that of the household head. Other relatives 
such as nephews, in-laws and parents have a lower likelihood of being insured than 
household head.  Persons not related to head of household have the least probability of 
being insured. Similarly, respondents indicating having a son or daughter living at home 
are 4% more likely to be insured compared to respondents that do not have son or daughter 
living at home.  
Age groupings indicate that the higher the age group the lower the likelihood of 
being insured compared to the base group of 15-19 years. One explanation could be that at 
the time of interview in 2008 NHIS enrollment was free of charge to minors or enrollees’ 
dependents younger than 22 years ().  Comparatively the probability is lowest for young 
adults 20-24 and aged 25-29 with negative marginal probability of 0.093 and 0.092 
respectively. The next lower group is middle aged 45-49 with a negative marginal 
probability of 0.083. Individuals in the age groups 30-34 and 35-39 have lower 
probabilities, though not as wide on the margin.  The age group 40-44 is not statistically 
different than the teens. The results could imply that individuals who have dependents (as 
are household heads) who are minors are motivated to take out insurance, and this group 
mostly fall in the middle ages up to 44. The probit results show also that the older the age 
of the head of the household the more likely a person in that household would be insured. 
The marginal effect is an increase in probability by a percentage point for each additional 
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age in years of the head. The sign on age squared is negative, indicating the existence of 
nonlinearity in the effect of age: while age has an increasing impact on probability the 
effect of age diminishes as household head gets older.  
3.4.2.6 Tobacco use as a measure of health risk aversion 
Although a small proportion of respondents use tobacco the evidence suggests that 
tobacco use is a strong predictor of health insurance status. The results show that the 
probability of being insured increases by 7% for respondents who do not use tobacco 
compared to those who use it. This result may be reflecting health risk aversion of the 
insured or that the insured tend to care more about health status, and therefore less likely 
to use tobacco. In that case it may be concluded that health risk aversion has some influence 
on the likelihood that an individual obtains health insurance in Ghana. On the contrary it 
is not a simple matter of preferences linking tobacco use to health insurance status but 
rather an underlying phenomenon where people using tobacco tend to be male, adult and 
of lower wealth status (all fall in less likely category), given the very small proportion of 
tobacco users.  
The probit results have thus far indicated that affordability of insurance is 
significant in the likelihood of being insured as evidenced by wealth status, type of 
occupation and region of residence which determines whether the insurance premium is 
subsidized or not.  Also important is the ease of access to insurance market as evidenced 
by the region and rural residency with longer history of mutual health insurance 
establishments. Finally, household demographics also matter: teens, persons in marital 
unions, the immediate family of the household head and older household heads are more 
likely to be insured. Further investigation is made to ascertain what factors predict the 
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likelihood that an insured individual makes out of pocket payments for needed health 
services. The next section presents econometric results on incidence and predictors of out 
of pocket payments by insured individuals. 
3.4.3 Incidence of out of pocket expenses by the insured 
Results from the simple probit regression analysis and the Heckman probit model 
(to account also for the correlation between insurance selection and out of payments) for 
predictors of out of pocket payments by insured individuals are shown in Table 3-3.  
3.4.3.1 Influence of the need for services and perception about quality  
The need for uninsured services as expected increases the likelihood of out of 
pocket payments among the group of respondents who have health insurance coverage. 
Individuals who have a need for services not covered by insurance are on average 12% 
more likely to make out of pocket payments relative to comparable individuals. Similarly, 
as expected the perceived quality of services received is a statistically significant predictor 
of out of pocket payments. The probability increases by 4% in the case of an individual 
who did not perceive good quality received, as compared to individuals who perceived a 
good quality at a the most recent visit to a hospital or clinic.   
3.4.3.2 The effect of affordability  
Affordability-related predictor variables (wealth quintile, employment) have 
average marginal probabilities that are not significantly different from zero when the effect 
of insurance selection is not taken into account. Wealth differences have a negligible effect 
on the likelihood of out of pocket payments among the group of insured. When all other 
covariates are held constant, the probability of out of pocket payments by a household in 
the highest wealth quintile is not significantly different from that of a household in the 
 156 
 
poorest wealth quintile. The results lack evidence of a difference in the probability of out 
of pocket expenses by individuals in any of the occupation groups, compared to the base 
group of unemployed individuals. While these covariates increase the likelihood of being 
insured the average marginal probabilities of out of pocket payment attached to these 
variables are not statistically different from zero.  Hence, a difference in ability to pay has 
no significant influence on the likelihood that insured individuals make out of pocket 
payments.  In that respect it could be said that health insurance coverage is equity 
improving in ability to pay for health services in Ghana; the same may not be concluded 
about access to quality health services.  
3.4.3.3 Importance of who pays for the insurance premium  
Who pays for the insurance premium influences the probability of out of pocket 
expenses.  For an individual whose insurance premium is paid for by a relative or friend, 
or by the employer, the probability of out of pocket payments for health services decreases 
by 4% and 8% respectively compared to the case of an individual paying for premium by 
himself.  Therefore, paying for one’s own insurance premium is associated with a higher 
likelihood of out of pocket payments than the case of individuals whose premiums were 
paid for.  This observation could allude to differences in the level of health care coverage 
among different groups of the insured persons. Employer provided insurance may 
correspond to employees having access to some institutionalized care that is more 
comprehensive than the average, even if the insurance policy (NHIS) may specify a 
universal benefits package. 
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3.4.3.4 Regional differences 
One would expect that regions with higher poverty rates have relatively lower 
incidence of out of pocket expenditures as a result of the combined effect of lower ability 
to pay and consequently lower demand for uncovered services, and a weaker health 
infrastructure. In comparison to the Western region insured people in Central and Upper 
East are less likely to make out of pocket expenses. These two administrative regions are 
as well the higher poverty distribution in Ghana (GSS 2008).  A resident of the Volta 
Region is the only case that has a higher (by 15%) probability of making out of pocket 
payments than a resident in Western Region. Residents of Greater Accra, though less likely 
to be insured, are no more likely than Western to make out of pocket payments. The 
regional differences do not all correspond to differences in likelihood of being insured, 
except in the case of Upper East with a higher likelihood of being insured and smaller 
likelihood of having to pay for out of pocket, and vice versa for Volta region. 
Arguably, supply side issues such as health care provider networks and availability 
of insured services as well as health care utilization patterns and incidence of health care 
benefits would be useful for explaining regional variations in out of pocket payments with 
respect to insurance coverage.  Such an investigation is a prospect for further study.  
 
 
  
1
5
8
 
Table 3-4: Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured, Ghana DHS 2008  
 Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured 
 Simple probit model (N=3378) 
Probit model with sample selection¤ 
(N=3245) 
  
Difference 
in 
probability§  SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
 
Difference in 
probability§ SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
Has need of services not covered by insurance: base 
group has not     
 
    
Need services not insured 0.117*** 0.01 0.09 0.15  0.095*** 0.02 0.05 0.14 
Perceived quality of service received during most recent 
visit to a clinic/hospital: base group ‘received good 
service’     
 
    
Quality not good 0.029* 0.02 0.00 0.06  0.016 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
Opinion about quality received by NHIS cardholder 
versus non cardholder:  base is ‘better’     
 
    
Same  0.034** 0.01 0.01 0.06  0.027** 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Worse 0.078*** 0.03 0.03 0.13  0.066** 0.03 0.02 0.12 
do not know/not sure 
0.063 0.04 
-
0.01 0.14 
 
0.060* 0.04 -0.01 0.13 
Household wealth: base group is 1st quintile          
2nd quintile 
0.026 0.02 
-
0.02 0.07 
 
0.026 0.02 -0.01 0.06 
3rd quintile 
0.003 0.02 
-
0.04 0.05 
 
0.021 0.02 -0.02 0.06 
4th quintile 
0.029 0.03 
-
0.02 0.08 
 
0.050** 0.02 0.01 0.09 
5th quintile 
0.049 0.03 
-
0.01 0.11 
 
0.079*** 0.03 0.03 0.13 
Occupation: base group is ‘not working’          
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 Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured 
 Simple probit model (N=3378) 
Probit model with sample selection¤ 
(N=3245) 
  
Difference 
in 
probability§  SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
 
Difference in 
probability§ SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
professional/managerial/tech 
0.013 0.03 
-
0.04 0.07 
 
0.019 0.02 -0.03 0.07 
clerical and services 
0.009 0.03 
-
0.04 0.06 
 
0.004 0.02 -0.04 0.05 
Sales  
0.037 0.02 
-
0.01 0.08 
 
0.025 0.02 -0.02 0.07 
Agricultural 
0.020 0.02 
-
0.03 0.07 
 
0.006 0.02 -0.03 0.05 
manual  
0.012 0.02 
-
0.04 0.06 
 
0.011 0.02 -0.03 0.05 
other -0.019 0.04 
-
0.10 0.06 
 
-0.019 0.03 -0.09 0.05 
Who paid for insurance premium: base group is ‘self’          
relative/friend 
-0.031* 0.02 
-
0.07 0.00 
 
-0.029* 0.02 -0.06 0.00 
employer/SSNIT 
-0.076*** 0.02 
-
0.12 
-
0.03 
 
-0.059** 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 
did not pay 
-0.045 0.04 
-
0.13 0.04 
 
-0.032 0.04 -0.11 0.05 
Highest level of school attended; base group ‘never 
attended’     
 
    
Primary 
-0.012 0.02 
-
0.06 0.03 
 
-0.001 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
Secondary 
0.028 0.02 
-
0.01 0.07 
 
0.034** 0.02 0.00 0.06 
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 Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured 
 Simple probit model (N=3378) 
Probit model with sample selection¤ 
(N=3245) 
  
Difference 
in 
probability§  SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
 
Difference in 
probability§ SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
post secondary 0.071** 0.04 0.00 0.14  0.081** 0.03 0.02 0.14 
Gender; base group is male          
Female 
-0.028* 0.02 
-
0.06 0.00 
 
-0.008 0.02 -0.04 0.03 
Relationship to head of household: base group is 
‘household head’     
 
    
Spouse 
-0.014 0.02 
-
0.05 0.02 
 
0.002 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
Son/daughter 
-0.003 0.02 
-
0.05 0.04 
 
0.005 0.02 -0.03 0.04 
Other relative 
0.044 0.03 
-
0.02 0.11 
 
0.035 0.03 -0.02 0.09 
Not related 
-0.100 0.06 
-
0.22 0.02 
 
-0.077 0.05 -0.18 0.02 
          
Age in years 0.012** 0.00 0.00 0.02  0.007** 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Age squared 0.000** 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Locality of residence: base group is urban          
Rural 
0.017 0.02 
-
0.01 0.05 
 
0.018 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
Region of residence: base group is Western          
Central 
-0.103*** 0.03 
-
0.16 
-
0.04 
 
-0.083*** 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 
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 Likelihood of out of pocket payments by the insured 
 Simple probit model (N=3378) 
Probit model with sample selection¤ 
(N=3245) 
  
Difference 
in 
probability§  SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
 
Difference in 
probability§ SE 
[95% 
confidence 
interval] 
Greater Accra 
0.055 0.03 
-
0.01 0.12 
 
0.010 0.04 -0.07 0.08 
Volta 0.204*** 0.04 0.13 0.28  0.149** 0.05 0.05 0.25 
Eastern 
-0.015 0.03 
-
0.07 0.04 
 
-0.003 0.02 -0.05 0.04 
Ashanti 
-0.038 0.03 
-
0.09 0.02 
 
-0.030 0.02 -0.07 0.01 
Brong Ahafo 
-0.039 0.03 
-
0.10 0.02 
 
-0.009 0.03 -0.07 0.05 
Northern 
-0.028 0.03 
-
0.09 0.03 
 
-0.007 0.03 -0.06 0.05 
Upper East 
-0.112*** 0.03 
-
0.17 
-
0.06 
 
-0.080* 0.04 -0.16 0.00 
Upper West  
-0.065** 0.03 
-
0.12 
-
0.01 
 
-0.020 0.04 -0.09 0.05 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V 2008. 
Note: Binary dependent variable oopd=1 if respondent has had to pay out of pocket for services and zero otherwise. 
§Marginal effect at factor variable levels is the discrete change in probability from the base. 
¤ Full Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman probit model. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.4.3.5 Effect of sociodemographic characteristics of household 
Examining socio-demographic characters of the individual shows that differences 
age and education level have an influence on the probability of out of pocket spending. 
Controlling for the confounding factors in insurance selection suggests that being female 
does not reduce the chance of out of pocket expenditures any better than for male. In 
contrast, an individual with post secondary education has an increase of at least 3 
percentage points (8 points for tertiary education) in probability than the reference group 
that has ‘never’ attended school. The older a person is the higher the likelihood of making 
out of pocket expenses; a year increase in age is associated with a 0.7 percentage point 
increase in probability.  
3.4.4 Predictors of the perception of quality of health care services   
Table 3-5 presents results of the multinomial regression with the perception about 
the quality of health services as outcome (dependent variable). The outcome variable, 
svsquality, indicates whether a respondent, in their own opinion, received a good service 
or not, and if not, what the main source of dissatisfaction was. The perception that service 
received was ‘good’ is the modal outcome, and the base category against which the relative 
risk ratios (calculated as the exponents of the coefficients, i.e., eBi) for the other outcomes 
(‘waiting times too long’, ‘staff impolite’, ‘did not receive adequate information’ and 
‘other’) are estimated.   The predictor (independent) variables include household wealth, 
rural -urban locality, and gender and education level.   
Column I in Table 3-5 reports the relative risk of perceiving poor quality due to 
long waiting times over perceiving good services received.  A respondent indicating that 
NHIS cardholders receive worse quality than non cardholders, or one that have had to pay 
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out of pocket for services is more likely to have experienced waiting times being too long. 
A respondent that had had to pay out of pocket for services tends to be 44% more likely to 
be dissatisfied due to a long wait than an otherwise comparable respondent. If a respondent 
indicated NHIS quality was similar to non-card holders, such an individual was twice likely 
to be dissatisfied due to long waiting times, but if NHIS quality was perceived worse that 
individual was fifteen times more likely to complain about wait times being too long.  
Females as a group are less likely than males to complain about wait times; so do 
individuals with secondary school level than otherwise comparable respondents. The 
estimates attached to quintiles of household wealth show that wealth does not predict 
satisfaction with quality of services, the only exception being the second quintile with a 
lower likelihood of waiting times being longer than otherwise comparable individuals.  
Having one’s child or children in the household is not a significant predictor of perceived 
quality. The results would imply that males and individuals having to pay out of pocket 
and especially those dissatisfied with NHIS are the most likely to be dissatisfied with 
services received due to long wait times.  
With regards to ‘staff not polite’ the relative risk ratios suggest that the predictors 
of dissatisfaction with services include again paying out of pocket, unfavorable perception 
of NHIS cardholder services quality and gender. In this case insured individuals that 
indicate paying out of pocket for health services are twice likely to be dissatisfied than 
otherwise comparable individuals. Subpar NHIS quality perceived is the most significant 
predictor of dissatisfaction due to staff impoliteness. 
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Table 3-5: Factors predicting perceptions about quality of services received at health facilities: multinomial logistic regression  
Dependent indicator variable for quality of service received 
last time treated at a clinic or hospital; base group received 
good service 
No, Waiting times too 
long No, Staff not polite 
 
No, not enough 
information received other 
 odds ratio SE odds ratio SE  odds ratio SE odds ratio SE 
 Has to pay out of pocket: base group ‘does not’ 
oopd 1.442** 0.146 2.033** 0.301  2.088*** 0.215 0.983 0.225 
 Perceived quality of service received by NHIS cardholder  
versus non cardholder:  base group perceives NHIS as ‘better’ 
same 2.581*** 0.144 5.166*** 0.471  1.631* 0.283 1.153 0.213 
worse 15.484*** 0.175 62.065*** 0.464  33.741*** 0.256 5.760*** 0.260 
do not know/not sure 1.539 0.481 4.656 1.092  6.231*** 0.478 26.483*** 0.236 
 Household wealth: base group is 1st quintile 
2nd quintile 0.529*** 0.240 2.213 0.620  0.756 0.393 0.780 0.292 
3rd quintile 0.752 0.228 0.654 0.753  0.954 0.380 0.695 0.312 
4th quintile 0.830 0.230 1.354 0.654  0.922 0.383 0.574* 0.331 
5th quintile 1.020 0.251 1.872 0.686  0.568 0.432 0.792 0.348 
 Locality of residence: base group is urban 
rural 0.969 0.159 1.043 0.353  0.727 0.243 0.699 0.227 
 Gender: base group is male 
female 0.693*** 0.127 0.550** 0.289  0.768 0.202 0.724* 0.175 
 Has child at home: base group has ‘none at home’ 
Child lives at home 1.202 0.129 0.669 0.292  1.147 0.205 0.869 0.178 
Highest level of school attended; base group ‘never attended’          
primary 0.771 0.221 0.488 0.673  0.620 0.401 1.174 0.295 
secondary 0.723 0.189 0.875 0.508  1.024 0.312 0.920 0.268 
post secondary 0.713 0.267 1.529 0.596  1.212 0.422 0.843 0.395 
 Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008. 
Note: Sample size= 3,494 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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An individual is sixty-two times more likely to be dissatisfied if they perceive NHIS quality 
to be worse than non-cardholders and five times more likely even if NHIS quality is 
considered to be similar. Females again are less likely than males to be dissatisfied due to 
staff impoliteness. 
Where the source of dissatisfaction involves communication about the health care 
process, perception about NHIS quality and having to pay out of pocket are the only 
statistically significant predictors of dissatisfaction with services received. An individual 
that perceives that NHIS cardholder receives worse quality than non-NHIS cardholder is 
thirty-three times more likely to be dissatisfied due to inadequate information received than 
an otherwise comparable individual. Even in the case of an individual that cannot decide 
about the relative quality of services received, he is six times more likely to perceive poor 
quality due to inadequate information received than an otherwise comparable individual. 
Having to pay out of pocket for services doubles the risk of perceiving inadequate 
information than not. 
For ‘other’ unidentified reasons for dissatisfaction with health services received at 
the most recent visit to a hospital or clinic, again pessimism about NHIS quality is a 
significant predictor of dissatisfaction. Perceiving NHIS quality as subpar or being 
undecided about the relative quality of NHIS is respectively associated with five times or 
twenty-six times the risk of being dissatisfied than not. Paying out of pocket on the contrary 
is associated with a lower risk of being dissatisfied due to ‘other’ unidentified reason. 
Hence, not having to pay out of pocket is associated with a higher risk of being dissatisfied 
but for some ‘other’ unidentified reason. Females as well as individuals in a higher wealth 
bracket, the 60th percentile, are less likely to complain because of ‘other’ reason.   
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The estimates also suggest that the residence (rural or urban) is not a significant 
predictor of perceived quality for any identified or unidentified reason among the insured 
persons in Ghana.  Similarly having a child at home is irrelevant and so are differences in 
wealth and education levels6.  
In summary, these results imply that among the insured individuals, wealth and 
locality of residence are not significant determinants of the perception of the quality of 
health services received. Evidently, dissatisfaction with quality of health services received 
is predicted by having to pay out of pocket and a perception that NHIS cardholders, 
compared to non-cardholders, receive subpar quality. Additionally, males are more likely 
than females to be dissatisfied with health services received. 
3.4.5 Predictors of perceived quality received by NHIS cardholder   
The insured respondents ranked also the quality of services received by NHIS card 
holders in reference to quality received by non-cardholders. Table 3-6 reports multinomial 
regression estimates of the relative risk that a respondent perceives the quality of services 
received by NHIS card holders is less than better (compared to quality received by non 
NHIS cardholders). The variable nhisqlty is the outcome variable that indicates whether a 
respondent believes the relative quality of health services received is better, same, worse, 
or ‘do not know/not sure’. The modal outcome is ‘better’ and it is the base category against 
which the relative risk ratios for the other outcomes are estimated in the multinomial 
regression.  
                                                 
 
6 Except secondary education and the 2nd quintile of wealth are associated with a lower likelihood to 
complain about waiting times being too long. Also the 4th quintile with has a lower likelihood to be 
dissatisfied due to some other (unidentified) reasons.  
 167 
 
Estimates of relative risk ratios (see Table 3-6) on worse quality given to NHIS 
cardholder indicate not surprisingly that respondents who experienced dissatisfaction with 
the quality of services received at most recent visit are the most likely to perceive worse 
quality of services given to NHIS cardholder. Respondents that experienced staff 
impoliteness are sixty times likely to indicate NHIS cardholders receive worse services at 
1% level of significance, than otherwise comparable individuals would suggest. 
Respondents who indicate receiving inadequate information about treatment are 33 times 
more likely to indicate that NHIS cardholders are worse off. Those for whom waiting times 
were the source of dissatisfaction are 15 times more likely to perceive NHIS as worse 
quality.  Another predicator of NHIS quality being worse is post-secondary education level. 
One explanation could be that higher education may be related to a better access to health 
care information and networks and consequently a higher threshold for quality. An 
alternate explanation could be that higher education corresponds to a higher likelihood of 
occupations and employment that belong in the SSNIT pension scheme and consequently 
mandatory payroll deductions towards the NHIS Fund. One may expect that for such 
individuals the perceived benefits of NHIS, and consequently quality of services, ought to 
be high enough to offset the disutility of mandatory contributions to NHIS Fund. This may 
be especially true for individuals that are least concerned about solidarity. Their threshold 
for quality in NHIS is therefore likely to be higher than average. 
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Table 3-6: Factors predicting perceptions about quality received by NHIS cardholders compared to others: multinomial regression  
 
Same Worse 
Do not know/not 
sure 
 odds ratio  SE odds ratio  SE odds ratio SE 
Need services not covered by insurance: base group has no such need  
Need services not insured 0.662*** 0.10 1.085*** 0.15 0.567*** 0.298 
Perceived quality last treatment at clinic/hospital: base is ‘good service’ 
No, waiting times too long 2.719*** 0.15 15.340*** 0.18 1.652*** 0.481 
No, staff not polite 5.166*** 0.47 60.465*** 0.46 4.677*** 1.093 
No, did not receive enough information 1.724*** 0.28 33.562*** 0.26 6.884*** 0.479 
No, other 1.150*** 0.21 5.819*** 0.26 26.275*** 0.237 
Has had to pay out of pocket for services: base group has not       
Has paid for services out of pocket 1.356*** 0.10 1.348*** 0.16 1.475*** 0.263 
Household wealth: base group is 1st quintile 
2nd quintile 1.020*** 0.14 1.074*** 0.26 0.953*** 0.320 
3rd quintile 1.363*** 0.14 1.393*** 0.26 0.961*** 0.344 
4th quintile 1.410*** 0.15 1.472*** 0.26 0.809*** 0.375 
5th quintile 1.398*** 0.16 1.543*** 0.28 0.671*** 0.410 
Locality of residence: base group is urban 
rural 0.953*** 0.10 0.893*** 0.17 1.016*** 0.264 
Gender: base group is male 
female 1.585*** 0.08 1.487*** 0.14 1.823*** 0.213 
Has child living at home: base group has ‘none at home’ 
Child lives at home 0.999*** 0.08 1.042*** 0.14 0.563*** 0.213 
Highest level of school attended; base group is ‘never 
attended’ 
      
primary 1.102*** 0.14 1.473*** 0.25 0.486*** 0.347 
secondary 1.283*** 0.12 1.197*** 0.22 0.619*** 0.283 
post secondary 1.437*** 0.18 1.647*** 0.29 0.631*** 0.483 
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Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008. 
Note: Dependent indicator variable for perceived quality of services received by NHIS card holder compared to non-cardholder; base group perceives NHIS 
cardholder receives ‘better’ quality.  
N = 3,494.      
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.             
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Females also are more likely than males to perceive NHIS quality as worse. The 
women are consistently more likely to suggest NHIS cardholder receives similar quality, 
or to be unsure about relative quality. In other words, the men are less likely to be 
undecided about NHIS quality and are more likely to say that NHIS is better. This contrasts 
with the case of perceived quality of service received at the most recent visit where females 
were less likely to indicate dissatisfaction about quality received. What may be influencing 
unfavorable position about NHIS than males? Females are more likely to be insured and 
less likely to pay out of pocket (as shown in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 respectively). 
 One explanation could be that females tend to use health care services more often 
in their capacity as primary care givers in the household and therefore more likely to have 
experienced NHIS cardholder benefits. In that case women would more likely hold stronger 
views about NHIS quality. As such unimpressed females may be more likely to perceive 
that non-NHIS cardholders must be better off.  Moreover, females are more likely to be 
unsure about relative quality received by NHIS cardholder.   
The results indicate also that the need for services not covered by insurance is not 
a significant predictor of the quality of health services received. The need for services not 
covered rather decreases the likelihood of considering NHIS quality as similar. In other 
words, respondents needing services not covered are more likely to consider NHIS quality 
as better. The implication is that respondents needing services not covered may be more 
appreciative of NHIS coverage. The summary statistics indicate also that 37 percent the 
respondents who need services not covered compared to 14 percent of the respondents who 
did not indicate a need for services covered, have had to pay out of pocket to pay out of 
pocket.  Since 16 percent of females (compared to 25 percent of males) need services not 
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covered by insurance this may imply that females are more likely to be dissatisfied with 
NHIS. Respondents who have had to pay out of pocket are more likely to consider quality 
as similar and more likely to consider NHIS quality as worse than respondents who have 
not had to pay out of pocket.  
When it comes to being unsure about the quality received by NHIS cardholder, 
paying out of pocket does not make a difference. On the contrary, basic education 
attainment and secondary level attainment are associated with a lower likelihood of being 
unsure, as is having children living at home. Respondents who experienced dissatisfaction 
about quality received at a visit due to inadequate information or other unidentified reason 
are the most likely to be unsure about NHIS quality. So as it turns out, the group of 
respondents more likely to be unsure about the relative quality of NHIS services (in Table 
3-6 ) are also the ones who tend to be dissatisfied with services received at the most recent 
visit because of inadequate information and as well the group that tends to be dissatisfied 
for ‘other’ unidentified reason. Improving access to information or effective 
communication about health services may be effective in improving quality of health 
services especially where NHIS benefits are concerned. The community of residence 
makes for difference with respect to opinions about the relative quality of NHIS cardholder. 
Gender is the only factor that consistently differs in opinion about the relative quality of 
NHIS.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Ghana is pursuing the goal of making basic health care free at the point of service 
through the National Health Insurance Scheme. The goal in this study was to examine the 
progress toward universal access to quality health care and the implication of NHIS on out 
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of pocket payments. The econometric analysis has shown that community of residence, 
ability to pay or affordability and gender are the key predictors of the likelihood that an 
individual or household would be insured. The northern regions, rural communities and 
females have a better chance of being insured but so also are households in higher wealth 
brackets. When insured individuals have had to make out of pocket payments the need for 
service not covered by insurance is the driving factor though ability to pay is also 
significant. This suggests that health insurance improves access to health services by 
making it more affordable. Alternately, out of pocket payments for the insured improves 
the feasible set of desired services since nee, quality and ability to pay are key predictors 
of out of pocket payments. NHIS does not eliminate out of pocket payments and the 
potential equity gaps in ability to pay even if NHIS improves them. Hence the catastrophic 
potential of out of pocket payments persists even though such payments might respond 
stronger to critical needs not included in insurance than to ability to pay for basic package 
of services. The results from the econometric analysis suggest that the attitude of health 
workers has a significant effect on perceived quality of care, more so than the adequacy of 
information or communication about the treatment process. Either information is adequate 
or clients do not care as much for details so long as they are handled with the dignity they 
expect. A good attitude of health workers has potential to significantly improve health 
outcomes, to increase enrollments in NHIS and consequently create a strong subscriber 
base that would ensure long term sustainability of the Scheme with the attendant gains in 
welfare.  
This study falls short in several areas largely due to limitations of the Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey V data in addressing the research questions.  One 
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limitation of this study is the lack of control for heterogeneity in health insurance schemes 
such as differences in performance (inherited, longer established versus relatively new 
mutual health insurance schemes), the local economies and the health system within which 
the schemes operate. This distinction is relevant in evaluating enrollments and outcomes. 
Another limitation is of absence of control for insurance status when analyzing the need to 
pay out of pocket and perceptions about quality of health services. The GDHS V survey 
questionnaire on these topics was administered to insured respondents only.  
Other supply-side issues about NHIS that have to be studied include the technical 
dimensions of quality of health care including clinical procedures and outcomes and 
accreditation of facilities and providers.  Also, information gathered from key informant 
interviews conducted in the process of this study suggest that NHIS faces critical 
challenges in the area of provider incentives, processing of benefits claims and 
reimbursements. However, these issues have been inadequately studied in the literature. 
The plan for a future research program is to evaluate the relative impact of the pilot phase 
of capitation reimbursement program compared to the general fee-for-service 
reimbursement approach on the quality of outcomes, on provider incentives toward quality 
health care and on efficiency in the use of resources in the context of NHIS. The immediate 
plan, however, is to extend this study to examine the key attributes of health care workers 
and health care facilities that produce quality outcomes and whether the NHIS has an effect 
on these outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH 
INSURANCE APPROACHES TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN 
GHANA AND RWANDA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The World Health Organization describes universal health care coverage as the 
progressive development of a health system including its financing mechanisms into one 
that ensures that everyone has access to quality, needed health services and where everyone 
is accorded protection from financial hardships linked to accessing these services (WHO 
2011).  Accordingly, it is a challenge for a health system and any country for that matter to 
attain universal health care coverage with regard to reaching social or political consensus 
and mobilizing the appropriate financing mechanisms that must be in place. By several 
accounts, Ghana and Rwanda are the only two in Sub-Sahara Africa considered to have 
achieved an “intermediate stage of development in their [universal] health coverage” 
(Dixon et al 2014) while a few others like Kenya, Mali and Nigeria are in the early stages 
of reform (Lagomarsino et al 2012). In 2003 Ghana passed its National Health Insurance 
Law (Act 650) with the goal to create sustainable financing of quality health care for all, 
with special emphasis on the poor in Ghana. It is this Law that established the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) specifically to:  
 
“…secure the provision of basic health care services to persons resident in the 
country through mutual and private health insurance schemes; to put in place a body to 
register, license, and regulate  health insurance schemes and to accredit and monitor 
healthcare providers operating under health insurance schemes; to establish a national 
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health insurance fund that will provide subsidy to licensed district mutual health insurance 
schemes; to impose a health insurance levy and to provide for related matters”. (Republic 
of Ghana 2003, p.1) 
 
Following the Law, the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (one per 
administrative district in Ghana) which constitute NHIS, the auxiliary institutions of the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
and the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) were created in quick succession. 
Presently, 156 DMHIS schemes representing more than 9 million subscribers (34% of the 
population) and 3,593 health care providers participate in the NHIS.  
Rwanda has similarly adopted a National Health Insurance Policy (RNHIP) as a 
strategy to attain universal access to health care with this expressed goal: “to provide a 
national framework for strategies and actions aimed at assuring that all residents of 
Rwanda can be enrolled in a health insurance plan that provides access to quality health 
care” (Ministry of Health, Rwanda 2010 p. 14). The RNHIP expands on previously 
existing community health insurance (CHI) and social health insurance (SHI) arrangements 
by including the formulation of a comprehensive framework specifically to strengthen 
public-private institutions partnerships and to establish a health insurance council to 
oversee the coordination of activities in the health insurance sector.  The community health 
insurance schemes, commonly known as Mutuelle de Santé, hence Mutuelle, are often cited 
as a classic example of mutual health schemes in the developing country context. The 
majority of citizens are enrolled in a CHI schemes with coverage estimated at more than 
85% in 2008 and although enrollments decreased in some years the proportion still stood 
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at 87% of the population according to the Ministry of Health (hence MOH-R) in Rwanda 
(MOH-R 2010, MOH-R 2012). Rwanda has some level of social insurance whereby 
employees in the formal public and private sector have mandatory insurance with 
contributions of 15% of basic salary, 7.5% of which is contributed by the employer. Also 
in existence is the Military Medical Insurance (MMI) for personnel and their dependents 
and it is funded by mandatory contributions of 22.5% of basic salary with 17.5% borne by 
the government. It is estimated that more than 90% of residents in Rwanda have health 
insurance (MOH-R 2012, RDHS 2011, EICV 2010). In effect not only do Ghana and 
Rwanda have in common a legal mandate on universal access to health care, they both have 
adopted district-level health insurance schemes as the main mechanism through which to 
attain universal health insurance coverage. Similarly, in both countries policy reforms 
towards a universal health insurance in recent years have involved efforts to increase 
centralization of fund management. In a revised Ghana National Health Insurance law (Act 
825) enacted in 2012 all the district schemes have been merged to form a nationwide NHIS 
which every resident of Ghana is now expected by law to belong to.  Consequently, all the 
district fund pools have been merged into on central Fund (NHIF) from which the 
Authority (NHIA) allocates subsidies to districts to cover operational costs. Effectively 
NHIS has evolved into a government-run community-level insurance scheme. Rwanda also 
has, since adoption of RHNIP in 2012, made the Rwandan Social Security Board as the 
supervisory authority in charge of all Mutuelle schemes but the community ownership is 
retained. In addition, a national pool of funds has been set up into which the funds 
mobilized by all Mutuelle schemes are to be collected (MOH-R 2012).  
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After almost decade in operation NHIS had just about 34% of the national 
population in membership according to the National Health Insurance Authority (2010). 
By December of 2012, 8,885,757 people were enrolled in 2012 (NHIA 2012), which 
amounts to an estimated 40% of the population. Yet a significant proportion of the 
population are eligible for exemptions from premium payments (the dependent minors of 
insured adults, pregnant women, the core poor and senior citizens aged seventy or more). 
What is more, alternative health insurance covers about 5% of the population (Ghana DHS 
2008) so that population coverage pales in comparison to Rwanda. Mutuelle has received 
acclaim for the high rates in population coverage. When the MOH-R began implementing 
a rollout of Mutuelle in 2006 only three out of thirty districts had been in operation in the 
pilot phase beginning in 1999. By the end of 2006, voluntary enrollments had increased 
fast enough to cover 76% of the population (MOH-R 2008).  Yet, unlike the NHIS, 
Mutuelle subscription stipulates insurance copayments and while the health services 
covered have been described as comprehensive (MOH-R 2012) the benefits package is by 
comparison smaller than the NHIS that is stipulated to cover 95% of the disease burden in 
Ghana.  
Given the near universal insurance coverage in Rwanda one may infer by this 
measure that Rwanda has made faster gains towards universal health care which then brings 
to question what the critical factors to Rwanda’s success are. More importantly, do the 
higher rates of insurance enrollments correspond to depth in coverage and equitable access 
to health care? Has there been a trade off in expanding coverage and access to quality 
services? Is speeding up insurance coverage sustainable given domestic resource and 
resource mobilization capacities? Or does universal health insurance coverage correspond 
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to a higher aid dependency? What key lessons and what caution should countries following 
in the stead of Ghana and Rwanda draw from either country’s experience? These are 
valuable lessons that a comparative analysis holds potential for. A scrutiny of the factors 
that have been critical to the insurance participation rates in Rwanda and Ghana could is 
relevant as general case study on universal health insurance coverage. In addition, it would 
be informative to compare these two countries along the dimensions of access to health 
care as well as sustainable financing to put in context the progress that Ghana has made 
and to examine the feasibility of attaining universal access to health care given the political 
economy.  
Arguably an attempt to compare policy outcomes across different jurisdictions is 
fraught with challenges beginning with the concern that they differ in policy contexts and 
the rate of policy change. The assessment of policy or its impact is a challenge given the 
multiplicity of variables that affect policy formulations and their outcomes. As one would 
expect, the difficulties are compounded when different countries are compared. However 
cross country comparisons may yield benefits in understanding the important factors that 
contribute to the progress of policy outcomes. Cyr and deLeon (1975) argue in favor of 
cross country policy comparisons by stating that:  
 
“…expanding the analytical horizon from one nation to two can easily more than 
double the difficulties involved. Nevertheless, comparative work also holds considerable 
promise for both the academician and the policymaker. The opportunities it provides are 
roughly related to the qualities which make it difficult”. (Cry and deLeon 1975 p.6) 
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Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) have similarly observed that in health policy 
research cross country comparisons of health is a common approach to evaluating 
normative questions such as concern equity in health or access to health care. In spite of 
their differences as far as countries, Ghana and Rwanda have both experienced colonialism 
and the repercussions on the political, social, cultural and economic institutions. Both 
attained independence from colonial rule around the same period: Ghana in 1957, Rwanda 
in 1960. Both are Sub-Saharan, although of different geography and ecology. In both 
countries mutual insurance schemes are de jure integral to the approach to universal access. 
Both have begun a policy on health insurance coverage around the same period: with the 
passage of the NHIL in 2003 and the beginning of NHIS implementation in 2005 in Ghana; 
with the beginning of CBHI in a pilot phase in 2003 and the national roll out beginning in 
2005 in Rwanda. Moreover, both countries have similarly structured national surveys that 
produce the data bases often used to assess indicators on health outcomes including health 
insurance demand (Demographic and Health Surveys) and living standards including 
household health expenditures (Ghana Living Standards Surveys; EICV in Rwanda). 
Contemporaneous comparisons become more feasible as either country surveys tend to be 
conducted within a year or two of the other country. For example, the standard DHS in 
Ghana has occurred in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 and in Rwanda, in 1992, 2000, 
2005, 2010 and 2015. The standard GLSS in Ghana has occurred in 1987/88, 1991/92, 
1998/99, 2005/06 and 2011/12 and in Rwanda in 1985, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2005 and 
2011. Even if these countries may be different than alike on a number of fronts the two are 
leading examples of reformers in universal access in SSA and consequently relevant in the 
global dialog on universal health care. Lessons on best practices could be extended (with 
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caution to case-specific factors that are not easily replicable) to other nations. The lessons 
are especially relevant to several in Sub Sahara Africa such as Nigeria, Kenya, Mali and 
Senegal that are at different stages of initiating or implementing universal health coverage 
reforms through national health insurance schemes, sometimes closely following the 
experiences of Ghana and Rwanda.  
4.1.1 The research goal, questions and hypotheses 
Ghana and Rwanda present interesting cases for comparative analysis given the 
similar objectives to attain universal access by means of a national health insurance policy 
but not so similar policy contexts and community-based approaches. More importantly 
Rwanda is close to attaining a feat that Ghana still struggles with- universal coverage in 
health insurance. It becomes useful to closely examine what factors and institutional 
features are critical to progress or to the challenges in adopting and implementing the 
respective district-based approaches to universal access. It is important to identify what 
factors may be considered luck or effort, country-specific or replicable. It is important also 
to identify how financially feasible universal access to health care could be, considering 
the program design, external resources and domestic resource capacities in either of these 
less resourced, developing countries.  
The goal in this essay is to examine the factors critical to the success and challenges 
of community-based approaches to national health insurance in the form they are 
implemented in Ghana and in Rwanda. The health insurance enrollment rate in Rwanda 
has climbed in spite of a difficult political history and modest economic resources as the 
country is ranked among the poorest in the world. External aid has been instrumental and 
leads to the question of the sustainability of universal health coverage.  On the other hand 
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Ghana’s experiment with combining funding sources (payroll deductions and general 
taxation) that are more adaptable to the advanced country context with community-based 
funding and management of schemes, also presents a question for debate about financial 
sustainability in a relatively large informal economy and a weak tax system. In either 
country the policy on national health insurance has universal access to health care as the 
ultimate objective. Consequently, the existing health insurance arrangements may be 
considered to have limited potential towards attaining universal access to care if expansion 
in access to care and the financial risks associated remain unchanged. In other words, the 
objective in this study is to analyze the impact and financial sustainability of community 
based insurance models adopted in Rwanda and Ghana as the mechanism to expand access 
to health care. The following are the specific questions the analysis attempts to answer:  
 (i) What are the outcomes in population coverage, access to health services and 
financial risk protection?  
(ii) What are differences in institutional factors and program design that explain 
differences in the outcomes?  
(iii) Are the programs financially sustainable? If not, what policy changes are 
needed to keep them sustainable?   
The initial hypotheses are that health insurance programs increase access to health 
services and the impact on access to health services is independent of the community-based 
model adopted, but a stronger domestic revenue mobilization capacity improves long term 
financial sustainability. One may argue that health insurance coverage in the developing 
country context is not a sufficient condition to guarantee access to quality health care 
considering that supply-side factors such as the availability of resources, the technical 
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quality of health care delivery and the efficiency of the health system are necessary. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that subscribers voluntarily enroll in health 
insurance programs because they expect to minimize financial barriers in accessing needed 
health care. Continual voluntary enrollments and expansion in insurance coverage then 
signal that access to health services is expected to have improved than the alternative case 
of the absence of an insurance program. One other assumption is that, in principle, the 
program objectives in Ghana and Rwanda are similar with respect to the policy goals for 
universal coverage, hence observed differences in population insurance coverage may be 
attributed to factors related to the program design. With regards to financing structure, 
earmarked taxation, mandatory payroll deductions from the formal sector and stipulated 
subscription payments by informal sector subscribers are the main sources of funds for 
Ghana NHIS (National Health Insurance Authority 2010, NHIA 2012). Rwanda Mutuelle 
has similar financing sources as Ghana but the relative importance differs while external 
sources are relatively significant than the case of Ghana (Ministry of Health Rwanda 2012, 
MOH-R 2013).  
The evidence in this study suggests that insurance programs improve access to 
health care and provide financial risk protection as expected. Ghana’s NHIS enrollments 
have been strongly associated with a higher socioeconomic status: higher wealth brackets, 
formal employment and higher education. In contrast to Ghana, Rwanda’s insurance 
system includes a mandatory feature through the requirement of enrollment by whole 
household units and household contributions to insurance premiums are determined by 
ability to pay. This program design corroborates the evidence in the empirical literature 
showing that disadvantaged groups are excluded from Ghana’s NHIS to a greater extent 
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than in Rwanda (e.g., Binagwaho et al 2010, Dhillon et al 2012, Lu et al 2012, Dixon et al 
2014b, Kusi et al 2015) as illustrated in Table 4-3 with further details in Appendix D. The 
Rwandan model is an integrated approach to poverty reduction which benefits from a high 
level of political commitment.  On the contrary political branding of Ghana’s NHIS 
overshadows its relevance as development strategy. With respect to provider 
reimbursements, Rwanda has inbuilt performance evaluation and monitoring with a client-
based component which helps to reduce principal-agent problems. Ghana lacks an 
integrated client-based evaluation component but rather emphasizes provider focused 
evaluations such as clinic audits. However, these measures have proven to be inadequate 
to deter considerable fraud in provider claims in either country. Contrary to the initial 
hypotheses about mode of financing and sustainability, institutional accountability is the 
critical factor for financial sustainability both in Ghana and Rwanda. The implication for 
policy is that Ghana NHIS should incorporate a mandatory component which is essential 
to the successful expansion in coverage to levels commensurate with universal coverage. 
Ghana should improve equity in coverage by determining household contributions 
according to ability to pay, and even though this proves to be a difficult challenge in Ghana, 
the search for a means-tested approach to premium contributions must continue.  
Subsequent sections provide further results and the details of this study. 
4.1.2 Method of analysis and data sources 
The comparison between the Ghanaian and the Rwandan model of national health 
insurance as a means to achieve universal coverage is based on existing data. An extensive 
literature review and a logging of information are the main methods used. These include 
assessments of the evidence about the linkages between participation in the health 
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insurance schemes and the outcomes in access to and utilization rates of health services, as 
well as financial risk protection and how strong these linkages are. Majority of the evidence 
is based on district level household and health facility surveys, and national household 
surveys and demographic and health surveys. Activities include identifying and 
categorizing the evidence about the key institutional and program design features that sets 
the schemes apart. The approach to financial sustainability assessment includes key 
accounting ratios and descriptive statistics. Financial sustainability of the approach to 
universal coverage would be assessed with respect to reliability of the sources of funding 
over the short and the medium term. This exercise would rely on both published and grey 
literature in country specific public records such as fiscal data, national health accounts 
and reports.  Further details about the methods are discussed in each respective section. 
4.1.3 Conceptualizing universal access to health care 
Universal health care coverage (universal coverage) invokes the values of equity, 
shared responsibility and quality in health care delivery irrespective of the individual’s 
ability to pay (WHO 2005, Stuckler et al 2010, WHO 2011, Japan-World Bank 2013, 
Mebratie et al 2014). It involves judgments about the range of services, the intended 
recipients and expectations about the quality of the defined services. As such universal 
health care may imply different things to different groups or countries but the common 
theme is the non-discriminatory access to a defined health benefit for a defined group of 
the population (Stuckler et al 2010, Mebratie et al 2011, Lagomarsino 2012).   Universal 
health ‘coverage’ has often been applied to the low and middle-income country context 
while universal health ‘care’ is the term often applied to the high income country setting. 
This distinction draws attention to the fact that attaining broad coverage of the population 
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does not necessarily guarantee access to a basic package of health care in the developing 
country context (Stuckler et al 2010). Drawing on this important distinction, this study 
conceptualizes universal access to health to imply the absence of economic barriers to 
attaining needed health care. This operational definition precludes connotations of the 
technical quality or the effectiveness of the defined minimum package of services. In other 
words, universal access in the context of this study assumes away the effectiveness of the 
defined basic package of health services in meeting the intended health needs of the 
population. In a similar way this study assumes a distinction between universal health 
insurance coverage and universal access to health care. In other words, we do not assume 
a high insurance coverage rate would necessarily imply the attainment of a universal health 
care system. The focus is that community-based health insurance approaches are the tool 
to expand health insurance coverage and by that, to expand access to a given minimum 
basic package of health care. In that respect universal health insurance coverage may 
ultimately lead to universal access to a defined minimum package of health care. The 
narrower definition is for the purposes of analysis while also acknowledging that 
assessments about universal coverage requires a holistic analysis of the health system 
including health services delivery and technical quality of health care and not only the 
analysis of financial barriers to access.    
As one would expect of population dynamics, universal health coverage entails 
dynamic continuous processes in response to shifting demographics, epidemiological and 
technological trends and expectations (WHO and World Bank 2015). Assessment of UHC 
design and implementation can be made by the dimensions in height, depth and breadth of 
coverage (Stuckler at al 2010). Height is in reference to financial cost sharing so that public 
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dominance would be commensurate with a greater height in coverage than would be the 
case with private dominance where services are based on ability to pay. Width refers to the 
percent of the population covered so that a broader program would cover almost all the 
population regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, as against targeted groups of the poor or 
the pregnant or children or veterans and such like. Depth of coverage refers to the extent 
of services included, whether a basic package of services or some essential medicines, 
hence the more comprehensive the package, the deeper the coverage. Another 
differentiating feature of a UHC program is the mobilization of resources or the financing 
structure. The key mode of financing are prepayments toward pooling risks, either through 
a national framework of mandatory contributions to (state-managed or privately-managed) 
social insurance programs, or through contributions to a community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) with voluntary membership as often apply in the developing country setting. CBHI 
generally involves greater participation of the target population in the design and 
management of the insurance scheme (Mebratie et al, 2013) and participation is often 
voluntary.  
Rwanda has adopted a two sector approach to expanding health insurance coverage 
as an important means to attain universal access to health care (community-based health 
insurance on one hand and social health insurance on the other) while Ghana combines 
both. NHIS is largely domestically financed arising from internal political dynamics while 
overseas development assistance has had a greater role in sustaining Rwanda’s CBHI 
program. The table gives a brief overview of the current structure of the programs while 
subsequent sections provide details about how this structure has evolved. Subsequent 
sections provide details also about the differences in outcomes, the peculiar and the 
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common institutional features of these country models and how these features explain the 
observed outcomes.  
   
Table 4-1: The general structure of financing and coverage: NHIS versus Mutuelle 
 Ghana NHIS Rwanda Mutuelle 
Starting year of nationwide 
expansion 
2005 2006 
Breadth of coverage Eligibility for all citizens.  
 
35% national population 
coverage in 2012 
Eligibility for informal sector.  
76% national population 
coverage in 2015  
Depth of coverage Defined package of services 
covering 90% of the national 
disease profile.  
All primary health care services; 
secondary services with varying 
levels of coverage  
Sources of financing Domestic: 
5-7% in premium s 
63-81% in earmarked taxes  
17-19% in payroll taxes 
  
 
ODA: 
< 5% in donations  
Domestic:  
55-66% in premiums 
2% in levies 
14% or more in government 
budget allocations  
5-6% in copayments 
 
ODA:   
11% in The Global Fund 
Administrative structure Relatively centralized 
-District schemes managed by 
local and government appointees 
-NHIA is the central 
implementing agency 
Decentralized 
-District schemes managed by 
community-appointed 
representatives  
-Implementation decisions 
shared between Ministry of 
health and scheme managers 
Provider reimbursement method Fee-for-service 
Capitation in select regions 
Fee-for-service with inbuilt 
performance-based evaluation 
Sources: Ministry of Health Rwanda Annual Report in various years, National Health Insurance Authority 
Annual Report in various years, and author’s calculations. 
 
 
4.1.4 Outline of the study 
The next section is a brief description of the country background by presenting 
several indicators of economic development and health system performance.  Section three 
presents a systematic review of the literature on the impact of Mutuelle and NHIS on 
households with emphasis on the patterns in enrollments, health services utilization and 
financial protection. Section four builds on the evidence by presenting the differentiating 
features of Mutuelle and NHIS that may lend themselves to differences in the patterns 
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observed. Section five analyses the financial sustainability issues for Mutuelle and NHIS. 
Section six is a summary of the key findings and concluding remarks and prospects for 
research. 
4.2 Country background 
A brief description of the economies of Ghana and Rwanda is useful to put in 
context the relative level of economic development and also the health system that 
Mutuelle and NHIS are founded in. This summary review of some key indicators suggests 
that the economic status and the development progress achieved in the recent decade vary 
for Ghana and Rwanda but the need to sustain improvements in access to health services 
is equally critical. In addition, this background information helps to explain the evidence 
presented in the study and the implications for universal health care coverage.  
4.2.1 Structure of economy and poverty 
As is common to most SSA and developing countries in general, Rwanda and 
Ghana have significantly large informal and agrarian sectors although slight transitions 
have been observed in recent decade. This feature of large informal sector is an important 
factor in the adoption of community-based health insurance as a policy tool for universal 
coverage. Informal sectors have limited access to formal financial services and expectedly 
lower rates of participation in formal insurance markets. Similarly, a limitation in formal 
employment arrangements limits the reach of social or employer-based health insurance. 
Accordingly, mutual or community risk pooling arrangements, whether government-
sponsored, donor-sponsored or completely autonomous, have become a dominant medium 
to reach the informal sector with health insurance services.  
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In Rwanda, subsistence agriculture is the source of livelihood for upwards of 49% 
of the population with another 9% in farm wage employment. Another 19% are in non-
farm self-employment and 14% in nonfarm wage employment (NSIR 2012). The economy 
grew at an average of 8.8% in 2011 spurred by the industrial growth resulting from the 
scale up of construction projects in national infrastructure building. Similarly, in Ghana 
recent data indicates more than 68% of the employed are in own-account, vulnerable work, 
hence predominantly informal (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). In recent estimates, 44.3% 
or employed individuals are directly engaged in agriculture or fishery and 10% are in 
manufacturing and industry. The services sector has been the leader in growth, unlike the 
case of Rwanda where industry is the growth leader. Also, Ghana has experienced a faster 
growth trajectory with rates as high as 15% in 2011 and an average of 6% in the years since 
2007 bolstered by revenues from oil and gas production (African Development Bank 
2014).  Regardless Ghana has been experienced widening budget deficits with an 
unprecedented deficit of 13% of GDP in 2012 and similar in 2013. What is more, neither 
the recent growth trajectory nor the deficit correspond to faster growth in health sector 
resources or improved health outcomes as may be observed below.  
Ghana has relatively higher gross national income per capita and lower rates of 
poverty than Rwanda as demonstrated in Figure 4-1. Although Rwanda is ranked among 
the poorest countries, evidence from living standards measurement surveys (Integrated 
Household Living Conditions Surveys or EICV 7 ) shows that poverty has declined 
                                                 
 
7 Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages 
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significantly in recent years.  For instance, consumption poverty fell from 58.9% in 
2000/2001 to 56.7 in 2005/2006 and again to 44.9% in 2010/2011. Extreme poverty 
declined from 40% in 2000/2001 to 35.8% in 2005/2006 and to 24.1% in 2010/2011. 
Within this period Rwanda achieved increased agricultural production, slower population 
growth, increases in non-farm wages and improvements in income transfers which may 
explain the poverty reduction. While poverty reduction has been significant in all 
provinces, rural poverty was 48% compared to urban poverty at 22% in 2010/2011 (NSIR 
2012). The depth of poverty in the capital, Kigali City, is 16.7% while differences between 
other provinces tend to be very small ranging from 42% to 52% in 2010/2011.  
Rwanda has more than 75 percent of the population living in rural areas compared 
to 49.8% in Ghana as shown in Figure 4-3.  This predominance of rural population has 
greater implications for inequities in access to economic infrastructure and its influence on 
the patterns in poverty distribution. For example, access to electricity for lighting is a low 
10.8% for the general population in Rwanda and yet rural-urban inequality is pronounced: 
46 percent of urban population have access compared to 4.7 percent of rural population. 
Using the World Bank estimate of the Gini index as an indicator of overall inequality, 
Rwanda compares better than Ghana as illustrated in Appendix D. Rwanda’s index 
increased from 28.9 in 1984 to a high of 53.1 in 2006 although declining to 50.8 in 2011, 
whereas Ghana’s index was at a level of 35.5 in 1987 but gained a smaller increase to 42.3 
in 2005.  
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Figure 4-1: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP): Ghana and Rwanda 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Gross national income per capita in Ghana and Rwanda (current US $) 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
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Figure 4-3: Population distribution by locality and access to electricity in Ghana and 
Rwanda (percent of total population) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
 
4.2.2 Health system performance in Rwanda and Ghana 
In 2000 the WHO World Health Report ranked Rwanda as one of the weakest 
health systems in the world. Rwanda had an overall rank of 172 out of 191 countries. Ghana 
was viewed to have a better health system at a rank of 135.  On health level indicators 
Ghana and Rwanda ranked worse at 158 and 181 respectively. Rwanda performs better 
however in the indicators of fairness in financial contribution, ranking at 60 compared to 
75 for Ghana. The relative importance of the factors that make up the ranking index is as 
follows:  1. Health Level: 25% 2. Health Distribution: 25% 3. Responsiveness: 12.5% 4. 
Responsiveness Distribution: 12.5% 5. Financial Fairness: 25%. To put in perspective how 
Ghana and Rwanda performed one may compare that only four other SSA countries 
(Seychelles, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Sudan) in the first 134, ranking at 56, 59, 132 and 
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134 respectively. Afghanistan, Cambodia and Burma were the only non SSA to rank below 
Rwanda at 173, 174 and 190 respectively. Although the WHO has since declined to rank 
health systems one has a point of reference about the relative progress Ghana and Rwanda 
have made in subsequent years.  
Nationwide surveys indicate that Rwanda has made significant gains in maternal 
and child mortality. The annual maternal mortality rates have reduced from 1071 deaths in 
2000 to 487 in 2010 and 69% of deliveries in 2010 were assisted by a skilled worker 
compared to 39% five years prior. In 2010 90% of children from 12 months to 23 months 
had received the scheduled vaccinations compared to 76% five years prior. Annual under-
five mortality rates declined from 152 deaths in 2005 to 76 in 2010. Rwanda is therefore 
believed to be on target to achieve the millennium goal for child mortality and maternal 
mortality by 2015 (NISR 2012). The usual major challenges in health service delivery such 
inadequate infrastructure and human resources, in particular, midwives and specialist 
doctors still persist. The average travel time to the nearest health facility is sixty minutes 
and at least 40% of the population live more than five kilometers away from a health facility 
(MOHR 2010, NISR 2012). It is easy to compare maternal and child health in both 
countries given the emphasis these demographics have received in the Millenium 
Development Goals for the past decade. Recent data (see Figure 4-4Figure 4-4) shows 
Rwanda has progressed from a weak position to attain better outcomes especially in 
maternal mortality even though Ghana had considerably better outcomes at the turn of the 
century. 
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Figure 4-4: Health outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
 
Judging by the level of human resources (see Figure 4-5) Ghana has a better 
resourced health system than Rwanda: physicians per 1,000 populations was 0.056 in 2010 
compared to 0.096 in Ghana, which translates to 17857 and 10417 people per doctor in 
Rwanda and Ghana respectively. Looking back, Rwanda has made some progress in this 
area considering the average of 0.069 physicians per 1000 of the population in the period 
2006-2013 compared to 0.1 in Ghana over the period 2000-20009 according to the country-
specific factsheets of health statistics published in WHO databases. Over the same periods 
the nursing and midwifery personnel per 1000 population was 0.69 and 1 in Rwanda and 
Ghana respectively.  
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Figure 4-5: Physicians per one thousand population: Ghana and Rwanda 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database.. 
 
Human resources aside, Rwanda has been described as having one of the most 
efficient public sector administration and consequently an efficient health system in Sub 
Sahara Africa. In contrast, the public health sector financing in Ghana has been described 
as in transparent (Abekah-Nkrumah et al 2009). The health system in Ghana was once 
described as the second most corrupt in the world (World Bank, Africa Development 
Indicators 2012). Seeing as a significant proportion of health sector financing is channeled 
through the public sector in Ghana it is easy to appreciate how public sector inefficiencies 
or mismanagement could have significant constraints on health outcomes in Ghana. On the 
other hand, a greater share of public health expenditures may have implications for equity 
since countries that have a stronger public role in the health sector have generally been 
associated with better equity in health care coverage (Stuckler et al 2010). 
4.2.3 Patterns in expenditures on health 
Domestic sources of health spending are an important indicator of a government’s 
commitment and a critical factor in the sustainability of health programs (Heller 2005, Lu 
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2010). The WHO (2010) estimates that the minimum per capita expenditure on health 
services required to provide basic life saving services is $44 per year. The average per 
capita health expenditures in current US dollars for the period 2010-2014 is estimated at 
$100 and $77 for Ghana and Rwanda respectively (World Bank 2014). By this measure, 
both countries would have resources at their disposal to provide a minimum basic package 
of health care. However, a given level of expenditures does not guarantee the required basic 
minimum package without taking into account other technical and institutional factors of 
the economy as well as the socio-cultural and economic barriers households face in gaining 
access to adequate care.   
Some general patterns in the expenditures on health over the past two decades show 
notable differences between Ghana and Rwanda, the shifting roles of public and private 
financing channels, and the relative importance of out of pocket expenditures.  In Rwanda 
over 40% of expenditures on health is financed from external with such funds going 
towards targeted programs (Rwanda 2010). The share of external funding in total health 
expenditures is believed to be much higher because of significant amounts of work by 
nonprofits that may not have been fully captured in the national accounts (Rwanda, 2010). 
Ghana also benefits from external support although the share in total expenditures on health 
is small compared to Rwanda, as illustrated in Figure 4-7. However, private expenditures 
are a bigger share in Rwanda as inferred from the relative share of public health 
expenditures in GDP (see Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7)  but the share of out of pocket 
expenses including insurance premiums (MOH-R, 2006) in the total expenditures are lower 
compared to Ghana (see Figure 4-8). With a relatively smaller public share but a larger 
external share it appears that more of the aid is channeled through the private sector such 
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as non-profit institutions on behalf of households. That may partly explain the relatively 
large private share in Rwanda as shown in Figure 6. In effect Rwandan households on do 
not bear as much of the burden regardless of the relatively large role of private spending.  
In as much as both countries have been beneficiaries of external resources, it 
appears that the Rwandan health system relies heavily on external support. It is a good 
thing that more resources have become available than Rwanda could mobilize domestically 
and especially with the high poverty rates. Regardless of the relative size of economy and 
given the relatively higher gross national income per capita in Ghana, Rwanda’s health 
expenditures per capita are comparable to those in Ghana (see Figure D3 in Appendix D).  
Rwanda’s health sector may be more vulnerable to the availability of external resources 
than the case may be for Ghana. Not surprisingly, Rwanda has set an ambitious goal to 
wean itself off aid as has been expressed in the country’s economic development plans 
(Vision 2020) health benefits from the current influx of external support (MOH-R 2012).   
 
Figure 4-6: Expenditures on health as a share of GDP: Ghana versus Rwanda 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators databases. 
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Figure 4-7: Public health expenditures and external resources as percent of GDP: Ghana 
versus Rwanda 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
 
Figure 4-8: The share of out of pocket payments in the total health expenditures in Ghana 
and Rwanda  
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
 
These patterns in expenditures suggest that financial sustainability of universal 
health coverage in Ghana depend to a greater extent on domestic resource mobilization 
capacity and most sensitive to public sector efficiency. Most likely in Rwanda, the 
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effectiveness of the non-profit sector at mobilizing and allocating resources efficiently has 
a greater stake in universal health coverage in Rwanda.  
4.3 Evidence on the outcomes in health care utilization and financial risk 
protection of Ghana NHIS and Rwanda Mutuelle 
Rwanda has experienced notable changes in health coverage and outcomes in a 
relatively short period of time. Health insurance coverage jumped from 7% in 2003 to 91% 
in 2010 (MOHR, 2010) and in the same period outpatient visits per capita increased from 
0.31 to 0.95. Under five mortality rates have been halved from 15.2% in 2005 to 7.6% in 
2010 (NSIR 2010). Delivery in a health facility by women who had a live birth increased 
from 28% to 69% in 2010. Significant increases in health spending occurred also within 
the same period (MOHR 2008, NSIR 2010, R. Dhillon 2011, and World Bank 2011). The 
NHIS in Ghana has similarly been associated with positive outcomes in maternal and child 
mortality and an overall improvement in communicable diseases (Ghana NDPC 2008, 
MOH-G 2012) because of increased utilization of health services. Outpatient visits per 
capita increased by 0.23 within three years of implementing NHIS compared to increase of 
0.15 (MOH-G 2012) in the eight years prior. A detailed and systematic review of the 
empirical evidence would be useful to identify in specific terms what impact these 
universal health insurance programs have had, including issues about equity and the 
potential to achieve universal access to quality health care.  
This section reviews the existing evidence on the impact of Ghana NHIS and 
Rwanda Mutuelle on access to health care, financial risk protection and health outcomes. 
The evidence is discussed with regards to the potential for community health insurance to 
attain universal health insurance coverage and the ultimate goal of universal access to 
health care. Furthermore, findings about community-based health insurance schemes 
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(CBHIS) in developing countries (Mebratie et al 2013) provide an additional point of 
reference by which to compare the performance of Ghana NHIS and Rwanda Mutuelles. 
Through a detailed review of CBHI in the developing countries, Mebratie et al (2013) 
arrive at some conclusions about CBHI characteristics based on CBHI outcomes, origins 
in formation and governance structure.   
With regard to CBHI outcomes Mebratie et al (2013) find that CBHI coverage as 
share of the target population ranges from 1% to 100% with an unweighted mean of 37.2%. 
Evidence in 61% of the studies indicates that the “ultra poor” are excluded and even where 
the poor are well included in membership they tend to use health services less intensively 
due to reasons such as inability to afford copayments, transportation costs and foregone 
income.  Evidence indicates that households with chronic health conditions more likely to 
join CBHI. The majority of the studies report increased health care utilization as an 
outcome of CBHI. The findings differ, however, across the type of health service: CBHI is 
somewhat more effective at extending access to outpatient services than inpatient services. 
Not much is discussed about outcomes in quality of health services. On financial 
protection, some studies looked at out of pocket payments but only half that number 
included measures of catastrophic spending most of these studies conclude that 
catastrophic spending has been prevented. The evidence suggests a reduction in OOP 
ranges between 12%-35% payments.  
With these measures in mind this study attempts to assess the performance of Ghana 
NHIS or Rwanda Mutuelle in equitably improving access to health care (as implied in 
policy objectives) and more specifically to compare which scheme performs better in each 
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measure of equitable coverage, improvement in access to health care or financial risk 
protection for households.  
The approach to the literature review is partially based on the systematic literature 
review framework for Meta analysis, a statistical technique to combine the findings from 
two or more independent studies to answer a common question and consequently the 
validity of the analysis depends on the quality of the systematic review on which is based 
(Crombie and Davies 2009, Mebratie et al 2012). The literature review in this study does 
not include technical statistical combinations and sensitivity analysis of findings. The 
review was adapted to the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses) protocol, hence the following guideline:  
1. The aim for the study is specifically defined as follows:  a review to provide a 
synthesis of the existing knowledge about the effect of the Ghana National Health 
Insurance Scheme, and similarly the impact of Rwanda Mutuelle Schemes, in four 
measures of outcomes: household insurance coverage rates, health service use rates, 
financial risk protection and the state of health (status).  
2. The sources of data are as follows: published and unpublished papers over the 
20-year period from January 1995-January 2015 as both country schemes had pre-existing 
schemes in the 1990’s and which had formed an integral part of the respective national 
insurance policies subsequently implemented.   
3. Databases: The publications were located through the search of the following 
five databases (the first four was obtained through the University of Massachusetts Library 
portal): Econlit, PubMed, Science Direct, SSRN JSTOR, Google Scholar. In addition, 
reports, background papers, working papers and pamphlets were searched in the WHO 
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databases and links to sponsoring institutions such as United Nations. Similarly, country-
specific databases (e.g. Ministry of Health, National Health Insurance Authority, NDPC) 
and links to sponsoring institutions and organizations (e.g., USAID, Dfid, DANIDA, JICA, 
Belgium), and NGO’s (e.g., ISODEC) were sourced. Academic, government and non-
government research consortiums (eg Joint Learning Network on Universal Health Care) 
were also important sources.  
3. Search criteria: The search was based on the key phrases and iterations of these 
phrases in this order: Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme and: -enrollments, -access 
to health services, -financial risk protection, -health status.  The same was repeated for 
Rwanda CBHI Mutuelle Schemes.  The searches churned out several hundred abstracts of 
research papers, books, reports, news articles, even also conference programs and outputs 
and many of these appeared to be remotely related and some not at all related to the 
objectives in this study. Nonetheless all the search results were routinely compiled 
electronically using RefWorks, or manually where necessary, and filed into lists of 
bibliographies for each key phrase search. As expected many of the search results were 
cross listed in two or more key phrase searches so such papers were kept to the first list in 
which they appeared. 
4. First selection: Given the specific objectives of this study, the titles, introductions 
and conclusions and in particular the abstracts were skimmed to identify papers that 
addressed at least one of the four outcome measures (enrollments, access to health care or 
health care use, financial risk protection, health state).  Papers that did not specifically state 
any of these outcome measures in the objectives, introduction or conclusions were 
considered to not address them adequately so such papers were dropped. At this stage a 
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rough count was made of the remaining relevant literature. About 50 papers on Ghana and 
40 on Rwanda remained for a second round of selection. 
5. Second selection: Studies that did not single out the relevant health insurance 
schemes in Ghana and Rwanda such as the studies that were generally regional or multiple 
country level analysis were disregarded for the sake of focus in this study. Similarly studies 
that did not include any measure of impact at the client or member (i.e., household or 
individual) level were dropped. About 40 were dropped at this stage. 
6. Final selection: The favored studies would ideally lay out specific and clear 
details about the research methods used to identify, collect and analyze information that 
adequately addressed clearly defined research objectives and certainly related to at least 
one of the four measures of impact stipulated in this review.  
About methods, the favored papers had to at least comment on, better still control 
for, the problems of confounding or interdependency or unobserved factors as they relate 
to insurance uptake, health care use, financial risk protection or health state. With these 
satisfied about 35 studies remained.  
The criterion used to select the final list for detailed review was that studies 
included statistical or econometric methods in the analysis of information were favored. If 
methods were largely qualitative in nature, they must include at least some descriptive 
statistics with tests of statistical significance.  This criterion of quantitative analysis was 
simply to aid in standardization and comparison of the findings. For example, outcome 
measures of health service use would state the averages for OPD use rates, hospitalization 
rates or the number of births that had skilled attendants and so on. Additional papers were 
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found looking through the reference lists of selected studies and these papers were included 
in the selection.  
7. Detailed review: A final list of 15 papers on Ghana and 7 papers on Rwanda were 
reviewed in greater detail.  The papers were carefully scrutinized and a data extraction 
template (similar to Table D1 and Table D2 in Appendix D) was used to compile the 
findings. For a group of better quality in methods, the quantitative analysis explicitly stated 
the attempts made to improve robustness in results with examples such as comparing 
results from alternative models, the theoretical and statistical support for choice of 
instrumental variables, appropriate model specification and so on. The studies that 
commented on robustness are identified by asterisk in the first column.  
8. Analysis and results: a summary of the quantitative measures has been compiled 
to identify overall scheme performance with respect to enrollments, health care utilization 
and financial risk protection to construct stylized facts about relative performance of Ghana 
NHIS versus Rwanda Mutuelles. The quantitative measures are summarized in Table 4-4, 
Table 4-5 and Table -6. The information in Table 4-3 shows the conclusions from the 
literature review. 
 
Table 4-2: Types of studies reviewed 
 Ghana Rwanda 
Number of studies reviewed 15 7 
Of which: 
Studies providing quantitative measures on enrollment 12 2 
Studies measuring impact on health care utilization 10 6 
Studies measuring extent of Financial protection 4 4 
Studies measuring the changes in health state 6 2 
Studies using only district survey data 13 3 
Studies using district and nationwide survey data 1 0 
Studies using only nationwide survey data  1 4 
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Some general observations about the studies may be noted. The studies are 
generally of three types: case studies of selected districts and based on primary data, studies 
based on household demographic and health surveys or general living standards 
measurement surveys, and a combination of both primary surveys and the secondary data 
from the national surveys. District studies have mostly been limited to one or two study 
sites in a region or two and sample size is often less than 500. A rare example of a study 
(Kusi et al 2015) in this category with a sample size exceeding 2000 covered three districts 
across three regions representing the three different ecological zones in Ghana but have 
comparable economies and fairly homogenous populations.  
The fifteen papers on NHIS covered seventeen studies and twelve of these studies 
included explicit measures about insurance enrollment rates of households, individuals or 
both. Of the 14 NHIS papers that used district surveys 11 were predominantly rural, 1 was 
a mixture of both and 2 were predominantly urban. But this rural predominance is useful 
for this study in the sense that the evidence is easier to compare with Rwanda where the 
district studies have all been based in rural districts but also Rwanda’s population is 
predominantly rural while 48% of the total population in Ghana is rural. Another 
observation is that a greater proportion of the NHIS studies focus on the districts that have 
had a longer history of CHI schemes and consequently regions such as Brong Ahafo with 
the oldest established CHI scheme in addition to the northern and upper regions whose pre-
existing CHI schemes were rolled out into NHIS are more represented than the other 
administrative regions. In particular baseline studies, inter-temporal comparative studies 
and experimental impact studies (Sulzbach, Dzakpasu, Yilma, Chankova, Akazli) have 
been based in these predominantly rural regions. In a similar vein the district-based studies 
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about Mutuelle involve the longer established CHI schemes and as well include pre and 
post Mutuelle roll out comparisons. These similar features of the studies are useful for the 
purposes of this study. With this in mind the key findings are compared in the categories 
of enrollment rates, health care utilization rates, financial protection and health state.  
The relative share of the studies per outcome measure reflects the relative 
importance of impact in the country context. Generally, the studies on Rwanda concentrate 
on health care utilization rates and financial protection and least on enrollment rates which 
is to be expected given the near universal enrollment rates. Studies on Ghana NHIS have 
higher representation enrollment equity and least on financial protection. Also, a smaller 
number of studies were obtained for Rwanda. All the studies on enrollment conclude that 
the poor are the least likely to be insured. In most cases households of the highest 
socioeconomic status (SES) are the most represented in insurance coverage. One of two 
studies on Rwanda that explicitly stated enrollment rates similarly indicate the poor are 
least represented. The evidence in all six studies that measured utilization rates strongly 
support an increase in health care utilization rates as an outcome of CBHI schemes in 
Rwanda. Health care utilization rates is found to be strongly positive outcome  
4.3.1 Financial protection, health care utilization and health status 
The evidence shows that insured households make lower out of pocket payments 
for health care. In addition, health care payments as measured in terms of food expenditures 
are consistently lower, suggesting a better ability to afford the consequent out of pocket 
payments. The financial impact is strongest in Rwanda.  The evidence consistently shows 
that health insurance has a significant impact on health care utilization. Again, the evidence 
in Rwanda indicates a stronger impact in the sense that the quantitative measures show at 
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least a doubling of use rates compared to before insurance coverage (Kagubare 2011, 
Saksena 2011, Schneider 2011, Dhillon 2012) while an increase of 7.5% was reported in 
Ghana in a similar time frame of insurance treatment (Dzakpasu et al 2012).  Increased 
utilization of health services may in theory suggest two things: moral hazard or improved 
access to needed health care. The latter is more likely the case for Rwanda judging from 
the improvement in health outcomes.  Binagwaho et al (2012) for example find no evidence 
to suggest that insurance coverage leads to a reduction in preventive measures against ill 
health.  The same results however suggest adverse selection as that the insured have lower 
health status, yet the insured with health needs are less likely to seek care perhaps due to 
other costs such as travel.  
 
Table 4-3: Strength of evidence about the impact of insurance schemes 
 Equity in enrollment Health care 
utilization 
Financial protection Health state 
 Studie
s   
Verdict on 
impact  
Studies Verdict 
on 
impact 
Studies Verdict 
on 
impact 
Studies The 
verdict 
on 
impact 
Ghana 
NHIS  
12 
(12) 
Strongly 
negative 
9 (10) positive 3 (4) Positive 4(6) Negative 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
1 (2) Inconclusive  6 (6) Strongly 
positive 
4 (4) Strongly 
positive 
2(2) Strongly 
positive 
Note: Number in parenthesis represents total number of studies that reported a quantitative measure of 
the outcome in question. Number not in parenthesis represents total number of the studies that indicate 
statistically significant evidence that support verdict.   
  
One study specifically tests for adverse selection in NHIS enrollment (Rajkotia and 
Frick 2011) concludes that NHIS is able to contain adverse selection although it does not 
eliminate it. The findings suggest that majority of household medical consumption is not 
substantially correlated with household enrollment costs and that generally no correlation 
exists between hospitalization and household enrolment costs. Ghana NHIS targeting has 
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been effectively towards pregnant women and to some extent children but least toward the 
poor.   
The use rates reported for Ghana are stated as proportional comparisons of insured 
versus uninsured, rather than a before and after scenario as used for Rwanda. In most cases 
the proportions of insured are double that of uninsured. However, the evidence on antenatal 
care use is mixed, ranging between 0-40% margin of difference between insured and 
uninsured. Five out of seven studies on maternal health indicate that the insured have at 
least 83% more use rates while and 5 of the 6 studies report differences smaller than 50%.  
Antenatal service use is similar for both insured and uninsured. One explanation is that a 
policy on free health care for pregnant women and children under five had been in 
operation prior to NHIS until 2007. Again a Free Maternal and Child Care component of 
the NHIS was phased in beginning in 2008. Additionally, nonfinancial factors such as 
lifestyle and cultural practices leading to a low preference for formal ANC may add to the 
reasons. The evidence nonetheless shows clearly that insured women are twice likely to 
experience a skilled birth attendant and more so to experience intensive care such as 
caesarian births (Sulzbach et al 2005, Chankova et al 2008).   
4.3.2 Equity in enrollment  
Equity in health care is one of the main goals of the NHIS as expressed in the NHI 
Law of 2003 (Act 625) and again emphasized in an amended NHI Law 2012 (Act 825). 
Equity concerns differential access based on levels of need (vertical equity) as well as 
access for all (horizontal equity). Equity in access to health care assures removal of 
structural inequalities that prevent certain social groups from gaining access to quality 
health care (O’Donnell et al 2007). Conceptually universal access to health care has the 
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important feature of horizontal equity by making health care accessible to disadvantaged 
groups. To the extent that Ghana NHIS and similarly Rwanda Mutuelle reduce catastrophic 
out of pocket health expenditures, vulnerable households and the poor for that matter, 
would be protected against financial risks associated with health shocks. Equity in access 
to health care would improve assuming supply-side systemic problems are also accounted 
for. However, for a program that is geared toward closing equity gaps or social protection, 
effective targeting of high needs groups is a necessary condition for success. In other 
words, equity in enrollment would require that households with greater financial risks and 
especially the income poor are included in the insurance program.  
With respect to Rwanda Mutuelle, although the selected studies do not focus on 
determinants of enrollments, the evidence suggest that poverty is the strongest determinant 
of being uninsured particularly in the years before the stratification of premium 
contributions according to socioeconomic status (Ubudehe system) of households (Saskena 
et al 2010, Binagwaho et al 2012). In fact, the studies on Rwanda do not report any other 
socioeconomic determinant to have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of 
being insured. On the contrary studies on NHIS show various socioeconomic indicators to 
be strong determinants of insurance status. Formal education is often reported as a key 
determinant of insurance status and so is formal occupation strongly associated with the 
likelihood of being insured (Jehu-Appia et al 2011, Yilma et al 2012, Dixon et al 2014a, 
Kusi et al 2014).  
The studies unanimously show evidence that non enrollment in NHIS is first and 
foremost a problem of affordability of the cost of insurance. Insurance not wanted or 
insurance not needed is are other important factors especially for higher welfare quintiles. 
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Systemic factors like the health system, attributes of insurer, in addition to other 
unspecified factors are collectively cited by about 21% of households. Inadequate 
information, institutional rigidities and political branding has declined in importance as a 
determinant of insurance status and the evidence suggests a high level of awareness about 
the NHIS and similarly about the benefits of enrollment (Kusi et al 2015, Jehu-Appiah et 
al (2011, 2012), Kotoh 2013, NDPC 2009).  
Households citing affordability as the most important problem are as well the ones 
with higher expected cost of insurance. Uninsured households are more likely to have 
lower ability to pay for the cost of insurance as measured in terms of food expenditures. 
For instance, in one study all 69 percent of households identified as not able to afford 
insurance were in the lowest two income quintiles (Kusi et al 2015). In contrast the majority 
of the relatively small proportion of households that cite nonfinancial factors as the most 
important reason for not being insured often belong in the upper wealth quintiles. The 
evidence suggests that individuals in the formal sector, or with higher education or in the 
upper quintiles of welfare are the most represented in the NHIS (Asante and Aikins 2008, 
Sarpong et al 2010, Jehu-Appiah et al 2011, Kusi et al 2014). While the higher inequity in 
the NHIS is brought to bear some evidence also suggests that NHIS has been effective at 
reaching the indigent. Households in lowest quintile of welfare are more likely to be 
enrolled than households in the second lowest quintile (Jehu-Appiah et al 2011, Dzakpasu 
et al 2012).  
Rural residence and proximity to facility are not significant factors in enrollment in 
Rwanda Mutuelle. In Ghana, proximity to a health facility increases the odds of being 
insured yet rural location of residence is inconclusive.  There is some evidence to suggest 
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that even where community-based primary facilities are available residents particularly 
NHIS members do not use them but go to secondary facilities as their first point of call, 
citing reasons as better quality of health professionals and availability of medicines (Gobah 
and Liang 2011).  
Some evidence on Ghana suggests adverse selection is a problem for the NHIS.  
Self-rated health status of the insured is lower than the uninsured. While a larger proportion 
of partially insured households report that insurance is not needed, the likelihood was also 
higher that insured individuals had chronic illness or perceived to have fair or poor health 
(Kusi et al 2015). In terms of demographic groups, older females are the ones that are 
consistently more likely to be insured.   
Studies that focus on a homogenous groups of people such as the aged (Parmer et 
al 2014) or communities of similar economic profile (Yilma et al 2011), socioeconomic 
factors, location and demographic variables not surprising appear insignificant. What is 
significant is an association with a majority group (ethnicity, religion). Consistently, being 
Christian has been identified as a strong determinant of being insured even in regions where 
Christianity is not the majority. 
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Table 4-4: Evidence on the enrollment rates: Ghana NHIS versus Rwanda Mutuelle 
Who is insured Ghana NHIS Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
 By demographic group By households By general population 
Difference in the odds of being insured (the odds 
reported for upper wealth quintiles minus the odds 
for lower wealth quintile) 
  2.4 - 4 NA  NA 
     
Difference in percent insured (the percent coverage 
of upper wealth quintile less the percent coverage of 
lower quintile) 
Panel study: 11.4-54.3 
(pregnant women) 
 14 - 24.4  
Insurance coverage rates (% of group) 72 (age 70+) 
65.4 – 91 (pregnant women) 
32.8 (under 5 children) 
90 (children 
under age 5) 
39 
(increased 
to 53 in 
panel study) 
30; 54 
33.9; 40; 
53; 54; 57; 
78; 
36.6 
Source: Selected literature. See details in Table D1 and Table D2 in Appendix D. 
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Table 4-5: Evidence on differences in health care utilization rates by groups of insured and uninsured  
 Ghana NHIS Rwanda Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
 Demographic groups Households  General population 
 
Differences in odds (odds reported for 
insured groups minus odds reported for 
uninsured groups) 
 
0.4   -outpatient 
0.83 -inpatient 
0.53 -prescriptions 
(women) 
 
0.3-0.6 for child age<5 
0.71 facility delivery 
0.75 for assisted delivery 
 
N/A 
  
2 for health 
facility use 
 
Percentage point difference between 
insured versus uninsured groups seeking 
care (percent reported for insured minus 
percent reported for uninsured) 
 
50 -skilled birth 
52 -facility delivery 
13 -antenatal care 
41 -post natal care 
  
65 
 
 
Difference in health care use rates 
for insured compared to use rates reported 
for uninsured: factor of multiple 
 
5x for caesarian operation 
   
4x 
 
Difference in use rates before and after 
insurance: factor of multiple  
    
1.85 per capita 
2.68 per day 
Percentage point difference in use rates 
before and after insurance  
(percentage points) 
21.1 (facility delivery)    
 
Equity gap in use rates before and after 
insurance (percent use rates for upper 
quintiles less percent use rates for lower 
wealth quintiles) 
 
64.7 declining to 53.8 
(facility delivery) 
  
76 
 
 
Difference in proportion of health care 
benefits going to upper versus lower 
wealth quintiles 
   
0.21 
 
Source: Evidence from selected literature. See Table D1 and Table D2 in Appendix D for details. 
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Table 4-6: Differences in out of pocket health expenditures by groups of insured and uninsured Ghana and Rwanda 
 Ghana NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
Ghana 
NHIS 
Rwanda 
Mutuelle 
 Demographic group Households General population 
Difference in the odds of catastrophic health spending  
(uninsured versus insured) 
 NA   NA 4 x 
Ratio of the proportion of uninsured versus the 
proportion of the insured paying out of pocket (OOP) for 
health services 
3.1 (facility delivery) 
78.6 (under 5 children) 
   
Ratio of the amount of OOP by uninsured versus amount 
by insured  
2.5 (facility delivery) 
0.35-0.4 (antenatal care) 
8.3x   
 
Ratio of the proportion uninsured versus the proportion of 
insured whose OOP exceed 10% of capacity to pay 
   
2.1 
 
 
Ratio of the proportion uninsured versus the proportion of 
insured whose OOP exceed 40% of capacity to pay 
   
3.9 
 
 
Ratio of the percent increase in poverty headcount as a 
result of OOP (uninsured divided by insured) 
   
2 
 
Source: Evidence from selected literature. See Table D1 and D2 in Appendix D for details. 
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4.4 Institutional features of Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS 
The implementation and the outcomes of policy are invariably influenced by the 
technical soundness of policy design. In turn policy design is influenced also by the 
competing interests of stakeholders, with the likelihood that constituencies with stronger 
influence would dominate policy choices. In effect the political, economic, socio-cultural, 
demographic and other contexts of an economy have varying degrees of influence on the 
institutions within which policies such as universal access to health care programs are 
carried out. In a review of the literature on CBHI, Mebratie et al (2014) observe that the 
policy debates do not revolve around the relevance of CBHI. The consensus is that CBHI 
does improve access and financial protection. Rather, policy questions have often focused 
on scheme characteristics and their effects (Stuckler et al 2010, Mebratie et al 2014) and 
about the desirable design features that would maximize desirable outcomes. In other 
words, the literature confirms the differences are in the features. Hence, in comparing the 
outcomes of the NHIS and the Mutuelle, the institutional framework surrounding these 
programs and their influence is fundamental.   
The purpose in this section is to compare the institutional features of Rwanda’s 
Mutuelle and Ghana’s NHIS and how these features relate to observed outcomes and the 
potential toward attaining universal access to health care. Rwanda’s Mutuelle and Ghana’s 
NHIS represent similar policy objectives in the sense of eliminating financial barriers to 
needed health care and to create universal access to health care for all regardless of ability 
to pay. While both programs may similarly be described as intended for universal health 
insurance coverage, they adopt not so similar community-based approaches, have different 
technical design and operate within different institutional set ups given the differences in 
countries and policy processes. This analysis highlights also the strategic policy design 
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features that have resulted in expected or successful outcomes and to make inferences about 
the best practices that may be replicable or country specific.  
4.4.1 Insurance benefits package   
The health system in Rwanda fully subsidizes preventive health services for the 
entire population but the cost of curative services is only partially subsidized. Persons in 
formal employment and the military have insurance arrangements that cover majority of 
the cost of curative services. However, majority of the population work outside the formal 
sector and would consequently be vulnerable to the cost of curative care. Consequently, 
the Ministry of Health implemented these community-based health insurance schemes, the 
Mutuelles de Santé, to raise revenues to cover curative health services (Kayonga 2007, 
MOH-R 2008). The Mutuelles are consequently non-profit, mutual aid schemes to reach 
the informal and consequently rural sector with affordable care. Communities are 
organized into risk pools, first at the sector (small community) level, and then collectively 
forming larger pools at the district level for secondary care, and then even larger pools for 
tertiary care at the national level. Mutuelle service providers may be public or private non-
profit contracted facilities but not private for-profit.  Providers are paid by Mutuelles 
directly, either through monthly capitation rates, on a fee-for-service basis, or by 
performance-based payments.  
The Mutuelle benefits package has two components: a Minimum Package of 
Activities (MPA) and the Complementary Package of Activities (CPA). MPA covers all 
the services and drugs at the primary level of care, typically by NGOs or government-run 
community health centers. CPA cover specialized care organized at the district level 
through district hospitals and specialists and tertiary care financed at the national level 
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through a handful of national referral hospitals (NRH) such as the Kigali University 
Teaching Hospital (CHUK). A list of services provided by the different types of health 
facilities may be seen in Table D3 in Appendix D. The CPA covers all child health services 
and childbirth; all inpatient services but selected surgeries at the district and tertiary 
facilities. Members are required to pay a deductible of RWF 200 at health centers and a 
coinsurance of 10% of the cost of all services at each visit to a district or referral hospital 
(MOH-R 2012).   
The NHIS similarly specifies a standard package of benefits for all members 
regardless of geographic location, sex, age or level of risk (see Table D4, Table D5 and 
Table D6 in Appendix D). According to the National Health Insurance Authority about 
95% of diseases in Ghana are covered. Outpatient visits, overnight stays, diagnostic 
services and treatment are all covered. A comprehensive drugs list is also covered (see 
details in Table D6 in Appendix D). Beneficiaries are not required to make copayments 
since the policy does not specifies zero coinsurance and benefit cost deductibles for any 
covered services, medicines or supplies. In practice, beneficiaries have often been known 
to pay for covered services either voluntarily or involuntarily. Reasons include supply 
constraints, quality constraints, discriminatory health worker attitude, or the contracted 
providers’ refusal of NHIS card bearers in protest of delays in reimbursements. The NHIS 
benefit package excludes cost intensive treatments such as for renal dialysis, most cancers, 
HIV antiretroviral therapy and organ replacement. Affected households are therefore 
exposed to catastrophic expenditures regardless of the stipulated generous benefit package 
of the NHIS. Given epidemiological transitions occurring in Ghana and the increasing 
share of chronic, non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and cancers, 
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a sizable proportion of the population would consider NHIS unbeneficial and thus refuse 
to enroll or renew membership.  
Similarly, the Mutuelle similarly has been experiencing enrollment challenges in 
recent years and supply bottlenecks are partly to blame. Subscription rates have declined 
to 73% of the population in the fiscal year 2013/2014 down from 91% in 2010 (see Table 
4-7). Subscribers have complained about being discriminated against especially in 
acquiring medicines while the district schemes that have experience sharp declines in 
enrollments have as well experienced the worst delays in delays in restocking drugs 
(Nkurunziza 2015).  Regardless of the absence of copayments and a relatively generous 
benefits package NHIS has experienced slower growth in enrollment rates than the 
Mutuelle as demonstrated in Table 4-7. A look at the insurance cost structure and the 
membership requirements provides another insight into the differences in outcomes. 
 
Table 4-7: Percent population enrolled in Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS 
Year Rwanda Mutuelle (%) Ghana NHIS (%) 
2003 7 NA 
2004 2 NA 
2005 44 - 
2006 73 15.2a 
2007 75 - 
2008 85 38
b 
2009 86 34.5
 
2010 - 34
 
2011 91c 33
 
2012 90c 35 
2013 80.9c - 
2014 73c,d - 
2015 76c,e - 
Source: Ministry of Health, Rwanda Annual Reports 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012; Ghana National Health 
Insurance Authority Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. 
a. Author’s calculation based on data from the Ghana living standards survey in 2005/2006. 
b. Author’s calculation based on data from the standard Ghana Demographic and Health Survey in 2008.    
c. These figures are for the fiscal year ended June 30th. 
d. By the Ministry of Health, Rwanda as cited in Nkurunziza (2015).  
e. By Ministry of Health, Rwanda as cited in Ivan Ngoboka (2015). 
 
 219 
 
 
4.4.2 Insurance costs and subsidies  
Membership in the Mutuelle is voluntary but the cost of the insurance varies by 
household socioeconomic status (SES) based on the national system of socioeconomic 
ranking commonly referred to as Ubudehe. Each family member pays the stipulated 
amount for their household SES category. According to government reports (MOH-R 
2012) as of 2012 the stipulated amount for individuals in the bottom two socioeconomic 
categories (CBHI category 1) was RWF 2000 (USD 3.26) and this group consisted of 
24.8% of the population. However, indigents in this group were completely covered by a 
combination of government and donor grants. Individuals in middle income households 
(CBHI category 2) had to pay RWF 3000 (USD 4.88). This category consisted of 65%.9% 
of the population. Individuals in the two upper SES categories (CBHI category 3) paid 
RWF 7000 (11.40) but these were a very small percent of the population (0.04%). 
However, the SES categorizations have only recently been implemented. Previously each 
family member had paid a flat rate of 1000 Rwandan francs (the equivalent of about USD 
1.63) annually as premium. Unlike Rwanda, Ghana lacks an operational system of 
socioeconomic classification and the relative capacity of Mutuelle in targeting the poor is 
one important institutional feature that explains key differences in outcomes.  The NHIS 
ends up with a far greater variation in the cost of insurance while also being less effective 
in discriminating by ability to pay for the cost of insurance.  
In contrast to the Mutuelle, NHIS does not require enrollment by whole household 
units and this may be one explanation why enrollment rates are much lower compared to 
the Mutuelle. NHIS Participation rates stood at 34% of the population as of December 2010 
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(NHIA 2010) whereas in previous years many believed that the NHIS had experience 
higher participation rates of up 60% based on reports by the NHIA (2009). These estimates 
had been based on an inappropriate methodology that reflected only cumulative 
enrollments and not actual enrollment rates (Makinen et al 2011, Brugiavinni and Pace 
2011, Apoya and Marriot 2011, NHIA 2010). Hence, according to the NHIA (2010) the 
historical information on the real enrollments in prior years is nonexistent. The Ghana 
Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 2008 had provided a basis for comparing 
the estimates. In 2008 35.4% of the population (based on a sample of men and women aged 
15-49 years) were enrolled in NHIS. In the early years of the NHIS enrollment rates stood 
at about 15% based on estimates from the Ghana Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
conducted in 2005-2006. The increase in enrollment has been steady but slow and yet about 
half of the population is eligible for exemptions from premium payment.    
By policy, children under 18 are exempt from premium payments but on condition 
that at least one parent or guardian is an active member. Active membership implies the 
individual is in good standing having paid all required fees to maintain current enrollment 
and eligibility for benefits. The new Law 2012 (Act 825) eliminates the requirement of a 
parent’s active membership for children. As a matter of fact, since 2010 children under five 
have been premium exempt regardless of a parent or guardian’s membership status. 
Another premium exempt group is senior citizens 70 years and over, retirees on the SSNIT 
pension scheme as well as the current contributors to the SSNIT pension scheme who by 
default contribute to the National Health Insurance Fund through a 2.5% payroll deduction. 
These groups are however required to pay the annual registration and processing fees to 
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remain active.  An annual registration processing fee of about GHS 4 (USD $1, current 
2015) is required also of most premium exempt groups to maintain eligibility for benefits. 
Individuals identified as extremely poor and pregnant women are exempt from both 
registration processing fees and premiums. A relatively small group of indigents are 
identified through the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) program.  This 
is a social cash transfer program that began in March 2008 and currently reaches about 
70,000 households.  Consequently, the insurance costs of LEAP participants are borne by 
government, grants from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and 
other donors and loan facilities from the World Bank. Similarly, the insurance costs of 
pregnant women are covered by the Free Maternal and Child Health component to the 
NHIS that was created in 2008 with a DFID grant of US$10 million.  The evidence suggests 
that this program has outstripped initial projections reaching costs of about USD43 million 
in the very first year, the excess of which has since been absorbed by the NHIS while the 
external support has dwindled (Witter et al, 2013). Pregnant mothers regardless of 
socioeconomic status are eligible. Accordingly, the evidence from the literature indicates 
equity in coverage among pregnant women while inequities persist among the general 
population given the general pattern that households in low socioeconomic status are least 
likely to have insurance.  
Despite the policy directive to target the poor, the evidence from the literature 
suggests that the NHIS fails to effectively reach the poor even though reaching the indigent 
has been fairly successful (Jehu-Appiah et al 2011, Dzakpasu et al 2012, Kusi et al 2014). 
The evidence shows that the cost of enrollment is the most cited reason for non-enrollment 
and increasingly so by households in lower quintiles of welfare. Even for easier identified 
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premium exempt groups of children and the aged the cost of registration can add up for 
larger households.  It appears that individuals in the formal sector who contribute to the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pension fund are better identified 
for premium exemptions, unlike premium exempt groups such as indigents in the informal 
sector. District schemes have at their discretion to decide which individuals may be deemed 
indigent to qualify for insurance cost subsidy. Yet the districts lack an effective system of 
socioeconomic classification by which to identify contributions capabilities of households 
and to extract surpluses through effective price discrimination and successfully target the 
needy.  This policy feature is arguably the crux of the problem and the reason why NHIS 
fails in equity. Ghana NHIS and Rwanda Mutuelle have similar aims to expand population 
health insurance coverage to reduce the financial risks in accessing health care and thereby 
extend access to affordable health services for all.  The NHIS in concept is a rational 
approach toward making health care accessible for all regardless of ability to pay. In 
practice institutional design of the NHIS lacks an effective targeting of coverage to 
disadvantaged groups with limited ability to pay and to participate, whereas these groups 
are the most likely to value the program. The NHIS has rather the unintended consequence 
of reducing equity despite the observed improvement in overall access to health care in the 
sense that health care has become more accessible to households who can afford the cost 
of insurance.  
Unlike the case of Mutuelle in Rwanda where enrollment costs are standardized 
across all schemes and by household socioeconomic status, NHIS enrollment costs have 
substantial variation, first by the overall SES of the district scheme and then by 
demographic or exempt grouping.  District schemes, in their failure to categorize 
 223 
 
households by SES and price premiums according to ability to pay, resort to charging a flat 
rate while the amount charged varies on average by the socioeconomic status of the district 
as a whole. For example, in May 2015, a quick survey of the insurance costs of a handful 
of schemes for the purpose of this study confirms no standard cost structure across 
schemes. The cost of enrollment is GHS 28 for a person registering with the Ga East district 
scheme in Greater Accra compared to GHS 14for a person registering with the Assin 
district scheme in Ashanti. The stipulated charges are GHS 14 for children aged 5-17, and 
GHS 24 for a SSNIT contributor. There are additional categories as veterans, military and 
the police. Other than the zero costs for children under five and persons aged seventy or 
more, there is no clear cut distinction of placing individuals in categories given the 
overlaps. A SSNIT contributor may claim the status of informal if premium costs are less 
and vice versa. For persons who choose to subscribe at the NHIA head office in Accra the 
charge is a flat rate of GHS 40 in premium and GHS 8 as registration processing fee. The 
range of prices for all 152 district schemes in Ghana is GHS 0-48 as shown in Table 4-8.  
The evidence shown in Table 4-8 indicates a difference of less than $2 in the 
maximum amount of the cost of insurance for Mutuelle (USD10.2) and NHIS (USD 11.86).  
The cost of subsidies is similarly covered by government and external sources. In the case 
of Mutuelle subsidies are allocated on a per household basis based on socioeconomic status 
but for NHIS the criteria for subsidy allocations are not explicit but are on a per program 
basis (eg LEAP, MCH). In effect Rwanda Mutuelle has an advantage over NHIS by the 
institutional feature of a more defined SES classification and targeting of the poor. 
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Table 4-8: Insurance costs and benefits: NHIS in Ghana versus Mutuelle in Rwanda 
 Ghana NHIS Rwanda Mutuelle 
Cost of insurance 
 
GHS 0-48 ($ 0-11.86) a 
Varies by the socioeconomic status of the district. Hence a flat rate 
which differs by district and then age group. 
Broken down as: 
Processing fee                GHS 0-8  
Premium fee                   GHS 0-40  
Card replacement fee     GHS 2-8 
RWF 3000-7000b ($4.37-10.2) 
Premiums vary by a well-defined socioeconomic status classification 
applied nationally. 
Broken down as: 
CBHI Category 1 (SES 1&2): RwF 3000 
CBHI Category 2 (SES 3&4): RwF 4500c 
CBHI Category 3 (SES 5&6): RwF 7000 
   
Premium exempt groups  Pregnant mothers, children under age 5, adults 70 years plus, SSNIT 
contributors, indigents 
N/A 
Processing fee exempt Pregnant mothers, indigents N/A 
   
Insurance cost subsidy and 
funding source 
Indigents (full subsidy): government and donors Pregnant (full 
subsidy): NHIS and donor support 
CBHI category 1 (partial subsidy of RWF 2000): government and 
donor support 
   
Benefit package Outpatient services, inpatient services, diagnostic services and drugs 
for about 95% of diseases  
Minimum package of activities (MPA):  all services and drugs at 
primary care facilities 
Complementary package of activities (CPA): Inpatient services, 
diagnostic services, maternal and child services and selected surgeries 
in secondary and tertiary facilities 
Exclusions from benefitb Most cancers, HIV ART, organ transplant, etc.  Eye care 
deductible 0 RWF 200 at health centers  
coinsurance 0% 10% after deductible at district/referral facilities 
Source: Ministry of Health, Rwanda Annual Reports 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012; Ghana National Health Insurance Authority Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012; interviews with key informants of selected District Health Insurance Schemes and the National Health Insurance Authority, May 2015.   
a. The exchange rates applied are the United Nations operational rates reported for June 1, 2015. The rate for Ghana is GHS 4.1 per US dollar and the rate for 
Rwanda is RWF 686.5 per dollar. 
b. Current rate as at April 2015 as cited in Nkurunziza, 2015. 
c. Author’s estimation based on information from Ministry of Health Rwanda CBHI Report (2012). 
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4.4.3 Administrative structure and governance 
A further look at the policy origin, the political context and socio cultural factors 
could shed more light on the differences in institutional features but first an overview of 
the organizational structure of the programs is presented in the section that follows.   The 
Ghana National Health Insurance Law (Act 625, Republic of Ghana 2003) was established 
the NHIS. By this law, three distinct health insurance schemes may be operated in Ghana: 
district mutual health insurance schemes (DMHIS) which collectively make up the NHIS, 
private mutual schemes and private commercial schemes. By the law, membership in a 
scheme is mandatory for all residents but residents are free to choose any type or number 
of schemes to join.  The new National Health Insurance Law 2012 (Act 825) now requires 
all employers to make insurance enrollment mandatory for employees but employers are 
not responsible for the cost of insurance. In practice no legal actions, probes or threats have 
ever been taken against the uninsured so insurance is in practice voluntary. Each DMHIS 
is governed by a board, and has a management staff to take care of the daily administration. 
Responsibilities of the board include setting the level of fees to be paid per category of 
subscribers, identifying the abjectly poor to be exempted from premium payments and 
negotiating service contracts with providers. At the national level the National Health 
Insurance Authority (NHIA) oversees the licensure of insurance schemes, accreditation of 
health care providers, the management of the national Fund and the revision of NHIS 
policies among other responsibilities. The NHIA, a quasi government agency, was 
established by the NHI Law of 2003 and entrusted with the regulatory oversight of the 
health insurance industry. Similarly, policy reforms in recent years include strategies that 
increase centralization of fund management. In the new NHI Law 2012 (Act 825) all the 
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DMHIS are merged to form a nationwide NHIS which every resident of Ghana should be 
part of.  Consequently, NHIS has now a central NHI Fund from which NHIA allocates 
subsidies to districts to cover their operational costs.  
Rwanda similarly has three main types of health insurance schemes: La Rwandaise 
d’Assurance Maladie (RAMA) or Rwanda Medical Insurance Scheme (RMIS), the 
Military Medical Insurance (MMI) scheme and the Community-Based Health Insurance 
Scheme, i.e., collectively the Mutuelle de Santé, which is organized in all thirty 
administrative districts in Rwanda. Unlike the case of Ghana, membership is exclusive for 
the different schemes. Membership in RAMA is restricted to employees in the formal 
sector and their dependents. Similarly, membership in MMI is mandatory for military 
personnel and their dependents. Citizens may voluntarily join the CBHI scheme in their 
district of residence. By several accounts the Mutuelles began in 1999 as a pilot scheme in 
three districts (Kabgayi, Kabuyer and Byumba) working together with about 52 health 
centers and the three district hospitals (MOHR 2012, Dhillon et al 2012). Within a year 
these pilot schemes appeared promising in improving access to health care therefore, 
beginning in 2005, development partners and the government put structures in place to 
expand the schemes to all 30 districts in Rwanda. In 2006 a policy and a legal framework 
for the nationwide CBHI scheme had been developed and the Ministry of Health had the 
mandate to strengthen these schemes. The legal policy and framework for a National 
Health Insurance Scheme had been completed in 2010 and the implementation of the policy 
officially began in 2011.   
The government aims to restrict its role to stewardship activities only such as in 
resource mobilization, capacity building, policy development, monitoring and evaluation 
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but decentralize policy implementation activities by engaging the communities.  Sectors 
are organized into roughly 50,000 people with at least one health centre, and a Mutuelle 
managed by community-elected representatives. Districts comprise five sectors on 
average, and have populations between 250,000 and 500,000 and at least one hospital 
providing secondary-level services. The Ministry of Health has worked in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Local Government to provide technical support and regulatory 
oversight of the Mutuelle. Judging by recent news reports, the transfer of oversight of the 
Mutuelle to the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB) as prescribed in the new CBHI 
policy (MOH-R 2010, MOH-R 2012) and resulting centralization of key administrative 
functions is expected in 2015.  The RSSB is imminently assuming regulatory oversight of 
the whole insurance industry in Rwanda. The Mutuelle may thus be approaching less 
decentralization and in similarity to NHIS but in Rwanda’s case, while the RSSB assumes 
regulatory oversight the community ownership will be retained.  
The Mutuelles de Santé are, in contrast to the NHIS, highly decentralized and have 
benefited from existing community-based organizing structures such as rural cooperatives 
that have provided majority of the management and administrative services. Rwanda has 
benefited also from a long history of community-based health insurance associations such 
as Muvandimwe de Kibungo that dated back to the 1960s according to the Joint Learning 
Network for Universal Health Coverage. Each district Mutuelle has a governing board that 
manages the pool of funds, negotiates contracts with the health centers and hospitals and 
manages insurance claims and reimbursements on behalf of clients. Each district in turn is 
partitioned into several sections of communities where a representative (usually chosen by 
the community) is stationed. Section managers are the direct liaison with communities and 
 228 
 
take on responsibilities such as managing registrations and collecting premiums.  Given 
the new CBHI policy of 2010 several changes have been occurring leading toward a 
centralized pool of funds and cross subsidization of districts as reflected in recent financial 
statements (see Tables in Appendix D). 
In the literature on community-based health insurance schemes worldwide, it has 
been observed that where potential beneficiaries have had increasing participation in the 
design, implementation, management and supervision of schemes, higher participation 
rates have also been observed (Stuckler et al 2010, Mebratie at al 2014). Government-run 
CBHI have been described as the situation where a central agency appointed by 
government is in charge of the setting up, mobilization, management and supervision 
decisions and less involvement of the community than in private mutual schemes or even 
provider-based schemes. Given the organizational characteristics of Mutuelle and NHIS, it 
appears that the Mutuelle have had more community involvement which may explain the 
higher participation rates than the case of Ghana NHIS.  
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Figure 4-9: Organizational structure of the Mutuelle de Santé of Rwanda 
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Figure 4-10: Organizational structure of the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme 
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According to the policy documents, universal health coverage is “a key priority for 
the government in its own right, but also a cornerstone of Rwanda’s development policies 
and goals (EDPRS) and linked to other targets like the Millennium Development Goals” 
(MOH-R 2010). It is also apparent from policy documents that the government has 
strategically adopted the cultural concept of Ubudehe as an important medium to gain 
significant degrees of community involvement in the development agenda for Rwanda 
(Republic of Rwanda 2001, Mapenza 2010). Ubudehe in general refers to the Rwandan 
cultural practice of collective action and solidarity in approach to community problems. 
The practice is believed to date back to over a century, originating in the form of 
agricultural cooperatives.  At the time, most likely in response to time limitations of the 
agricultural seasons, community members would work in rotation from one family farm to 
the next, speeding up the clearing process in time for planting. Members who were unable 
to participate for reasons as disability or illness would be helped next. With colonization 
and transitioning to a cash economy the practice weakened as hired labor became available 
yet community organizing and solidarity would be expected as a characteristic of Rwandan 
culture.  Policy makers have thus capitalized on this cultural characteristic and adapted 
poverty reduction programs in ways that meet the needs of beneficiaries.  
Consequently, the ‘Ubudehe Program’ was launched in 2001 as part of the efforts 
to draft Rwanda’s poverty reduction strategy.   Ubudehe Facilitators would, for example, 
visit communities to facilitate discussions about the nature of poverty, the effective ways 
to solve problems or the responsibilities that the community would on take to address 
issues. Community cooperatives, micro credit schemes and consequently the Mutuelles 
have begun in this way. The Ubudehe Program may be considered as an institutional 
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grassroots participation or participatory governance in Rwandan society and more so 
enables the contextualization and applicability of policy interventions. The Ubudehe 
approach to policy has had positive outcomes, even also receiving political and 
international and political acclaim. Regardless, the Ubudehe has had its share of problems 
that render it potentially ineffective for reasons such as a lack of funding and the political 
branding it receives as a tool intended to garner a spotlight on the government and less as 
the poverty reduction tool intended to build trust among citizens (Mapenza 2010).  
 It is also through the Ubudehe program that Rwanda has in recent years developed 
its six SES (Ubudehe) classifications of households. It is also possible that Ubudehe 
classifications would be a closer approximation of actual living conditions than an 
alternative measure (based only on conventional household surveys) given the possibly 
increased authenticity of information confirmed through peer reviews and community 
consensus.  
Rwanda also possess a common language and arguably a smaller challenge in 
language barriers than the case of Ghana and therefore the likely advantage that policy 
interventions would have a faster reach of populations, all things considered.  For instance, 
in Ghana, social marketing campaigns, the NHIS a case in point, have required targeting 
all major language groups, obviously a greater logistical challenge than the case of 
Rwanda.  Nevertheless, in matters of national policy and a universal health care policy for 
that matter, the polity, political processes and the political economy for that matter may be 
more powerful explanations of outcomes than just logistical problems.  
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Table 4-9: Institutional differences between Rwanda Mutuelle and the Ghana NHIS 
 Key differences 
 Rwanda Mutuelle Ghana NHIS 
Policy Origins Community-grown pilot program  
Intended as a development program 
Top-down government initiated program of free 
health care 
Intended as a social insurance program 
 
Year of implementation On pilot basis in 3 selected districts beginning in 
1999; nationwide expansion starts in 2005  
Nationwide expansion starts from the beginning in 
2005, starting with the conversion of a handful of 
pre-existing provider-based schemes into district 
schemes 
 
Implementing agency Ministry of Health National Health Insurance Authority 
 
Structure and governance Decentralized: 
Schemes are organized around communities of 
50,000 (Sectors) and managed by community 
appointed representatives 
Each of 30 Districts comprises several pooled 
sectors and covers between 250,000 to over 
500,000 populations. 
 
Relatively centralized 
Schemes are organized around the (152) 
administrative Districts, and a scheme covers a 
population of about 60,000 in rural to over 
250,000 in a subdivided metropolis 
Management board comprises local and 
government appointees.  
Implementation decisions shared between NHIA 
and district board 
 
Political context Stable political regime  
Consistent policy orientation 
A change in political regimes and associated 
(proposed and contested) changes to policy  
 
Targeting: 
Population 
Insurance cost subsidy 
Consistent 
Informal sector; rural; poor 
Standardized, by socioeconomic status of 
households based on an integrated system of 
classification 
Inconsistent, contradictory 
Blind targeting.   All residents 
Different standards: demographic, SSNIT 
affiliation, abject poverty status & 
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 Key differences 
 Rwanda Mutuelle Ghana NHIS 
Fiscal commitment 
 
Increases with performance and development 
partner support 
Implicitly depends on the level of transparency in 
central budget allocations of the earmarked taxes, 
levies and donations  
Public perception A national development agenda; poverty reduction 
strategy 
Community ownership 
Political branding: a program to influence voter 
sentiments 
A program to eliminate “cash-and-carry” 
 
Evaluation tools Integrated: performance based financing (pay-for-
performance).  
Includes systematic client-based evaluations. 
Emphasizes perceived quality of care. 
 
Integrated in technical efficiency of providers. 
Reactive otherwise. 
Licensing: Scheduled/unscheduled technical and 
financial audits of providers.  
Lacks an integrated client-based evaluation 
component. Ad hoc commissioned studies on 
demand-side factors.  
Reliance on client-based evaluations originating 
from independent/outside agents  
 
Financing >50% from annual member premiums  
<25% from other social insurance funds 
<13% from Ministry of Health annual budget  
<12% from the Genocide victim’s fund 
Other: Development partners, charitable 
organizations, private health insurance levies, local 
government   
<7% from annual member premiums 
<19 % from social security (SSNIT) pension funds 
<70% from earmarked taxes  
Other: Development partners, Parliamentary 
allocations 
 
 
Mode of provider claims and reimbursements Performance-based assessments and then 
payments according to: 
Fee-for-service or Capitation  
Payment by Diagnostic-Related Group: (in most 
districts) 
Capitation: for outpatients (in selected districts) 
Fee-for-service: for medicines 
Source: Ministry of Health, Rwanda Annual Reports 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012; Ghana National Health Insurance Authority Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012; interviews with representatives of selected District Health Insurance Schemes and the National Health Insurance Authority, May 2015.   
a. Rwanda’s approximations are based on government reports over various years hence the difference in current allocations shown in Table 4-13. 
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4.4.4 The political context of universal coverage 
Having looked at the policy design features of the Mutuelle and the NHIS a further 
look through the lens of the political processes surrounding the programs gives yet a clearer 
picture of how these programs differ.   
4.4.4.1 Political motivation for the NHIS in Ghana  
Health care financing and out-of-pocket payments have been influential in the 
political history of Ghana. After independence in 1957, citizens enjoyed free health care. 
Subsequent years of economic recessions coupled with growing health care expenditures 
weakened the ability of government to finance health care. User fees were increasingly 
introduced at point of service and following the Bamako initiative user fees were 
institutionalized with the Legislative Instrument (LI) 1313 of 1985. The exemptions for 
vulnerable groups were inadequate to minimize catastrophic effect of user fee charges 
being increasingly felt across the country (Agyepong and Nagai 2011). The nostalgic 
longing for free health care would be understandably strong among the generation of baby-
boomers and beyond who had experienced full public provision in a relatively socialist 
republic beginning with Nkrumah’s rule after independence. Politicians in the past have 
been known to capitalize on the growing burden of out-of-pocket payments for education 
and health care and the desire to return the country back to free public provision to drum 
up support for coup d'état or political unrests (Wahab 2008). The National Patriotic Party 
(NPP) was the first democratically elected government to peacefully transition to power in 
2000. The NPP, arguably the most conservative political party in Ghana made “free health 
care for all” a prominent theme in its manifesto. It appears this promise was instrumental 
to winning the elections against the left-leaning government of Jerry John Rawlings who 
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been in power (under different governments) for two decades. And this after winning by a 
significant margin the second round of contested elections against the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) party of Jerry John Rawlings.  
Political strategizing, political commitment, political acclaim and political 
disapproval features prominently in the evolution of the NHIS even after a decade of its 
implementation. The passage of the National Health Insurance Law (Act 625) of 2003 was 
remarkably fast paced even amidst resistance from opposition parties, prominent labor 
unions and development partners. Criticisms by civil society (notably the Unions) had to 
do with inadequate democratic processes by which the law had been created (Rajkotia 
2007, Wahab 2008). Other concerns had to do with the technical soundness of program 
design with respect to the sustainability of a social insurance scheme given the apparently 
weak institutional set up of the country (McKinnen et al 2011; Brigiavinni and Pace 2010).  
Development partners preferred an expansion from a pilot phase (similar as in Rwanda) of 
the several existing mutual insurance schemes that were being successful, similar to the 
case of the Mutuelle. Understandably the opposition party (NDC) was in favor of this 
approach as under their rule these pilots had been initiated with the apparent intention to 
approach universal access by expanding community-based schemes nationwide following 
the proposed model of development partners.   
In reality the NPP had made a campaign promise and therefore after coming to 
power commissioned a task force to find ways to establish a program of free health care. 
Another election cycle was due to arrive. The assignment given to this task force by the 
government was specific and threefold as elaborated by Rajkotia (2007). The task was to 
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design a program to: (1) eliminate out of pocket payments for health care (2) be implement 
immediately and (3) be expanded nationwide in a short amount of time  
A free health care program that would be financed by a combination of taxes and 
therefore a social health insurance program met the criteria. Such a program would be faster 
implemented through the district governments given the already existing administrative set 
up. The task force had its fair share of political manoeuvring as consultants who 
recommended changes and considered a fast track implementation of such a program to be 
impractical were labelled as unpatriotic and marginalized (Rajkotia 2007). Consultants 
favoring a sounder design had suggested using a long term approach by growing the 
schemes from bottom up in a gradual expansion of the pre-existing community-based 
models. Other suggestions included an element of coinsurance to raise revenues and gate-
keep to contain costs. The political machinery of the government was astute to limit 
advocacy and consequent resistance in order to fast-track the parliamentary processes to 
get a bill passed into law.  Opposition parties, labor unions and civil society groups 
protested the general lack transparency and participatory approach. A compromise was 
reached with unions to exempt workers from paying premiums given the payroll taxes 
going to fund the scheme. Hence the all-important feature of exemptions for SSNIT 
contributors. Another compromise was to delegate some management functions at the 
discretion of each district and in that way attain some semblance of community 
participation to appease some protesting publics. In place of copayments the favored 
proposal was a premium decided as the equivalent of the poverty line and hence a $1.25 
equivalent in premiums was decided with the argument that this amount would maintain 
solvency initially while also acknowledging that financial sustainability may (or not) work 
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depending on outcomes. It is apparent that while making health care freely accessible was 
desired, the government political agenda was the overriding factor in adopting a seemingly 
unsound technical design for a start. The NHIS Law was passed in 2003, NPP was voted 
again into power in 2004 and implementation of NHIS begun in 2005.  
The NHIS grew in popularity and reported fast enrollments in the early years and 
has won international acclaim for the innovation of combining social insurance with 
community-based approaches (Rajkotia 2007, Apoya et al 2011, National Health Insurance 
Authority 2011).  The willingness of the incumbent government (since 2008) to maintain 
the NHIS even though it had been perceived of as the legacy of the previous government, 
underscores the critical role political commitment has played. The NDC government 
subsequently attempted to implement a one-time payment for a life-time subscription to 
the NHIS and one may not ignore the fact this was a manifesto and the NDC won the 
elections in 2008. As early as 2009 the government initiated plans to implement the one-
time-payment. The stated rationale was to eliminate the key problems plaguing NHIS: the 
delays in registration renewals and the difficulties in identifying the poor to be granted 
premium exemptions. Judging from the news archives of prominent news journals (the 
Daily Graphic, The Ghanaian Times) the one-time payment not surprisingly elicits much 
debate, with most citizens perceiving the policy of as an impractical, or that of political 
gimmickry.  The debate resurfaces intermittently with policy proposed variations to the 
one-time policy and especially around the election cycle as recorded for 2012. Even the 
government announcing in 2013 that one-time-payment was being shelved because of so-
called stakeholder concerns could not kill the debate. Contradictory statements have 
resurfaced in recent months with a government official stating affirming that one-time 
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payment had never been abandoned whereas the NHIA senior executive had stated at a 
press conference that one-time payment was never an option.  
NHIS has had political connotations to its existence but an advantage of this 
political branding is that the NHIS, as long as it is a program of free health care coverage 
would benefit from political commitment and the domestic consensus for pursuing in a 
program of free health care coverage. Free health care is an issue that is politically 
sensitized in Ghana, quite unlike free education or any other public provisioning of that 
matter. In contrast to Rwanda, NHIS may the consistency of a well planned development 
program with the attendant contradictions in targeting, equity and financial sustainability. 
Regardless of its political branding and because of this feature it is at best a political tool 
that unites the country and at its worst, it brings out irrational policy debates.  Political 
commitment notwithstanding, the evidence remains that financial sustainability of the 
scheme is questionable which is discussed in further detail.  
4.4.4.2 Political motivations for the Mutuelle in Rwanda 
Rwanda also had a “free of charge” health care policy when the country gained 
independence from colonial rule in 1962 and similar to Ghana, the free health care soon 
proved to be unsustainable (MOH-R 2008, Schneider 2005, Dhillon 2012). It was soon 
abandoned. Health insurance coverage was largely nonexistent with the exception of the 
small group of formal sector employees who had occupational injury coverage and the 
mandatory insurance for public sector workers and the military. In Rwanda, the 
government describes the Mutuelle as a flagship health financing policy and strategy to 
improve access to health services (MOH-R 2008, MOH-R 2010, MOH-R 2012) and as 
such Mutuelle is viewed in the broader context as a means and an end in itself to poverty 
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reduction. A strong political commitment (Dhillon et al 2011) is demonstrated again in the 
government’s commitment to establish universal access as part of a larger development 
program towards attaining a middle-income status by 2020 (Vision 2020, EREDEP).  The 
incumbent government has ruled since 1994 and has been described as a ‘benevolent’ 
dictatorship (Dhillon 2011). Reports elsewhere indicate a political agenda to champion a 
model of development in Africa, in particular to wean the country off aid (Zakaria 2012). 
Rwanda is believed to have an effective public administration system that is also efficient 
especially with external resources and this helps their cause. Universal coverage as a policy 
is then in the larger context of Rwanda’s ambitious development program and one would 
expect the commitment to continue especially because of the longevity of the incumbent 
govern, so to speak, and the apparent domestic ownership of the development program. 
But then the problem arises when higher income has been attained (regardless of patterns 
in inequality) and where the shift toward private sector provisioning (depending on the 
dominant philosophies and commitment to public provisioning) and consequent capitalist 
dominance and consequent inequalities in access to care based on ability to pay may start 
to grow. One may wonder also if a change in regime would make a difference in policy 
emphasis.  
In effect, while the originations of Rwanda’s Mutuelle program may be situated 
within the broader context of a poverty reduction program, Ghana’s NHIS has had a 
dissimilar beginning in an incumbent government’s manifesto even though both country 
programs have similar legal mandates and policy prescriptions as would be expected of a 
policy on universal health coverage. 
iii. Setbacks 
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Despite the impressive progress in Mutuelle coverage health insurance in Rwanda 
have setbacks that are to be expected of a low income country. The health infrastructure is 
inadequate to meeting the health needs of majority of the population. Though Mutuelle 
membership imply a comprehensive benefit package the complete products and services 
are lacking in the rural and urban periphery so that members have to pay out of pocket to 
acquire them from private providers. Copayments at the secondary and tertiary levels of 
care are a burden to the poor.   
Despite community involvement and the participatory approach to Mutuelle there 
is still low managerial capacity and lack of autonomy of the Mutuelle, similar as in Ghana. 
In addition, the Mutuelle schemes started out as strong partnerships between the health 
centers and the communities but after the expansion into nationwide-community 
partnerships, the partnerships with the district and national hospitals have been weak. 
Scaling up of Mutuelle presents coordination, governance and management problems. 
While members are well represented at the local level they have weak representation at the 
district and national management levels.  
As a result of delays in reimbursements of health care providers following financial 
challenges of schemes especially in recent years, it has been reported that Mutuelle clients 
face discriminatory practices with long wait times and unfavorably health worker attitude 
at the health facilities. This experience then discourages retention in membership. This is 
a similar situation for NHIS as the stigma attached to NHIS has discouraged participation.  
Another problem common to NHIS and Mutuelle is that provider payments 
mechanism allows cost-creeping. Provider-induced demand, over-servicing 
(overutilization and over prescription), corruption and misappropriation of funds by fund 
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managers persist. Provider claims fraud is particularly reported in Ghana. Further 
discussion of the key issues that influence financial sustainability of Mutuelle and NHIS 
here follows.  
4.5 Financial sustainability issues and the policy implications 
Sustainability is arguably a complex concept with perspectives varying across 
disciplines and research traditions. With regards to health care programs, sustainability 
may imply the maintenance of health benefits, the institutionalization of programs, the 
sustenance of community capacity or the continuation of programs (Gruen et al 2010). 
Alternatively, sustainability is a multidimensional concept as the WHO would describe it: 
“The ability of a project to function effectively, for the foreseeable future, with high 
treatment coverage, integrated into available health care services, with strong community 
ownership using resources mobilized by the community and government” (WHO 2002).  
Ensuring the sustainability of a health program is an important target but arguably 
a moving target in the sense that opportunity costs exist (and understandably greater in the 
context of a low income country) and these costs may be changing with time and 
circumstances. At the same time premature discontinuation of programs often results in 
wasted human, technical and monetary resources and unmet needs regardless of the context 
for discontinuation. Sustainability assessments are therefore essential.  
While not disregarding the importance of a multidimensional approach to 
sustainability assessments, this study focuses on the financial sustainability of Ghana’s 
NHIS and Rwanda Mutuelle.  This involves an analysis of cost outlays in relation to the 
resource base to assess each country’s ability to sustain its program for a given level of 
coverage and time period. For the purposes of this study, financial sustainability is defined 
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as the ability to cover all monetary costs with the existing financing streams, given the 
objectives of the program. The assessment is in two parts. The first makes a judgment based 
on published financial statements and reports.  A second assessment extends the discussion 
to the current political economy and the implications for financial sustainability based on 
information from both published and unpublished sources.  Finally, the analysis lays out 
the policy changes needed to keep the programs financially sustainable based on 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of financial resource allocation and sources.    
4.5.1 Patterns in expenditures  
This section compares the components and performance of expenditures by the 
Mutuelle and by the NHIS using the information in government published reports and 
financial statements (MOH-R 2012, NHIA 2012, 2011, 2010, and 2009). These reports 
cover the periods July 2011 to June 2012 for Rwanda and January 2009 through December 
2012 for Ghana. Table 4-10 shows the compilations on expenditures.  As would be 
expected, the provider reimbursement is the largest component:  84.72% for Rwanda 
(2012) and 77.2% for Ghana (average for 2009-2012). NHIS operations and logistics is on 
average 8.38% of total spending, with the remainder (14.35%) allocated to causes such as 
social intervention programs and support to partner institutions. Support to partner 
institutions has three components:  i) primary health and preventive care ii) district health 
projects and iii) health services investments (NHIA 2012). Therefore, if one were to include 
support to partner institutions as a category in direct expenditures on health services, then 
at least 87.25% on average goes to health services.  This number compares favorably with 
84.27% in the case of Mutuelle. On average 12.75% of total expenditures by the NHIS is 
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allocated as operating expenses compared to 15.27% by Mutuelle but then Mutuelle 
categorizations are simpler: operating expenses and reimbursements.  
While the relative shares of the expenditure categories are similar for Mutuelle and 
NHIS, the levels of expenditures differ significantly. NHIS expenditure in per capita terms 
is much higher even after adjusting for inflation and purchasing power parity.  Between 
2009 and 2012 the NHIS spent the equivalent of USD 365.38 per active member which is 
11.56 times the amount by Mutuelle (USD 33.34) in 2012. For provider claims payments 
alone, the NHIS again spends considerably more (USD 13.53) per outpatient and inpatient 
contact than the Mutuelle (USD 3.49) as demonstrated in Table 4-11 and Table 4-12. 
4.5.1.1 Efficiency issues 
There is reason to believe that additional information on Mutuelle from previous 
years would show similar patterns and Mutuelle average expenditure per capita would not 
exceed the amount for 2012. In the first place, the active membership of Mutuelle has 
increased much faster over the years than the case of the NHIS as indicated in Table 4-7. 
One may question whether the relative depth (number of services) and height (proportion 
of costs) of coverage accounts for much of the difference in expenditures per capita 
especially if the cost, the quality or the intensity in consumption of services is 
comparatively greater for NHIS. Accordingly, the information that would give a good 
estimate of the degree to which the relative cost of services accounts for the dissimilarity 
in expenditures per capita include disaggregated data on the reimbursement schedules and 
rates as well as the case mix (e.g. claims per diagnostic related grouping).  Given the nature 
of the relevant information and given the scope of this study, such information has been 
difficult to access. However, some evidence on health services costs from sources outside 
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the NHIS or the Mutuelle could be useful in making some conclusions about the relative 
performance of expenditures by the NHIS and the Mutuelle.  
The WHO estimates of per unit cost of hospital care for outpatient and inpatient 
visits (excluding drugs and diagnostic services) in Rwanda and in Ghana is listed in tables 
in Appendix D. The data suggest that Rwanda’s hospital costs in 2005 were generally 
higher than those in Ghana (see Table with estimates of unit costs at hospitals in Rwanda 
and Ghana in Appendix D) and Rwanda experienced faster growth in per unit costs 
(measured in constant international dollar) from 2000 to 2005.  This may suggest that in 
later the unit costs (in constant international dollar terms) of health services in Rwanda 
would at least match those in Ghana. It is reasonable to assume that the higher expenditures 
of the NHIS are not all accounted for by a higher cost of health services per se. It is 
important to note, however, that these WHO estimates exclude the cost of drugs and 
diagnostic services.  
Another question arises about whether the differences in the relative size of the 
standard benefit package for NHIS versus Mutuelle (see Table 4-8) would be a significant 
factor in the differences in expenditures.  It is difficult to directly compare benefits. On one 
hand NHIS benefits are limited to a number of services although it purportedly covers 95% 
of diseases and zero copayments by policy. On the contrary Mutuelle coverage is limited 
to 90% of the cost of services (after a deductible) while also the number of services is 
limited to (100% of services at primary facilities but only inpatient services and selected 
surgeries in secondary and tertiary facilities). But the implication for costs is clear: the co-
payments component in Mutuelle is potentially more effective at gate-keeping and 
deterring overutilization of services and consequently limiting the cost of claims, than the 
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NHIS. The average number of contacts per active member of the NHIS (2.77) is greater 
than the case of the Mutuelle (1.07) as illustrated in Table 4-11 and Table 4-12. 
4.5.1.2 Influence of provider reimbursement methods 
Another factor could be the inflation of costs by providers. Fee-for-service 
payments method had been the approach in reimbursing health services providers until 
2008 when NHIA introduced the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groups (G-DRG) as the 
framework. Medicines remain on the fee-for-service system but prices are standardized 
across the country (Agyepong-Martefio and Yankah). The opportunity exists for cost 
escalation and patient over-servicing. Rwanda is also considering moving to a DRG basis 
from its current fee-for-service (MOH-R, 2011). In addition, Rwanda has a comprehensive 
performance-based financing framework since 2006 that integrates many variables into 
assessing provider performance and compensating accordingly. The monitoring of 
performance is based on quarterly evaluations of a list of 13 services and 185 variables to 
measure facility outputs, quality of service, access to care and administration. Provider 
payment is then scaled to performance based on the evaluations made at the district and 
sector levels (Kajonga 2007, Joint Learning Network).  Consequently, the performance-
based financing provides an incentive structure that puts pressure on providers to improve 
quality of service to satisfy their Mutuelle clientele. Given the higher enrollments in the 
Mutuelle, risk pooling is larger and so the per capita costs relative to mobilized resources 
would be lower for a given cost of claims. Also, the chances for Mutuelle providers to 
escalate costs may be lower than the case of Ghana NHIS because of the inbuilt provider 
performance evaluation tool by which Mutuelle provider reimbursement claims are 
assessed. Ghana NHIA has similarly introduced a capitation payments system on a pilot 
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basis in the Ashanti Region beginning in 2012. This system involves advanced payments 
of an agreed predetermined amount per client per period. Capitation has been limited to 
outpatient services except specialist services. It is believed that capitation payment method 
would be an effective cost control, simplify claims processing, generate competition 
between providers and provide better risk-sharing between providers, schemes and 
subscribers. Capitation was met with a lot of resistance especially by health care providers 
in the private sector who at the time considered the proposed monthly capitation of GH 1.1 
(1 USD) for diagnosis and GH 0.65 (USD 0.70) for drugs per active member in the 
catchment area as inadequate and will force an increase in out of pocket payments. In 
consonance with the capitation system members now are limited to a referral system and 
may not roam, to provide some measure of gate-keeping for providers.   
Alternatively, provider claims in Ghana may be more inflated than the true cost of 
services. NHIS is a significant channel of public facility financing based on some evidence 
that the NHIS alone provides upwards of 80% of public hospital internally generated funds 
(MOH-G 2012). Some evidence suggests that a number of health centers in Rwanda could 
operate at a surplus with the funds received from the Mutuelle (Kabugare 2006) hence 
Mutuelle could similarly be a significant channel of finance for health facilities though the 
relative proportions in national expenditures cannot be compared this way.  
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Table 4-10:  Expenditure components of the Mutuelle and the NHIS 
 Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme Rwanda Mutuelle 
Year of published financial statement 2009 2010 2011 2012 2011/12 2012/13 
 Distribution of expenditures by category (% of total) 
Reimbursements/claims payment  84.3 74.9 71.8 78.2 84.7 82 
Operating expenses 5.9 8.6 8 11.0 15.3 18 
Support to partner institutions 9.8 14.3 6.5 9.5 N/A N/A 
Social intervention programs - - 12.0 - N/A N/A 
Depreciation - 2.21 1.7 1.3 N/A N/A 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Surplus/deficit (% of total expenditures) -5.0 -13.0 -19.0 -2.0 7.2 -10.2 
 Amount of total expenditures 
Total expenditures in millions local currency  427.1 531.3 764.2 788.3 22,737.6 27,971.1 
Total expenditures in million US$ (constant 2010 
prices) 335.4 371.6 465.6 368.96 33.34 35.7 
 Expenditures in per capita terms 
US$ per active subscriber (constant 2010 prices) - 45.51 56.6 41.5 3.2 3.7 
In international $ (PPP) per subscriber (2010 
prices) - 81.4 122.0 106.77 7.18 8.9 
 Active membership 
Number of subscribers (millions)      -     8.16     8.23    8.89     10.39 9.53 
Percent of national population - 34 33 35 90.7 80.9 
Sources: Ministry of Health Rwanda Annual Report, various years, Ghana National Health Insurance Authority Annual Reports, and author’s calculation. 
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Table 4-11: NHIS reimbursements per outpatient and inpatient contact, 2005-2012 
      Average costa per inpatient contact, USD (current) 
 
GHS 
millions 
(current) 
Total number of 
outpatient and 
inpatient contacts 
(thousands) 
Active members 
(thousands) 
Contacts 
per active 
member 
Proportion 
inpatient 
Assumes GHS 
12.69bb per 
OPD contact 
Assumes 
inpatient cost at 
3.35x OPD  
Assumes same 
weight for 
OPD 
2005 7.6 626.8 - - 0.05 0.5 40.7 13.5 
2006 35.5 2,569.2 - - 0.05 37.7 45.7 15.3 
2007 79.3 4,952.0 - - 0.06 74.1 52.0 17.8 
2008 183.0 9,967.1 - - 0.06 93.4 48.7 16.7 
2009 362.6 17,603.2 - - 0.06 111.2 43.6 14.7 
2010 397.6 17,655.7 8,163.7 2.2 0.04 180.2 49.2 16.1 
2011 548.7 26,937.7 8,227.8 3.3 0.05 103.5 40.4 13.6 
2012 616.5 25,303.4 8,885.8 2.9 0.06 122.0 40.0 13.53 
Source: Ghana National Health Insurance Authority Annual Report, various years. 
a. Author’s estimations based on National Health Insurance Authority Annual Reports 
b. This is an average based on data this author obtained in January 2013 from the outpatient unit of Ridge (regional) Hospital in Accra. This data consists of 
unaudited claims the hospital had prepared for the month of December 1-31st, 2012 and covered some 2,044 outpatient contacts.  
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Table 4-12:  Claims payments for services provided to Mutuelle members, 2011/2012 
 2012/2013 2011/2012 
 
Total number of 
outpatient and 
inpatient contacts a 
Total cost (in millions 
RWF) 
Total number of 
outpatient and inpatient 
contacts 
average cost per contact b 
Rwandan 
Franc 
International $ 
(PPP) 
USD 
(current) 
Health centers  
                               
7,215.2  7,337,349 983.4 3.8 1.6 
District Hospitals -                        8,095.9  695,942 11,633.0 45.3 19.1 
National Referral Hospital 
CHUK - 1,331.2  64,339 20,690.2 80.5 34.1 
Ndera Hospital -                           104.0  12,590 8,263.6 32.2 13.6 
SCPS Kanombe -                            55.0  7,471 7,361.7 28.6 12.1 
Military Hospital -                            44.9  4,037 11,121. 0 43.3 18.3 
King Faisal (Private) -                           373.4  1,494 249,953.8 972.6 411.8 
Total  6,874,295                      17,219.7  8,123,222 2,119.8 8.3 3.5 
Contacts per active member 1.23 - 1.07 - - - 
Proportion inpatient 0.05 - 0.08 - - - 
a. For health centers only. Based on provisional estimates in Ministry of Health, Rwanda Annual Report for year ended June 2013. 
b. Author’s estimations based on Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Health Annual Reports. 
Source: Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Health CBHI Report 2012, Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Health Annual Report 2013. 
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Expenditures may have been under reported in the case of Rwanda Mutuelle or it 
is plausible that a sizable portion of the difference in expenditures could be explained by 
Mutuelle being more cost efficient than Ghana.  The assumption that Mutuelle is relatively 
cost efficient than NHIS may be testable where ample relevant disaggregated data is 
available but the foregoing discussion in this study suggests that it is a reasonable 
assumption. NHIS has consistently run a deficit (by as much as 19% of total expenditures 
in 2011) as may be seen in Table 4-10 though the deficit improved in 2012. Following is a 
discussion of the sources of funds with the observation that patterns in financial 
sustainability, as observed, could very likely improve if each country commits to and 
succeeds in improving accountability and efficiency in the current financing arrangements, 
and without changes to the existing policy design.  
4.5.2 Funding sources and the prospects   
While there is some similarity in the relative weight of expenditure categories for 
NHIS and Rwanda, the sources of funds are markedly different. The information in Table 
4-13 shows relative importance of the funding sources for Mutuelle and for NHIS. Levies 
are the most significant source of funds for Ghana and at the same time the least important 
source for Rwanda. The opposite may be said of premiums. Premium collections are the 
most significant source of funds for the Mutuelle (55%) followed by government sources 
(21%) and then the Global fund (11%), an external source. The NHI Law (2003) 
established a National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) to finance the NHIS. More than sixty 
percent of the fund is obtained from the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) – an 
additional 2.5% of value added tax (VAT) on qualifying imports and goods and services 
supplied. 
 252 
 
 
 
Table 4-13: Funding sources for Rwanda Mutuelle and Ghana NHIS in various years 
 
Ghana National Health Insurance 
Scheme Rwanda Mutuelle 
Financial year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2011/12 2013/12 
 Distribution of the funding sources by category (%) 
Insurance premium - - 4.5 3.7 55.0 66.0 
Levies 80.9 63.3 72.8 74.1 2 1 
SSNIT - 18.9 17.4 18.3 N/A N/A 
Government - - - - 21 14 
Copayments N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 6 
Global fund/External N/A N/A N/A N/A 11 10 
Other 19.2 12.8 5.3 3.9 6 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Amount of funds  
Total in million local currency 
units 407.5 461.0 617.8 773.8 24,374.3 25,107.0 
Total in million US$ (constant 
2010 prices) 320.0 322.4 376.4 362.2 35.7 32.0 
In US$ per subscriber 
(constant 2010 prices)  - 39.5 45.8 40.8 3.4 3.4 
Source: Ministry of Health Rwanda Annual Report in various years; National Health Insurance 
Authority Annual Report in various years; author’s calculations. 
 
Another important source is mandatory 2.5% of individual contributions to the 
Social Security and Pensions Scheme Fund mostly by the formal sector. In the literature 
these two sources have been interchangeably referred to as NHIL contributions (see Table 
4-14).  The other sources of fund include parliamentary allocations, returns on Fund 
investments and grants and donations made to the Fund. Informal sector adults are required 
to make direct contributions in the form of premiums to their district health insurance fund. 
Premiums are determined on a sliding scale (between GHS7.2 to GHS 48) depending on 
the SES status of the District, or by category of exemption. Additional revenue sources that 
have been proposed for the NHIF are petroleum taxes, ‘sin tax’ and higher levies.  
It is evident that the financial sustainability NHIS is technically linked to the 
domestic tax revenues consequently to the performance of the economy. On average more 
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than 70% of the reported funding is the earmarked sales taxes, hence levies, as described 
in Table 4-13. That means the greater portion of pooled funds is not in tandem with the 
level of subscriptions, and similarly not in line with the level of claims payments, unlike 
the case of Mutuelle. Given the relatively low share of premiums, one may conclude that 
the financial sustainability of the NHIS is all a problem of the premium component but 
may be inconsequential. The NHIS financing model implies that funding is less sensitive 
to subscriber participation which is a good feature for planning purposes. In principle, 
macroeconomic management is the most significant influence on funding.  The advantage 
for Ghana NHIS compared to Rwanda Mutuelle is the higher level of domestic ownership 
and less dependence on the credibility of external sources. To the extent that domestic 
sources are adequate the higher level of domestic ownership of NHIS is an important 
advantage for long term sustainability. The challenge remains to ensure domestic revenue 
growth is adequate for the growth in insurance coverage, assuming funds are well managed 
and costs are contained. The challenge also is to ensure political commitment across 
regimes.  
It would take a significant increase in premium rates and or enrollment rates to 
make any meaningful impact on funding given the status quo. As shown in the foregone 
analysis, increasing the cost of premiums would likely decrease membership rates while 
rolling back the gains made so far in improving access. On the other hand, increasing 
enrollment rates, even if that would entail a reduction in premium rates and better targeting 
of vulnerable groups, could still have a positive impact on risk pooling and adverse 
selection while also increasing access. The potential for adverse selection is a program 
design feature of NHIS. Figure 4-11 illustrates the distribution of membership by 
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exemption status 8 . It is apparent that premium exemptions are gradually displacing 
contributors (545 in 2010 and 60% in 2012) while contributors have consistently been in 
the minority. Pregnant mothers have increased in share from 3.5%, 5.5% and 8.6% in 2008, 
2009 and 2010. It is a good thing also indigents have increased from 1.4% to 4.4% from 
2010 to 2012. The proportion of informal contributor has also increased by three 
percentage points from 2010 to 2012 even though the contributor base is declining.  
 
Figure 4-11: Percent of NHIS active membership by category of premium exemption, 
2008-2012  
 
Source: National Health Insurance Authority Annual Reports for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
Pregnant women, the aged and children under five are more likely to use health care than 
other groups of the population. At the same time improving their access to health care 
                                                 
 
8 The lower accuracy of the data prior to 2010 and subsequent change in methodology for calculating 
the membership numbers may explain the kink in the observation. 
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makes the most impact on measured health outcomes such as in the millennium 
development goals.  
The second most important source of funding for NHIS is the contributions from 
the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pension fund. This source 
technically varies with the amount of payroll contributions to the pension fund. The core 
contributors are therefore public sector formal employees where SSNIT contributions are 
mandatory. The SSNIT-contributor base is a smaller (about 4%) proportion of the total 
population of Ghana in comparison to the informal sector contributor-base (by way of 
premium payments) of about 10% of the population (NHIA 2013). The SSNIT 
contributions have been a significant component of central government revenue allocations 
to NHIS. SSNIT contributions to the NHIL have ranged between 32% to 21% as shown in 
Table 4-14 and only by 4% of the population, this proportion is significant compared to the 
contributions from value added taxes and custom duties (also shown in Table 4-14). These 
taxes, together with the SSNIT contributions, as a proportion of total government revenues 
have ranged from 7% in 2008 to 5% in 2014. While additional revenue sources such as 
‘sin’ taxes (e.g., on alcohol and tobacco) and fuel levies have been proposed (NHIA 2013) 
it is obvious that there is room for improvement from the existing tax sources without 
increasing the tax burden by improving accountability and efficiency in managing existing 
funding sources.  In fact, one may argue that the long term sustainability of NHIS and 
similarly the NHIS could be assured through a fundamental improvement in accountability 
by the different stakeholders without the need for fundamental changes in the policy 
design, as may be illustrated in the discussions that follow.  
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Table 4-14: National Health Insurance Levy contributions and allocations  
Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
National Health Insurance Levy  
revenue sources 
In million GHS 318.3 319.0 388.0 550.2 714.0 806.7 999.9 
Of which (%)  
Customs Collection  44.6 53.2 47.1 51.9 51.0 50.2 46.3 
 Domestic VAT Collection  22.6 28.6 34.2 33.85 29.7 30.1 31.9 
 SSNIT Contribution  32.8 18.2 18.7 14.27 19.3 19.3 21.8 
National Health Fund allocations 
In million GHS 256.5 182.5 351.3         377.0 587.3 752.8 947.2 
  
As a ratio of NHIL revenues (%) 80.6 57.2 90.5 68.5 82.3 93.3 94.7 
        
NHIL as ratio of tax revenues (%) 7.4 6.9 6.2 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.1 
Source: Republic of Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Annual Budget Statements, 
various years; author’s estimations. 
 
4.5.3 Fiscal accountability and the threat to program sustainability 
Inadequate resources for ambitious projects could easily be understood to cause 
problems for sustainability especially in the developing country context. However, the 
analysis in this section builds on evidence suggesting that the mismanagement of funds is 
as critical as the lack of resources for the sustainability of the NHIS and the Mutuelle.   
4.5.3.1 Fiscal commitment  
Some financial sustainability issues of NHIS have been attributed to problems in 
central government allocation of funds to the NHIS. According to published reports and 
financial statements (NHIA 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) fund allocations have improved in 
timeliness but delays persist (NHIA 2012). Delays in provider reimbursements is one factor 
that discourages potential providers from joining the scheme and these delays have been 
largely attributed to the Ministry of Finance delays in releasing budgeted allocations from 
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the NHI Fund. When delayed funds are released they are done in installments. Vetting of 
provider claims is another explanation for the contested delays in provider reimbursements, 
and claims vetting could of itself improve financial sustainability so long as it is reasonable 
amount of time.  All the same administrative delays could be considered one problem that 
threatens NHIS financial sustainability. As may be seen, central government annual 
allocations to the NHIS have varied between 57% and 95% of the NHIL revenues collected 
(see Table 4-14). This pattern may be demonstrating that when lower than budgeted funds 
allocated in a given particular year, arrears payments improve amounts allocated in 
subsequent years.  
There is indication that administrative inefficiencies occur in managing SSNIT 
contributions such that even when funds from domestic sources could be adequate 
administrative bottlenecks have made them inaccessible to the NHIS. For example, at a 
parliamentary hearing on April 30th 2015 the Controller and Accountant General’s 
Department have admitted delaying the transfer of SSNIT contributions to a designated 
account at the Bank of Ghana (Ghana News Agency 2015). However, the Controller 
General indicated having no knowledge of the amount of funds involved although the 
period concerned is 2012 and 2013.  The government’s Auditor General similarly claimed 
to have had no knowledge of the delayed transfer of funds. It is unfortunate that such 
oversight would occur and the responsible public officials fail to account for funds of this 
scale. Such an occurrence could possibly hurt efforts to encourage voluntary participation 
of the private sector in the SSNIT pension scheme. The potential for improving NHIS 
funding through the important SSNIT contributions is therefore limited to mandatory 
public employee contributions.    
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Compared to Ghana, budget performance for Rwanda appears higher judging from 
budgetary allocations to the health sector. For example, the allocations for the fiscal year 
2011/2012 were on target and executions were 105% of allocated funds according to the 
published budget statements (MOH-R 2012).  In fiscal year 2012/2013 also expenditures 
on human resources exceeded target by 6%, while financial accessibility to health services 
(i.e. subsidies to households) was on target at 100%, diagnostics and treatment was at 102% 
of approved funds, with availability of drugs and consumables the only category that 
obtained less than the approved funds, at 75%. The other category not on target, 
expenditures on geographic access to health services, was exceeded by 40% with the note 
that budgetary support from extra sources been received. Budgetary statements of the 
Ministry of Health in Ghana indicate fund allocations had been about 13% below target for 
the 2011/2012 fiscal year; this was a midyear observation however (MOH-G 2012).  Beside 
the many factors that could influence budget outcomes, it is likely that, fiscal commitment 
to the Mutuelle is relatively high in Rwanda. Apparently, also, external support has been 
reliable in Rwanda.  
4.5.3.2 Misappropriation of funds  
It is to be expected that, for an insurance program, principal agency problems would 
arise but the extent to which such problems influence financial sustainability may be 
compounded by inefficiencies in the system. In the NHIS, as in the Mutuelle, different 
stakeholder groups have been implicated in specific misconducts that minimize the trust 
and the solidarity that such social programs depend on as illustrated in the discussion that 
follows. One may observe that the patterns in misconducts that have been publicly 
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identified have varied in accordance with the institutional contexts and the design of the 
programs but the negative impact on financial sustainability has been similar and evident.  
In recent years the Mutuelle has experienced falling rates in subscriptions which 
purportedly came as a surprise to citizens and policy makers alike (MOH-R 2012, MOH-
R 2013, Hakizimana 2014, Ngoboka 2015). The impact was well realized when a crises of 
sorts began to emerge. The hardest hit districts have been unable to keep up to schedule in 
providing health services. Health facilities have been affected for instance with the lack of 
financing to restock medicines and in turn Mutuelle subscribers have felt cheated to have 
paid for insurance and not have access to the expected services. The feedback on further 
falling rates in enrollments have meant some districts operating increasingly at a deficit. 
While cross subsidizations with surpluses by other districts as well as public and donor 
support have been available for failing districts, the repercussions are a potential erosion 
of the gains Rwanda has made expanding access to health care and a an eventual collapse 
of the Mutuelle system.  In advance of recent public debates, parliamentary probes and 
commissioned studies about the falling rates in Mutuelle membership (Hakizimana 2014, 
Rwembeho 2015, Ngoboka 2015, Asaba 2015, Ntirenganya 2015, Bucyensenge 2015) 
interesting patterns in enrollments had been observed by policy makers (MOH-R 2011, 
MOH-R 2012).  
Previously, some sections had been recording enrollment rates that were in excess 
of population size. Among the probable causes, the Ministry of Health (MOH-R 2011, 
2012) cites one such reason as the pressure scheme managers felt to report progress in order 
to obtain acclaim and improved allocation of resources given the requirements of the 
performance-based payments system. It would soon be clear after systemic investigations 
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and extensive audits that mismanagement of funds was happening on a massive scale 
especially in select Western province districts that had experienced the worst of the crises 
in enrollments and health service disruptions. An example is the recent high profile arrests 
of several district mayors charged with falsification of documents and conniving with 
pharmacies to defraud the Mutuelle. In one instance as much as RWF 9.6 million had been 
embezzled in the Eastern Province (Hakizimana 2014, Rwembeho 2015, Ngoboka 2015, 
Asaba 2015, Ntirenganya 2015, Bucyensenge 2015).  
Similarly, the Minister of Health (Dr. Binagwaho) has gone on record that although 
enrollments have marginally improved, the Mutuelle has experienced as much as RWF 7 
billion in uncollected revenues for the fiscal year 2014/2015 alone (Ngoboka 2015, Asaba 
2015). To give context to this loss, the amount reported as premiums collected in the 
2012/2013 fiscal year is about RWF 16 billion. These losses compound the financial 
position of the Mutuelle and coupled with the losses of health centers and hospitals that 
depend on the Mutuelle for internally generated funds, the repercussions are greater. The 
quick response of the administration in apprehending culprits, commissioning extensive 
audits and research, and the general public’s advocacy for sustaining the Mutuelle 
(Hakizimana 2014, Ngoboka 2015, Asaba 2015, Ntirenganya 2015) may worked to regain 
some trust of the citizens in the Mutuelle system.   
In the case of the NHIS, the publicized examples of fraudulent practices of 
providers give another perspective into how serious the problem of resource 
mismanagement and leakages in the system is and the threat to financial sustainability the 
program (Marma 2008, Peacefmonline 2009, Ghanaweb 2010, JoyNews 2013, Bannerman 
2014, Andoh 2015). The NHIA recouped the equivalent of USD7.4 million over a two-
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year period for fraudulent claims charged by providers. Some providers have been known 
to recycle processed claims from month to month (Bannerman 2014). In one instance a 
provider who owns a private practice and works as well in a public facility processed claims 
for 1540 clients in the two facilities at exactly a month apart. The fraudulent claims 
involved were estimated at about USD500,000. A recent example involved the physician 
in charge of one administrative district’s health system, in which case the fraudulent claims 
have been estimated at about USD150,000 (Andoh 2015).  A similar report involves a 
physician charged with falsification of documents by submitting claims for services 
rendered to phantom patients, and again presenting claims for said patients for services in 
several facilities owned by same physician. This doctor’s fraudulent claim from January to 
December of 2013 alone is estimated at about USD 60, 000 USD (Nti 2015). Such news 
has become common especially following special audit exercises by the NHIA. If one 
considers that total funds for NHIS was USD 362.2 million in 2012 then such level of fraud 
for a few publicized high profile cases, in addition to the probable countless others that 
have not been publicized or even identified suggest that the leakage of funds could be 
phenomenal. In addition to providers, patients, contractors and scheme managers have been 
known to make fraudulent claims on the NHIS funds. Cases of impersonation whereby a 
non-member uses the identification of an active member to access services are known to 
be common. Similarly ganging is known to be happening, whereby a number of 
individuals, typically household members, access services using one active member’s 
credentials. Members are known also to misuse services by filling prescriptions on behalf 
of non-members in exchange for cash (NHIA 2013).  
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It becomes apparent that attaining long term financial sustainability of the NHIS is 
a herculean task unless mechanisms are incorporated to force and maintain an adequate 
level of accountability. With this sketchy data one may conclude that the so-called 
inadequate financing structure is arguably made worse as a result of fund misappropriation 
and mismanagement by the different levels of agency be it the central government, Scheme 
managers, service providers and contractors. NHIS clients themselves have been 
implicated in defrauding the Scheme (NHIA2013).  
4.5.4 The financial sustainability verdict of the status quo  
Judging by the available financial statements it is apparent that the NHIS is not 
financially sustainable, regardless of the positive impact that has been observed in 
improved access to health services.  While the Mutuelle has managed to operate at an 
overall surplus of 7% in 2012 and 2013 (MOH-R 2013), the NHIS has operated at a loss 
in every year since 2009. While the exact losses in 2013 and 2014 have not been estimated 
in this study some evidence gathered suggests that the financial collapse of the NHIS is 
imminent unless there is a significant injection of funds. Public debates about the financial 
sustainability of NHIS have been ongoing since its inception and the debates have 
intensified in recent months as evidenced in the records on parliamentary proceedings and 
in the media.  The NHIS, within three short years of its implementation, turned from 
operating on a surplus to a deficit beginning in 2008 (NHIA 2009). While public officials 
have been known to make assurances about the government’s commitment to NHIS, 
alternative reports from the providers’ perspective may suggest that the losses in recent 
years are unsustainable.  
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According to news reports in March 2015 the Christian Health Association of 
Ghana (CHAG), the largest group of non government provider (about 183 health facilities), 
has made know its intention to no longer accept NHIS card bearers (Owusu 2015, Nti 
2015). Previously, an ultimatum was announced in September 2014 to withdraw services 
from NHIS due to nonpayment of arrears. It was reported at the time that GHS50 million 
(US$14 million) was owed in arrears to the CHAG. In other news, The Society of Private 
Medical and Dental Practitioners ordered its members to withdraw services to NHIS clients 
with effect from May 4, 2015 due to nonpayment of claims due (Starfm 2015). Similarly, 
the Chamber of Pharmacy had since August 2014 refused to supply medicines and supplies 
on credit to health facilities as health facilities had been failing to settle bills in a timely 
fashion because of the delays in NHIS reimbursements (Nti 2015). The Health Insurance 
Service Providers Association of Ghana has regularly threatened to withdraw services from 
NHIS-cardholders and is on record to have issued a two-week ultimatum for delayed 
reimbursements in late 2014. Politicians in the opposition have given momentum to the 
awareness about the financial difficulties facing the NHIS. For example, during budget 
readings in March 2015, a highly publicized event in Ghana, a parliamentarian went on 
record in stating that the ‘cash-and-carry’ system has been reinstated to near pre-NHIS 
levels due to failure to expand the NHIS. The deputy Minister of Health is on record to 
have stated (in reaction to protesting health providers in May 2015) that the NHIS owed an 
amount of GHS460 million (USD 120 million) to health care providers but that government 
was on course to working out a strategy to bailout the NHIS. On the other hand, similar 
such statements of reassurances appear to lack specific details about what plans 
government is making to address the so-called imminent collapse of the NHIS.  
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Some statements by the non-government sector, specifically the Universal Access 
to Healthcare Campaign (UAHCC), a network of Ghanaian and international 
nongovernment organizations, add to the evidence about the financial position of the NHIS. 
From the perspective of the UAHCC the current state of the NHIS requires an urgent 
restructuring of financing by the government especially because the national health 
insurance levy is a huge resource envelop but the delays by the Ministry of Finance in 
releasing these funds is the issue at stake. From this perspective, Ghanaians have been 
contributing adequately in taxes and levies towards financing the NHIS but a huge gap 
persists between resources mobilized and NHIS financing. The urgent call on government 
is thus to be transparent about the amount of resources mobilized and to what uses they 
have been put (Starfm 2015).  Another perspective of the UAHCC is that operational 
inefficiencies are well to blame as the cost of processing claims is estimated to have 
increased by a factor of forty in ten years (Jakubowski 2014). Recent reports by the 
National Health Insurance Authority add another perspective to the financial sustainability 
problem of the NHIS. From this perspective corruption in claims processing, the poor 
quality of pharmaceutical products on the Ghanaian market and generous claims payments 
are critical factors influencing the financial state of the NHIS (NHIA 2013).  
The Mutuelle on the other hand has potential for sustainability in the long term. 
From the provisional estimates for 2013, the share of premiums has increased rather 
appreciably to 66% (MOH-R 2012) but this may be a displacement of revenue since the 
overall revenue envelope shrunk. At the same time enrollments decreased. Given the 
increasing challenges with fraud and the consequent interruptions in enrollments and 
services, the reduction in revenues is to be expected. While surpluses at the section level 
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were adequate to absorb losses at the district and national levels in 2011/2012, the losses 
by districts in 2012/2013 outstripped the surplus balances at the section level. With the 
recent improvements in enrollment rates, financial sustainability could be expected to 
improve when the districts return from operating deficits to a surplus position. The 
Mutuelle system could be expected to be financially sustainable over the long term. Beside 
the large premium contributions component, direct central government allocations as the 
second most important source of funds implies that political commitment to Mutuelle (as 
a poverty reduction strategy) would sustain the program. Based on the available data and 
the stipulated funding sources one may conclude that the 21% share of government is 
exclusive of the additional 11% from external sources, the Global Fund. As long as the 
external component is sustainable, the Mutuelle is sustainable over the long term.  
4.5.4.1  The multidimensional context of sustainability 
Looking at the data on financial sustainability the verdict is to rule out the viability 
of the Ghana NHIS as a mechanism to attain universal health coverage given the status 
quo. However, extending the discourse to a multidimensional context of health care 
program sustainability, one may consider also the context for the interaction of socio-
cultural, political, geographical and health system characteristics in addition to resource 
availability (Shediak-Rizkallah and Bone 1998, WHO 2002, Gruen et al 2010, Shell et al 
2013). In this context, to the extent that health outcomes of NHIS are desirable, policy 
makers would be justified to extend NHIS regardless of financial sustainability, 
considering other alternatives as defunding other programs or running indefinite deficits.  
Another important relational framework for assessing program sustainability is the 
interaction between a program and the driving forces in resource mobilization for program 
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delivery.  For instance, donor funds may be affected by the status of the economy, the 
polity and tax base of the donor country, or by competing priorities of host governments, 
multilateral institutions and the implementing agencies delivering the health interventions, 
or even possibly by the perspectives of the beneficiaries being helped. This context aptly 
describes the sustainability conditions for Rwanda where external sources are upwards of 
11% specifically for CBHI and an even higher proportion of over 50% generally in the 
national expenditures on health. Regardless, some countries have achieved substantial 
improvements in population health by prioritizing health development despite major 
constraints in limited resources and dependence on external sources for that matter (Gruen 
et al 2010, Stuckler et al 2010). Another complex interaction that influences program 
sustainability involves stakeholders and what they identify, define and prioritize as health 
concerns or how they choose to do this (Gruen et al 2010).  This is because defining and 
prioritizing issues concerning hierarchies of health needs involves some subjectivity and 
different stakeholders would have different emphases. The approach to universal coverage 
therefore may not be dictated simply by the financial sustainability horizon. Financial 
sustainability may in turn be dictated by stakeholders’ priorities in choosing the mode of 
financing, whether by mandatory taxation or by mandatory private insurance, or by public 
financing through a single-payer system or a combination of public and private financing 
with varying degrees of emphasis on private versus public roles. In effect, regardless of the 
verdict on financial sustainability, a broader assessment about sustainability would be 
required to make concrete statements about the sustainability of the programs.  The focus 
in this study has been narrower as it has been limited to the financial viability of the 
programs based on a limited set of information.  
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4.5.5 Policy changes needed for financial sustainability 
We propose several changes that would improve financial sustainability of the 
NHIS and the Mutuelle. However, these recommendations are based on the assumption of 
the status quo in the disease profiles, the defined package of benefits and the rate of health 
care utilization. Given the sources of funds and the performance over the years as illustrated 
in Table 4-13, one area where improved performance is needed for Ghana NHIS is the 
informal sector contributory client base (subscriptions) considering the smaller population 
coverage.  An increase in the contributory client base is the more practical approach since 
a raise in the premium rates is not politically desirable. In addition, without improvements 
in means testing, an increasing in the cost of insurance premiums would worsen the existing 
problems in equity. As has been demonstrated in this study, NHIS coverage is stronger 
associated with higher socioeconomic status and more of the poor are excluded. Increasing 
the contributory base may improve sustainability while also reducing effectiveness of the 
NHIS in attaining the desired goal of universal coverage. Also, public sector reforms 
towards efficient mobilization of tax revenues would similarly improve the channelling of 
funds to the NHIS.  Given the sensitivity of NHIS revenue to economic performance, it 
would be necessary to establish an emergency fund that could absorb the shortfalls in 
public revenues during economic downturns. 
The Mutuelle in Rwanda has attained a higher population coverage for the given 
benefit package it provides. Given the status quo an improvement in revenue sources might 
still be possible without compromising the goal of universal coverage. Rwanda should 
target a higher share of domestic funding for the Mutuelle even while benefitting from 
donor support. One approach to improve domestic sources would be an increase in the 
 268 
 
existing earmarked taxes from insurance markets. Enforcement of these taxes could 
improve the funding from domestic sources.  
Cost containment is most impactful in provider reimbursements as is often the case 
for universal health care programs (Stuckler et al 2010, Lagormasino 2012, Aryeetey et al 
2012). The evidence indicates that both countries are expending efforts to improve 
efficiency in provider reimbursements through the adoption of capitation in Ghana and 
performance-based reimbursements approaches in Rwanda.  While the search for cost 
containment is laudable, it is critical that stronger efforts are expended to minimize fraud 
and misappropriation of funds. The ample evidence in this study illustrates that fraud by 
providers and clients alike is a common problem with NHIS. The capitation system of 
reimbursements might be effective in curtailing fraud provider claims fraud as has been 
promised by the NHIS.  Similarly, there is increasing evidence that fraud by scheme 
managers is a potential threat to the sustainability of the Mutuelle. The Rwandan 
government’s swift response through investigations and prosecutions is a step in the right 
direction. Such efforts should be sustained to deter increases in fraudulent activities that 
could threaten financial sustainability.  
4.6 Conclusion  
This study set out to examine the critical factors in the successes and challenges of 
the community-based health insurance approaches to universal health care coverage in 
Rwanda and in Ghana. The objective has been to compare the outcomes and the differences 
in using these models as the mechanism to expand equitable access to health care. 
Specifically, evidence in the literature has been compiled to evaluate outcomes in health 
care utilization, health status and protection from the financial risks of accessing health 
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care.  Further assessments have been made about the key institutional characteristics that 
have influenced differences in these outcomes. The analysis has focused also on the 
financial viability of the universal coverage models and the key factors that influence long 
term sustainability. The underlying hypotheses had been that the community-based models 
make significant impact on expanding access to health care and that differences in political 
and community involvement have been key to outcomes, as also the mode of financing is 
key to sustainability. 
Some common patterns have been observed for both country models. Overall, the 
results strongly suggest that the community based models have been useful as a starting 
point to target unreached populations. A critical feature of these models is that public 
expenditures and consequently fiscal commitment is necessary to the usefulness of 
community-based approaches in reaching levels commensurate with universal access. The 
evidence shows that the mode of financing is important as far as a sound policy design but 
this is not the critical factor for long term sustainability, which is in slight contradiction to 
the initial hypotheses of this study.  This study finds that the policy design and 
implementing structures are not exclusive to technical soundness but a more practical 
approach in conformity to the context of the domestic political economy.  
Financial sustainability indeed is the critical deciding factor of sustainability since 
strong domestic commitment to the goals of universal access to health already exists. In 
turn a critical factor for financial sustainability is the harnessing of political and 
institutional forces towards the efficient use and allocation of the available resources. 
Resources have been made available through considerable domestic resource mobilization 
capacity and external support. Fundamentally, the financial sustainability in both countries 
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is threatened by the usual principal-agent problems that are characteristic of insurance. 
Consequently, financial sustainability depends on improvements in accountability in order 
to reduce incidences of misappropriation of the available resources, whether by clients, 
providers, managers or even the political regime. Both country models have benefitted also 
from social capital (although in different forms in conformity to the socio-cultural and 
political economy contexts) in terms of popular support for free access and consequently a 
domestic ownership of policy on universal access to health care.   
Beside these common factors, the study has shown that Rwanda and Ghana differ 
in many respects in regards to the implementation and the outcomes of their community-
based universal health insurance models. It is evident that the health care system in Rwanda 
is not without problems and in some respects Ghana is better endowed. Ghana has 
relatively a higher burden of non-communicable diseases. Poverty levels are worse in 
Rwanda. This study has shown that the models in both countries have potential to expand 
access to health care because significant improvements in insured households’ health care 
utilization and financial risk protection.  However, in the case of Ghana, relative difficulties 
in charging premiums based on ability to pay have resulted in inequitable coverage. The 
cost of insurance is a significant deterrence to participation especially by the poor. The 
NHIS studies indicate a strong association between high socio-economic status and NHIS 
membership which suggests that disadvantaged groups are excluded. If one were to use the 
rates of health insurance among the population as a measure of universal health coverage 
then the conclusion would be Rwanda, but not Ghana, has succeeded with its model.  
Problems in equity in access to health care persist in terms of the poor not being able to 
access health services due to other problems as the cost of transportation.  
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The relatively rapid progress of Rwanda’s Mutuelle program in terms of coverage 
can be attributed to significant grassroots participation and the incorporation of internal 
experiences and evidence-based strategies in adapting Mutuelle into ongoing poverty 
reduction strategies. The Rwandan model is an integrated approach to poverty reduction 
and therefore ties into other ongoing rural development strategies and forms part of national 
development programs. On the contrary political branding of Ghana’s NHIS has 
overshadowed its relevance as a development strategy. The NHIS originated as a health 
sector reform with politically charged motivations and by relatively non-participatory 
approaches.  
The enabling factors in country contexts go beyond the obvious factors of a smaller 
population and higher density in addition to common language that makes grassroots 
organizing relatively more approachable in principle and in logistic terms in Rwanda’s 
case. The Rwandan model has incorporated socioeconomic status (Ubudehe) 
classifications that make it relatively more effective in tying insurance premiums to 
households’ ability to pay. Although voluntary, Rwanda’s model promotes higher 
enrollments since whole households are required. Ghana’s model has a relatively blind 
approach. Regardless of policy prescriptions that target the poor, and even though the 
abject poor have been reached, inability to charge premiums by ability to pay has meant 
that the poor as well as middle income households in the informal sector are discouraged 
by the cost of insurance. In addition, enrollment organized on individual rather than 
household basis does not promote higher enrollments while also encouraging adverse 
selection.  
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Political will has been a key feature in both country models but for different 
reasons. The incumbent government’s ambition to attain a middle income country status 
by year 2020 among other development goals has been evident. Hence, the commitment to 
health improvements and therefore the Mutuelle the adopted model to expand coverage. In 
the case of Ghana, arguments about which political regime has claim to a legacy in NHIS, 
sometimes leading to inconsistent policy debates overshadows the commitment to the 
NHIS as the country’s strategy to attain access to health care for all. The political branding 
of NHIS diminishes solidarity and the consequent domestic resource mobilization potential 
that could ensure long term financial sustainability. 
It is necessary to amend the NHIS policy to include whole household enrollments 
as a measure to reduce the problem of adverse selection. Another recommendation is to 
developing several insurance packages for a segmented market to encourage enrollments. 
Price signals may be a second best option to price discriminate given the problems with 
charging premiums by ability to pay, for the same standard package. The finding that 
households in higher SES tend to refuse to enroll because NHIS is not needed suggest that 
targeting a different package of care while also ensuring a standardized package of care 
universally may enrollment. Such a package may include coverage for high end hotel costs 
in inpatient services or select non-communicable diseases. However, such a policy would 
necessarily require risk assessments, coinsurance and deductibles as measures to minimize 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Evidently, such a policy changes are not financially 
sustainable without fundamental changes to the payments system that would minimize 
fraud. To this end inclusion of electronic identifications and billing, inclusion of 
 273 
 
performance-based financing and inclusion of more stringent public accountability while 
improving administrative efficiency could improve resources for NHIS.  
This study has provided a general overview of the relatively higher per capita costs 
of the NHIS in comparison to a similar policy in a fellow Sub-Saharan African country, 
Rwanda. A more detailed investigation of the cost schedules in Ghanaian health facilities 
and pharmaceutical industry would provide more critical information for evidence-based 
payments structure of the NHIS. Also as more household data have become available from 
recent national surveys it would be possible to investigate the determinants of health 
insurance demand and out of pocket payments to identify what impact NHIS has made 
over the years and what evidence-based changes to policy design would improve its 
usefulness as a universal access program. Such information could identify the feasibility 
or usefulness of targeting a different package to different segments of the population.  Of 
particular interest is the investigation into the extent of leakages of funds through 
misappropriation of funds. Given the increasing amount of fraudulent practices, a 
compilation of the incidences and conditions of fraudulent activity would help to identify 
effective means of improving accountability.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSION 
 
Health is integral to the quality of life. Health is a means to, and outcome of 
economic development. It plays a critical role in poverty reduction. Health is a fundamental 
human right. Knowing the nature of household health costs and the burden that it places on 
them is important to any meaningful effort to expand access to health services, to reduce 
health inequities and to improve health outcomes. Out of pocket payments for health care 
often act as a barrier to essential health services particularly for those that need it most. 
Hence a growing number of countries aspire to attain universal health coverage with the 
main objective to make essential health services available to all regardless of ability to pay. 
However, universal health coverage comes with formidable challenges for developed and 
developing economies for reasons such as the consensus building required, the massive 
mobilization of resources and the problems in targeting due to changing population, 
environments and priorities. Ghana and Rwanda are prominent examples that have 
committed to establishing national health insurance programs with the intent to speed up 
progress toward universal health coverage.  
This study set out to analyze out of pocket health care expenditures of households 
and the incidence of catastrophic payments, the reach of Ghana’s National Health 
Insurance Scheme in reducing inequities in access to quality health care, and to identify 
program features that are critical to the long term success of NHIS. The study compared 
outcomes in the case of Ghana with those of Rwanda which has a similar national health 
insurance program but is not so similar in approach. The first essay analyzed the 
determinants of household health costs and the potential for catastrophic expenditures on 
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health. The second essay investigated the determinants of out of pocket payments and 
perceived quality of health care as experienced by the insured. The third essay undertook 
comparative analysis of the relative impact of the community-based approaches to 
universal health coverage in Ghana and Rwanda, and the institutional factors of the gains 
and sustainability of the schemes. A systematic review of the literature has been undertaken 
to compare the impact on financial risk protection, health care utilization and health status. 
The study further compared the institutional features of each country model and how these 
features could explain differences in outcomes. It compared the financial viability and the 
key factors that influence long term sustainability of both country models of universal 
insurance coverage.  The results from this collection of essays have policy implications for 
improving progress toward universal health care coverage. 
5.1 Summary of findings 
The empirical analysis of household health care expenditures is based on data from 
the Ghana Living Standards Survey conducted in 2005/2006 (coinciding with the first year 
of NHIS implementation). The results show that the majority (85%) of the individuals 
reporting any expenditure on health care had to be financed out of pocket.  At least two-
thirds of households reported some health expenditures irrespective of illness status. With 
regard to the distribution of health care spending, medication is the most frequent 
expenditure while hospitalization is the most expensive as one would expect. A difference 
across localities shows up in rural households having a higher proportion of health 
expenditures on inpatient services and urban household’s having a higher proportion spent 
on medication. The proportions spent on health provider consultations and transportation 
to health facility is statistically similar across localities. Health expenditures are higher 
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among households that have experienced hospitalization as may be expected, but the 
poorest households are the most affected.  
With regard to factors that influence the decision to spend on health care, the 
incidence of illness and its severity are the key determinants of household health 
expenditures. Again in the decision to spend, the effect of socioeconomic characteristics 
such as education of the head of household or household poverty status as indicated by 
welfare is found to be statistically weak. However once a household has decided to spend, 
education becomes a significant factor in the amount of expenditures. In addition to 
morbidity and its severity, longer than average time in travel to reach health care provider 
or facility has significant marginal impact on health care expenditures.  Yet, the indicators 
of ability to pay are statistically weak determinants of the amount of expenditures. It is safe 
to conclude that out of pocket expenditures on health are nondiscretionary and health 
services are not regarded as a normal good whereby expenditures vary strongly with 
affordability. 
With respect to catastrophic expenditures as measured in proportion to food 
expenditures, the evidence shows that all households have a potential for financial risk but 
the risk is statistically stronger for poorer households. In descriptive statistics wealthier 
households have a higher ratio of health to food expenditures but this observation indicates 
the ability to pay given the smaller ratios of health to non-food expenditures. When other 
factors are controlled for, poorer households show up as the most affected by catastrophic 
out of pocket payments. Again, the regions and localities with a higher poverty distribution 
have a higher financial risk of household out of pocket expenditures on health care.  These 
findings lead to the conclusion that the structure of household health expenditures in Ghana 
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has strongly built in the financial risk regardless of wealth status. The poor face the most 
risk because of the higher health needs as measured by self reported health status, coupled 
with the lower ability to afford higher health expenditures. Out of pocket health 
expenditures have the potential to drive households into deeper poverty or tip non-poor 
households into poverty. Reducing financial risks in household health expenditures has 
significant potential to reduce poverty. 
Looking at the poverty-inducing patterns in household health care expenditures, it 
is a strategic policy to have the NHIS established with the goal to make health care free at 
the point of service. One would expect that enrollment in the NHIS, especially by the poor, 
would minimize the risk of catastrophic household expenditures on health care. The 
findings from the second essay suggest that the socioeconomic status of the household, 
residence and gender are the key predictors of the likelihood that an individual is insured. 
Specifically, the four regions to the north and especially rural communities and females 
have a better chance of being insured than the Western and other regions to the south. More 
importantly, individuals from households in upper wealth brackets are the most likely to 
be insured still after controlling for locality of residence and gender. When insured 
individuals have had to make out of pocket payments, the need for uninsured services is 
the driving factor even when ability to pay is accounted for. This leads to the conclusion 
that NHIS improves access to health care but does not eliminate the potential for 
catastrophic expenditures especially among the poor. In spite of NHIS coverage, out of 
pocket payments have a financial risk potential for the insured households that can least 
afford them in the event of acute health care expenses not covered by insurance. The 
findings suggest a majority (80%) of the insured perceive NHIS beneficiaries receive better 
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or similar quality of services as the non-NHIS members. Yet among the insured, out of 
pocket payment is the most significant predictor of the dissatisfaction with quality of 
services whereas socioeconomic factors such as wealth status, education or residence are 
statistically insignificant. Unfavorable attitude of health worker has a stronger effect on the 
likelihood of NHIS-client dissatisfaction compared to long waiting times, communication 
about the treatment process and any other factors.  
The conclusion that can be made of the progress of NHIS is that a good attitude of 
health workers could significantly improve voluntary enrollments in NHIS and 
consequently create a strong subscriber base that could ensure long term sustainability of 
the scheme with the attendant gains in welfare. Evidence in the literature suggests that high 
attrition rates occur in NHIS membership and the evidence show that population coverage 
has slowed down to about a percentage point increase each year since 2010.  
The evidence from the third essay provides a context to examine the progress that 
NHIS has made toward equitable access to health care, and the ways to overcome 
challenges in attaining coverage levels commensurate with universal access to health care. 
Rwanda has similarly adopted a national health insurance policy as the mechanism to 
ensure protection against the financial risk of accessing health care. Rwanda began an 
expansion of community based health insurance from a pilot phase in three districts around 
the time Ghana began implementing the NHIS in 2005 also with a handful of pre-existing 
community-based schemes. By the end of 2006, voluntary enrollments had increased to 
reach 76 percent of the Rwandan population and by 2010 at least 90 percent of Rwandans 
had some form of health insurance. By 2006 15 percent of the population in Ghana was 
enrolled in NHIS and by 2010 about 33% were enrolled in addition to 5% in alternative 
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private health insurance. Hence the progress of Ghana in expanding access to health care 
while reducing household financial risks is compared alongside Rwanda’s apparent 
achievements in additional population coverage.  
One explanatory factor in the higher rates of population coverage in Rwanda is that, 
unlike the Ghana’s NHIS, Rwanda has the advantage of enrollment by whole households 
and payment contributions are more strongly aligned with household ability to pay. Not 
surprisingly, the findings indicate that disadvantaged groups are excluded from Ghana’s 
NHIS to a greater extent than in Rwanda. The empirical evidence in the literature indicates 
that NHIS enrollments have been strongly associated with higher socioeconomic status and 
with formal employment. Health care utilization rates have shown similarly impressive 
outcomes in both country models. The improvement in financial risk protection is relatively 
stronger in Rwanda than in Ghana. On health status, the evidence in the empirical literature 
indicates that Rwanda has a stronger association between health status and health insurance 
whereas insured individuals in Ghana tend to have a poorer health state than the general 
population. The evidence suggests that adverse selection is stronger in Ghana NHIS as 
household members of poorer health status are more likely to be enrolled, given that 
enrollments are selective on individual basis and, unlike in Rwanda, enrollments are not 
mandatory by whole household units. A relatively higher tendency for adverse selection 
into NHIS is an expected outcome especially since affordability of insurance is the most 
significant reason for not enrolling, (especially by the bottom two quintiles of welfare), 
while having no desire for health insurance is a reason most cited by uninsured individuals 
in the upper quintiles.  
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With regard to institutional differences, the Rwandan model is an integrated 
approach to poverty reduction which benefits from a high level of political commitment.  
On the contrary political branding of Ghana’s NHIS overshadows its relevance as a 
development strategy given the public perception of political motivation in NHIS as a tool 
to gain political votes.  The political economy but not the technical soundness of policy has 
been the necessary condition for the effectiveness of the model adopted in either country. 
Making enrollment mandatory for households has been a major factor for achieving 
universal coverage in Rwanda. In contrast the NHIS in Ghana is yet to establish and 
enforceable mandatory component. In addition, Rwanda has inbuilt performance 
evaluation and monitoring with a client-based component which helps to reduce principal-
agent problems. Ghana lacks an integrated client-based evaluation component though it 
does well in monitoring provider effectiveness through accreditations, and evaluations 
such as clinic audits. These measures have not deterred considerable fraud in the provider 
claims.  
Contrary to the initial hypothesis concerning financial sustainability, the mode of 
financing is not the necessary condition for long term sustainability although it is 
important.  Institutional accountability is the critical factor for financial sustainability both 
in Ghana and then in Rwanda. Rwanda has adopted a two-sector approach to universal 
health care financing consisting of community-based health insurance on one hand and 
social health insurance on the other while Ghana combines both. In the literature one of the 
critiques of the community-based health insurance (CBHI) approach to universal health 
coverage (UHC) is the tendency for fragmentation of the health system in ways that could 
slow down progress toward UHC (McIntyre et al 2008, Lagarsimano et al 2012).  For this 
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reason, Ghana’s greater reliance on well-defined financing sources (earmarked taxes, 
payroll deductions, insurance premiums) that integrate traditional social health insurance 
approaches, with less emphasized CBHI sources has potential to improve equity in the 
contributions. Alternately, the structure of the economy presents challenges with a large 
informal sector. This coupled with weaker ability to target premiums by ability to pay of 
the non-exempt adult population the problem of affordability for the poor and the problem 
of smaller risk pool and adverse selection weaken the benefits of Ghana’s relatively larger 
social health insurance component.  In contrast, Rwanda has proven to benefit from 
community-based financing by adapting UHC to its political economy and cultural 
contexts. However, the financial sustainability may be undermined by dependence on 
external financing and the usual principal-agent problems in the management of funds.  
5.2 Policy implications 
Efforts to effectively target health care to households with critical health care needs 
have to be stepped up. Moreover, these efforts would be most effective if accompanied by 
effective education programs that increase access to quality health care and health 
behaviors. The goal of achieving equity in health care by equal access for all would not be 
realized without an emphasis effectively targeting quality health care to disadvantaged 
households while also improving universal access to a basic package of health care.  In the 
same vein, reducing regional resource gaps and poverty gaps has strong potential to 
improve access to health care for all citizens and the associated benefits that may feed back 
into equity in economic growth and consequently real progress in development. Making 
whole household enrollments mandatory in NHIS would increase coverage. To improve 
targeting of coverage to less advantage groups, Ghana could adopt the community-
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supported mechanisms that have been tested through existing household cash transfer 
programs to develop socioeconomic classifications to decipher household ability to pay for 
insurance. A blanket increase in insurance premiums would worsen the problem of inequity 
in coverage.  
Improving interpersonal interactions between health care workers and clients is 
critical to NHIS sustainability. Understandably, the NHIS is situated in the context of the 
systemic problems in health care delivery in Ghana such as long wait times, staff 
unwelcoming attitude, and the general lack of resources for up to date technology and 
medical supplies. NHIS is being carried out through pre-existing health care system with 
the deficit in infrastructure and human resources. However, the evidence in this study 
corroborates what has been reported elsewhere that NHIS card holders face an extra level 
of frustration from intimidating staff demeanor (SEND-Ghana 2010, Dalinjong and Laar 
2012). The results suggest that provider and staff attitude toward clients is the most critical 
cause of dissatisfaction with quality.  Information from personal interviews with National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) representatives in Accra (January 30, 2013) suggests 
that the NHIA is keenly aware that client dissatisfaction with quality is an important cause 
of the shortfall in the level of subscriptions required to keep the Scheme operating 
sustainably.  
The results from this study suggest that improving interpersonal relations in health 
care delivery to NHIS cardholder may yield quick results in client satisfaction and 
consequently improve attractiveness of NHIS. In particular, discriminatory practices 
against NHIS subscribers must be tackled aggressively. One approach would be a social 
marketing campaign or public advocacy for behavioral changes among health care workers 
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in general and especially toward NHIS clients. In some communities there may be the need 
to remove cultural biases that view NHIS as a health care program for the destitute.  
A rebranding of the NHIS to appeal to different consumer groups could be another 
remedy to reduce stigma, improve client satisfaction and increase NHIS attractiveness. In 
such an effort possibly, in addition to the existing NHIS uniform plan package that covers 
a standard package of services, supplementary packages may be defined to attract different 
segments of the population and thereby encourage more enrollments. For example, separate 
plans may be defined to cover acute inpatient care only for households who would prefer 
to use NHIS as supplementary insurance but at a higher premium to contribute to the 
existing standard minimum package that could be further subsidized to reach the poor. This 
plan may improve financial sustainability while also improving universal access. 
Alternative packages that cover basic care (such as physician office visits and hospital 
registrations) with differentiated prices may be more affordable or attractive for individuals 
who may consider existing plans too expensive for the expected benefits.  Similarly, NHIS 
could have separate plans to cover only prescription medicines for individuals who may 
prefer that option.  NHIS could then become attractive to households who consider the 
current uniform package not suitable to their needs. Similarly, more providers may qualify 
to join, or may be attracted to join the Scheme. At the same time as more citizens opting 
into the program would improve universal access.  
Arguably the financial sustainability of a universal coverage program and the NHIS 
for that matter requires a large client base and consequently the need to make enrollments 
mandatory and enforceable. Providing a supplementary insurance through NHIS may help 
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to increase acceptance of mandatory insurance especially in a large informal sector where 
enforcements of social insurance contributions are difficult.  
Emphasizing improvements in health care delivery is the efficient approach to 
universal access. The results have shown that waiting times is the primary cause of 
dissatisfaction with health services. Reducing systemic problems in health care delivery 
could yield faster results in increasing access.  Regardless of free health care at the point 
of service, accessibility is compromised if prompt health care seeking is discouraged by 
costly long wait times. The tendency to rely on unskilled care or to seek proper care too 
late reduces the benefits of free health care at the point of service.  
5.3 Limitations of the study 
With regard to the first essay, the absence of panel data means the results lack the 
time trend that could be useful for differentiating random shocks from predicted behaviors 
regarding health expenditures. Using data from secondary sources means a lack of control 
on data generating processes. Similarly, the data lacks detailed information about health 
status such as chronic disease and frequency of illness that could significantly predict 
demand for health insurance. In a similar vein, the data is limited in information about long 
run income, savings, safety nets, social capital and other socio-cultural factors that might 
be important indicators of household coping mechanisms to catastrophic health shocks. 
Hence significant factors in determining the financial risks households face might be 
omitted. However nationally representative survey data from secondary sources is an 
available alternative to undertaking an (expensive and financially less feasible) original 
national survey for this study. Also, the study does not include indicators of the supply-
side factors (availability of health services, economic and social infrastructure) that could 
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give a better insight into household health care demand and the resulting impact on health 
expenditures.  
Similarly, the second essay falls short in several areas due to limitations of the 
Ghana Demographic and Health Survey data in addressing the research questions. In 
addition to the data limitations listed for essay one, another limitation of this study is the 
lack of control for heterogeneity in health insurance schemes such as differences in 
insurance premiums (e.g., insurance registration fees and premiums vary by poverty and 
socioeconomic status of districts with wealthier districts setting higher charges), 
administrative performance and effectiveness (e.g., inherited and longer established 
schemes versus relatively new insurance schemes), the local economies and the health 
system within which the schemes operate. This distinction could be relevant in evaluating 
reducing unobserved characteristics that influence insurance enrollments and outcomes.  
In the third essay, equity issues in utilization, whether overconsumption of health 
services or under consumption by different groups occurs so that in reality expanding 
access deepens inequities in health care utilization. The nature of access is also important. 
For instance, emphasis on curative care may be misleading; intensive use of curative care 
by subscribers could be due to a lack of quality care hence poor outcomes resulting in 
repetitive use. It may also be due to sheer overutilization of services (when gate-keeping is 
not effective) or may be provider-induced, hence cost escalation. Institutional comparisons 
would require a more in-depth knowledge and personal experiences of the country context. 
For instance, information through key informant interviews would improve this aspect of 
the research. The analysis on Rwanda falls short in this area. The analysis of financial 
sustainability would require information about current financial status and trends in 
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financing and expenditures as well as expected future revenue flows and expenditures. The 
lack of data has made such an analysis impossible.  
5.4 Research prospects 
This study suggests a follow up that would empirically investigate the 
interrelationships between household socioeconomic status, health seeking behavior and 
access to health care to shed more light on the direction of impact on health care 
expenditures and poverty status in Ghana. A more recent nationwide household survey data 
(the sixth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey in 2012/2013) makes it feasible to 
investigate these relationships. It would be useful to estimate equity gaps such as in the 
differences in access to health care and health care seeking behavior attributable to 
differences in the socioeconomic status of individuals or households. Similarly, it would 
be useful to find out if the NHIS has improved upon its inclusiveness by reducing equity 
gaps in enrolment of disadvantaged households. It would be possible to compare recent 
catastrophic payments incidence and what progress NHIS has made in improving 
protection against the economic risks of household health care seeking. It would be 
possible to investigate the determinants of health insurance demand and out of pocket 
payments to identify what impact NHIS has made over the years and what evidence-based 
changes to policy design would improve its usefulness as a tool for universal access. Such 
information could possibly identify the feasibility or the usefulness of targeting a different 
package of insurance benefits to different segments of the population. 
While access to care may be crucial to promoting and maintaining good health, 
access is not enough. An important aspect of the discussion of access to health care should 
include the technical quality of health care and whether access to care translates effectively 
 287 
 
into better health outcomes. The supply-side factors about the NHIS that have to be studied 
include the technical effectiveness of health services including clinical procedures and 
outcomes and accreditation of facilities and providers.  Also, information gathered from 
key informant interviews conducted in the process of this study suggest that NHIS faces 
critical challenges in the area of provider incentives, processing of benefits claims and 
reimbursements.  
Another prospect for research is to evaluate the relative impact of the pilot phase of 
capitation reimbursement program introduced in the NHIS. This pilot phase provides a 
natural experiment to compare capitation and the traditional fee-for-service method of 
reimbursement in terms of provider incentives in cost containment, quality of services and 
the relative gains in efficiency for the NHIS.   
This study has provided a general overview of the relatively higher per capita costs 
of the NHIS in comparison to a similar policy in Rwanda. A detailed investigation of the 
reimbursement structure of the health insurance programs would provide useful 
information for evidence-based payments structure of the NHIS. This information in 
addition to studies on the cost schedules in Ghanaian health facilities and the 
pharmaceutical industry could provide information about the reasons for the relatively high 
per capita costs of the NHIS. Of particular interest is the investigation into the extent of 
leakages of funds through misappropriation of funds. Given the increasing amount of 
fraudulent practices, a compilation of the incidences and conditions of fraudulent activity 
would help to identify effective means of improving accountability.  
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APPENDIX A 
PATTERNS IN POVERTY, DISEASE BURDEN, HEALTH SERVICES AND 
HEALTH SPENDING 
 
Life expectancy and mortality rates in selected African countries, 2009 
 Ghana Africa Nigeria Rwanda South 
Africa 
Low 
income 
High 
Income 
Global 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
60 54 54 59 54 57 80 68 
Under-five mortality§ 69 127 138 111 62 117 7 60 
Infant mortality§ 47 80 86 70 43 75 6 42 
Maternal mortality¤ 350 620 840 540 410 580 15 260 
Adult mortality rate 332 383 370 279 496 321 88 176 
Source: World Health Statistics, WHO 2011. 
§ Per 1,000 live births. 
¤ Modeled estimate per 100,000 live births and year 2008. 
 
 
Private health expenditure ratios in Ghana 
 2000 2008 2013 
Private expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure 58.6 50.0 39 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as % of private expenditure on health 79.6 78.8 91.9 
Private prepaid plans as % of private expenditure on health 6.1 6.2 - 
Per capita total expenditure on health (PPP int. USD) 66 114 214 
Per capita government expenditure on health (PPP int. USD) 27 57 - 
Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (USD) 18 55 100 
Source: National health accounts data (World Health Organization, 2011) 
Sources: National health accounts data (World Health Organization, 2011), World Bank World 
Development Indicators.  
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Percent poor in Rwanda by districts, 2011 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Rwanda (2012), p. 17. 
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Distribution of poverty in Ghana, by district  
 
Source: World Bank, 2011b, Map 1 based on GLSS5 2005/06 and CWIQ 2003. 
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Source:  National Report on Ghana: Global Study on Child Poverty Disparities (UNICEF, 2010 p. xi). 
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Under-five mortality rates per 1000 live births, 1990-2009 
 
Source: World Health Statistics, WHO 2011. 
 
 
  Adult mortality rates per 1000 population age 15-60 years 
 
Source: World Health Statistics, WHO 2011. 
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Regional distribution of outpatient attendance per capita Ghana, 1997-2008 
 
Source: The Health Sector in Ghana: Facts and Figures 2009 (Ghana Health Service 2010). 
 
 
Population per nurse by regions, Ghana, 2003-2008 
 
Source: The Health Sector in Ghana: Facts and Figures 2009 (Ghana Health Service 2010). 
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Population per doctor by regions, Ghana, 2003-2008 
 
Source: The Health Sector in Ghana: Facts and Figures 2009 (Ghana Health Service 2010). 
 
The leading causes of death in Ghana 
Rank Cause Mortality (%) 
1 Malaria 13.4 
2 HIV/AIDS related conditions 7.4 
3 Anemia 7.3 
4 Cerebro Vascular Accidents 6.4 
5 Pneumonia 6.2 
6 Septicemia 5.1 
7 Hypertension 4.1 
8 Cardiac diseases 4 
9 Meningitis 2.3 
10 Diarrheal diseases 2.3 
  All other causes 41.5 
  Total 100 
Source: The Health Sector in Ghana: Facts and Figures 2009 (Ghana Health Service 2010). 
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APPENDIX B 
PATTERNS IN HEALTH CARE DEMAND IN GHANA 
Health practitioner first visited in the two weeks preceding interview, GLSS5 2005/06 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from Ghana Living Standards Survey V 2005/2006. 
 
 
 
Main reason for consulting a health practitioner, GLSS5 2005/2006 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from Ghana Living Standard Survey V, 2005/2006. 
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Percent distribution of patient facility use by type of health practitioner first consulted in 
the two weeks preceding interview, GLSS5  
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doctor 86.8 32.5 13.2 5 1.8 0 7.0 2.0 1.4 36.7 
dentist 1.1 1.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 4.2 0.9 
nurse 8.1 38.4 22.6 22.5 1.8 0.1 8.3 4.6 30.6 13.9 
medical asst 2.5 23.3 54.7 7.5 0 0.1 1.3 0.7 7.0 7.7 
midwife 1 3.8 5.7 35 0 0 0.6 2.0 1.4 1.8 
pharmacist 0 0.2 1. 9 0 83.0 0.9 0.6 0 2. 8 2.4 
drug/chem 
seller 0.2 0.1 0 17.5 13.4 98.2 18.5 46.7 26.4 32.4 
trad. healer 0 0.4 0 10 0 0 57.3 27 5.6 3.1 
trained TBA 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 
untrained TBA 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.9 0.7 0 0.1 
spiritualist 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 3.8 1.3 8.3 0.3 
other 0 0 1.9 2.5 0 0 0.6 15.1 12.5 0.8 
           
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
 
 
  
 297 
 
Pair-wise correlation: Payments for consultation, travel, medicines and hospital stay 
 Inpatient services medicine consulting 
medicine 0.69*   
consulting 0.1 0.17*  
travel 0.07 0.21* 0.11* 
Source: Calculations based on data from GLSS5.  
*p<0.05.  
 
 
Hospitalizations and health care payments by locality of residence, GLSS5 2005-06 
 
Admission 
rate (% of 
respondent
s) 
Popul
ation 
Average 
length of 
stay 
Average 
inpatient 
payment 
(₵) 
Std 
Deviation 
Maximum 
payment (₵) 
Average 
total 
payments 
for health 
care 
 Accra 
(GAMA) 4.5 16 3.6 
               
188,667  
               
289,405  
             
1,150,000  
                 
87,778  
urban 
coastal 5.0 13 4.4 
                 
28,300  
                 
47,563  
                 
120,000  
                 
61,250  
urban forest 3.1 21 5.9 
               
178,667  
               
274,655  
             
1,000,000  
                 
52,482  
urban 
savannah 6.1 19 4.1 
                 
92,789  
               
164,995  
                 
660,000  
                 
39,806  
rural coastal 5.9 19 7.2 
           
2,104,429  
           
6,240,074  
           
23,600,000  
                 
99,052  
rural forest 4.0 49 4.3 
               
297,213  
               
945,167  
             
6,500,000  
                 
55,270  
rural 
savannah 7.0 95 4.2 
               
175,505  
               
442,690  
             
3,000,000  
                 
40,007  
Total 5.1 232 4.6 
               
296,502  
           
1,633,308  
           
23,600,000  
 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
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Health care payments by individuals by category of expenditure and location, GLSS5 
 Mean (₵) Std. Err. (₵) 
Linearized 
ratio 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
Consult 
urban              4,433                 374  8.0% 6.8% 9.3% 
rural              3,977                 359  8.1% 6.1% 10.0% 
Travel 
urban              3,105                 195  5.6% 5.0% 6.3% 
rural              3,173                 246  6.4% 4.9% 7.9% 
Inpatient Services 
urban              2,579                 637  4.7% 2.5% 6.8% 
rural            10,415             4,364  21.1% 7.8% 34.4% 
Medicine and medical supplies 
urban            44,961             1,933  81.6% 79.1% 84.1% 
rural            31,744             1,164  64.4% 53.6% 75.2% 
Total 
urban            55,078             2,279  100%   
rural            49,309             5,019  100%   
      
Estimated total where unable to break down (N=698) 
urban          129,533           16,284     
rural          101,690           12,870     
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
N=9117 
 
 
Household health expenditures as a ratio of non-food expenditures, by quintile and 
location, GLSS 5 2005/2006 
 1 2 3 4 5  All quintiles 
All Urban 2.37 0.97 0.75 0.50 0.35  0.58 
GAMA 4.19 1.34 0.80 0.84 0.42  0.79 
Urban coastal 1.16 0.65 0.89 0.59 0.34  0.50 
Urban forest 2.17 1.01 0.82 0.32 0.34  0.50 
Urban Savannah 1.68 0.66 0.42 0.3 0.21  0.51 
        
All rural 0.72 0.64 0.50 0.55 0.39  0.57 
Rural coastal 0.82 0.60 0.55 0.68 0.50  0.61 
Rural forest 0.74 0.65 0.53 0.49 0.35  0.54 
Rural Savanna 0.71 0.64 0.41 0.54 0.29  0.60 
        
All locations 0.89 0.71 0.57 0.52 0.36  0.58 
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
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Household health expenditures as a proportion of non-food expenditures by quintile and 
location, GLSS 4 1997/98 
 1 2 3 4 5  All quintiles 
All Urban 2.34 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.26  0.47 
GAMA 2.21 0.10 0.13 0.29 0.25  0.27 
Urban coastal 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.26  0.33 
Urban forest 0.73 0.33 0.38 0.27 0.27  0.73 
Urban Savannah 0.69 0.40 0.21 0.46 0.18  0.36 
        
All Rural 0.58 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.36  0.42 
Rural coastal 0.54 0.45 0.37 0.40 0.32  0.41 
Rural forest 0.5 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.37  0.10 
Rural Savanna 0.63 0.49 0.37 0.30 0.41  0.50 
        
All locations 0.94 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.31  0.44 
Source: Calculations based on data from the GLSS4 1998/1999. 
 
The ten highest observations for household health expenditure, old cedis, GLSS5  
 
Total health 
expenses 
Inpatient 
expenses 
Consult 
expense 
Medicine 
expense 
Travel 
expense 
inpa
tient 
days 
house
hold 
size 
Locati
on 
Househ
old head 
Travel 
time in 
hrs 
1    1,375,000     960,000    10,000  
   
385,000  20,000  4 1 rural male 1.3 
2    1,527,500  1,000,000  
    
22,500  
    
500,000  25,000  7 5 rural male 5.0 
3    1,252,000  
 
1,105,000    15,000  
    
132,000  - 8 9 rural male 6.3 
4    1,680,000  
 
1,150,000    20,000  
    
490,000  20,000  6 9 urban male 4.0 
5    1,518,000  
 
1,200,000  - 
    
315,000    3,000  14 5 urban male 3.5 
6    3,364,500  
 
2,800,000  18 ,000  
    
546,500           -    5 7 rural male 4.0 
7    3,595,000  
 
3,000,000         -    
    
520,000  75,000  14 9 rural male 1.3 
8    3,260,000  
 
3,000,000   10,000  
    
200,000  50,000  7 1 urban male 1.0 
9    6,655,000  
 
6,500,000   35,000  
      
82,000  38,000  5 7 urban male 1.2 
1
0  26,400,000  
23,600,00
0  200,000  
  
2,500,00
0  60,000  14 2 urban male 4.0 
Source: Calculations based on data from GLSS5 2005/2006. 
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Distribution of health expenditures by household units: levels versus log transformation, 
GLSS5  
 
Source: Calculations based on data from GLSS5 (2005/2006). 
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Number of households for whom government, employer or insurance gives support for 
the majority of health care expenditures, GLSS5 
  welfare quintile    
 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Supported 55 96 136 145 194 626 
percent 3.6 6.8 9.0 8.4 7.6 7.2 
       
Not supported 1,457 1,314 1,370 1,573 2,347 8,061 
percent  96.4 93.2 91.0 91. 6 92.4 92.8 
       
Total 1,512 1,410 1,506 1,718 2,541 8,687 
percent 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Source: Calculations based on GLSS5 data. 
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APPENDIX C 
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN GHANA, DHS V (2008) 
 
Distribution of respondents by insurance status and socioeconomic characteristics, Ghana DHS 2008 
Had insurance at any time in past 3 months? No (%) Yes (%)  Total (%) Count 
Region                                                                    
Western 64.1 35.9 9.3 881 
Central 74.3 25.7 6.6 622 
Greater Accra 75.6 24.4 13.6 1292 
Volta 73 27 9 849 
Eastern 56.6 43.4 9.9 935 
Ashanti 61.4 38.6 15.8 1495 
Brong Ahafo 48.2 51.8 8 763 
Northern 65.3 34.7 10.8 1021 
Upper East 55.8 44.2 7.7 729 
Upper West 53.2 46.8 9.5 897 
   All 63.2 36.8 100 9484 
Pearson chi2(18) = 310.5   Pr = 0.00  Cramér's V =   0.128 
wealth quintile 1= poorest 
1 74.2 25.8 23 2181 
2 69.3 30.7 18.9 1789 
3 63.6 36.4 17.2 1634 
4 55.2 44.8 20.9 1984 
5 52.5 47.5 20 1896 
read watch listen how often            
not at all 71.9 28.1 9.5 854 
  
3
0
3
 
Had insurance at any time in past 3 months? No (%) Yes (%)  Total (%) Count 
less than once a week 52.2 47.8 0.3 23 
at least once a week 62.3 37.7 86.7 7803 
almost every day 48.4 51.6 3.5 316 
Pearson chi2(6) =  60.2634   Pr = 0.000 Cramér's V =   0.0579 
loc2 
urban 58.1 41.9 43 4076 
rural 67 33 57 5408 
Dummy agegp 
15-19 62 38 20.9 1979 
20-24 68.1 31.9 16.6 1575 
25-29 66.2 33.8 15 1425 
30-34 59.4 40.6 12.2 1160 
35-39 61.9 38.1 12.1 1148 
40-44 60.6 39.4 9.3 878 
45-49 63.4 36.6 8.4 801 
50-55 59.3 40.7 5.5 518 
Dummy gend 
male 68.4 31.6 48.2 4568 
female 58.3 41.7 51.8 4916 
Dummy married_status   
never married 65.4 34.6 36.8 3486 
married 59.8 40.2 48.1 4565 
living together 67.2 32.8 8.5 809 
widowed 68.1 31.9 3.8 364 
not living together 72.3 27.7 2.7 260 
Dummy has children living at home 
No 65.4 34.6 47.6 4516 
  
3
0
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Had insurance at any time in past 3 months? No (%) Yes (%)  Total (%) Count 
Yes 61.1 38.9 52.4 4968 
Dummy occupation   
not working 60.2 39.8 22.2 2103 
professional/managerial/technical 38.8 61.2 6.1 583 
clerical and services 62.7 37.3 9.2 874 
sales 58.1 41.9 17.6 1666 
agricultural 72.5 27.5 32.8 3113 
manual 63.4 36.6 12.1 1145 
educlevel   
no education 71.5 28.5 21.5 2035 
primary 70.1 29.9 18.2 1727 
secondary 60.1 39.9 54.5 5166 
higher 39.2 60.8 5.9 556 
Dummy relnhead  
head 65.7 34.3 42.1 3997 
wife 56.7 43.3 22.8 2162 
daughter 62.5 37.5 24.3 2307 
other relative 68.1 31.9 9.9 935 
not related 69.9 30.1 0.9 83 
Dummy tobacco 
no 77.9 22.1 4.8 456 
yes, smokes nothing 62.4 37.6 95.2 9028 
   All 63.2 36.8 100 9484 
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V 2008 
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Distribution of respondents by incidence of out of pocket payments and by perceived quality and socioeconomic characteristics, DHS 
2008 
  Distribution of respondents, DHS 2008 
oop (Need to pay out of pocket?)   No Yes Sometimes Total                 Total 
 % % % % Count 
needsvs      
no 85.6 9.8 4.6 79.5 2778 
yes 67.2 22.8 10.1 20.5 716 
dsvsqlty      
good 83.6 11.2 5.3 80 2794 
Not good 74.9 17.7 7.4 20 700 
svsqlty      
yes 83.6 11.2 5.30 80 2794 
no, waiting times too long 75.3 15.6 9.1 9.7 340 
no, staff not polite 64.9 26.3 8.8 1.6 57 
no, did not receive enough information on 
treatment/illness 66.9 24.4 8.70 3.6 127 
other 83 14.2 2.8 5 176 
dnhisqlty 
good 84.6 11.6 3.8 50.3 1757 
Not good 79 13.4 7.7 49.7 1737 
nhisqlty      
better 84.6 11.6 3.8 50.3 1757 
same 80.3 11.9 7.8 35.9 1254 
worse 73.5 17.7 8.70 10.2 355 
don't know/not sure 81.3 15.6 3.10 3.7 128 
whopaid_ins    
yes, respondent paid for self 76.7 16.6 6.6 41.9 1415 
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  Distribution of respondents, DHS 2008 
oop (Need to pay out of pocket?)   No Yes Sometimes Total                 Total 
 % % % % Count 
yes, paid by relative/friend 87.1 8.9 4.00 48.3 1633 
yes, paid by employer/ssnit 79.7 13.8 6.5 7.7 261 
no, other 87 8.7 4.3 2 69 
gend      
male 78.9 14.9 6.2 41.3 1444 
female 83.9 10.8 5.4 58.7 2050 
region      
Western 81.3 11.4 7.3 9 316 
Central 88.8 8.1 3.1 4.6 160 
Greater Accra 70.2 20.6 9.20 9 315 
Volta 57.6 38.9 3.5 6.6 229 
Eastern 80 9.4 10.60 11.6 406 
Ashanti 80.6 11.1 8.3 16.5 577 
Brong Ahafo 86.3 6.3 7.30 11.3 395 
Northern 84.5 13 2.5 10.1 354 
Upper East 93.5 5.6 0.9 9.2 322 
Upper West 89.5 10 0.5 12 420 
occupation    
not working 87 8.7 4.3 24 838 
professional/managerial/technical 73.9 16.8 9.2 10.2 357 
clerical and services 79.4 13.2 7.4 9.3 326 
sales 78.4 13.6 8.00 20 698 
agricultural 84.2 12.5 3.30 24.5 856 
manual 80.9 13.8 5.30 12 419 
educlevel    
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  Distribution of respondents, DHS 2008 
oop (Need to pay out of pocket?)   No Yes Sometimes Total                 Total 
 % % % % Count 
no education 86.9 10.9 2.2 16.6 579 
primary 87.6 9.5 2.9 14.8 516 
secondary 80.4 13 6.6 59 2061 
higher 73.1 16.9 10.1 9.7 338 
   All 81.8 12.5 5.7 100 3494 
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008 
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Regional distribution of socio-demographic characteristics, insurance status and quality perceptions, Ghana DHS 2008 
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Count % 
Wealth             
Poorest 4.3 0.8 0.3 8.2 5.8 3.6 9.3 25.2 22.1 20.4 2181 0.2 
Poorer 14.9 7.2 1.7 
11.
7 12.6 15.4 9.4 10.1 5.3 11.7 1789 0.2 
Middle 9.8 11.5 4.9 
14.
2 13.8 19.3 8.9 8.7 2 6.9 1634 0.2 
Richer 9.6 8.7 17.3 7.6 12.2 22.3 9.5 4.8 3.1 4.8 1984 0.2 
Richest 9 6.2 43.9 4.2 6.1 20.1 3 2.8 3 1.8 1896 0.2 
     All 9.3 6.6 13.6 9 9.9 15.8 8 10.8 7.7 9.5 9484 1.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.35 Pearson χ2(36) = 4620.54 Pr = 0 
read, watch, listen to news           
not at all 3.5 4.4 4.2 6.4 3.2 7.1 7 28 19.8 16.3 854 0.1 
less than once a week 4.3 4.3 17.4 13 4.3 30.4 0 13 4.3 8.7 23 0.0 
at least once a week 10.2 6.8 14 9.5 10.9 16.7 8.4 8.6 6.1 8.8 7803 0.9 
almost every day 11.7 4.7 41.1 7 5.1 10.4 4.1 8.9 5.4 1.6 316 0.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.19 Pearson χ2 (27) = 941.08 Pr = 0 
loc2             
Urban 8.2 5.8 28.2 5.9 8.5 20.6 7.4 7.4 3.4 4.6 4076 0.4 
Rural 10.1 7.1 2.6 
11.
3 10.9 12.1 8.6 13.3 10.9 13.1 5408 0.6 
Cramer’s V =0.431 Pearson χ2 (9) = 1758.2 Pr = 0.000 
Agegp             
15-19 9.4 6.8 11.1 10 9.6 15.1 7.1 10.4 8.3 12.2 1979 0.2 
20-24 7.6 6.3 15 7.9 9.8 18.4 8.5 10.4 7 9.1 1575 0.2 
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Count % 
25-29 7.4 6.5 15.5 8.3 9.1 18.2 8.9 10.4 7 8.6 1425 0.2 
30-34 9.2 5.3 16.6 7.9 8.7 14.3 9.9 12.2 6.7 9.1 1160 0.1 
35-39 11.9 7.1 13.2 8.6 10.2 13.9 7.4 11.7 8 7.9 1148 0.1 
40-44 10 6.8 13.9 9.5 10.4 14.2 7.1 9.3 9.6 9.2 878 0.1 
45-49 9.7 6.5 10 
10.
6 11.1 17.1 7.9 11.7 7.2 8.1 801 0.1 
N/A 11.8 7.5 13.3 9.5 12 11.4 6.9 10 8.3 9.3 518 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.05 Pearson χ2 (63) = 148.4 Pr = 0 
Gender             
Male 9.7 6.3 13.1 9.1 10 14.9 7.9 11.5 7.8 9.7 4568 0.5 
Female 8.9 6.8 14.1 8.8 9.7 16.6 8.2 10.1 7.6 9.2 4916 0.5 
Cramer’s V = 0.04 Pearson χ2 (9) = 13.9 Pr = 0.13 
Marrital status            
Never married 8.4 6.4 16.1 8.5 10.6 16.6 6.8 9.5 7 10 3486 0.4 
Married 10.7 5.5 12.2 8.4 9.4 12 7.2 14 9.7 10.9 4565 0.5 
living together 4.4 11.2 10.1 14.8 8.9 29.7 15.7 2.8 0.5 1.7 809 0.1 
Widowed 8.8 12.1 12.6 4.7 10.2 19.8 11.3 4.9 8.2 7.4 364 0.0 
not living together 11.5 4.2 16.9 13.1 10.8 21.9 11.2 3.8 2.7 3.8 260 0.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.13 Pearson χ2 (36) = 681.69 Pr = 0 
has children living at home           
No 9.1 6.4 16 9 10 17.2 7.4 8.8 6.6 9.4 4516 0.5 
Yes 9.4 6.7 11.4 8.9 9.8 14.4 8.6 12.5 8.7 9.5 4968 0.5 
Cramer’s V = 0.10 Pearson χ2 (9) = 97.0 Pr = 0.000 
Occupation            
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Count % 
not working 8.8 6.7 16.6 9.3 10.4 15.1 7.2 8.3 6.6 11 2103 0.2 
professional/managerial/technical 10.3 8.4 23.2 8.6 8.2 14.1 6.2 8.6 6.7 5.8 583 0.1 
clerical and services 9 5.4 23.3 7 11.4 23.7 7.3 4.5 4.1 4.2 874 0.1 
Sales 9.4 8.2 20.4 9.4 12 18.2 6.5 7.1 4.6 4.1 1666 0.2 
Agricultural 9.1 5.4 1.6 9.6 8.4 10.8 10.9 18 12.3 13.9 3113 0.3 
Manual 10 7.2 18.8 7.6 9.5 21.7 5.4 6.9 5 7.9 1145 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.16 Pearson chi2(45) = 1269.4 Pr = 0.000 
Educlevel            
no education 5.5 3.2 3.6 6.9 3.6 6.2 8.5 29.2 15.7 17.5 2035 0.2 
Primary 9.5 7.9 8.9 
10.
8 10.3 13.7 9.3 6.8 10.8 12 1727 0.2 
Secondary 10.8 7.3 17.3 9.5 12.4 20.6 7.7 5.1 3.4 5.8 5166 0.5 
Higher 8.6 7.2 31.1 5.9 7.7 11.9 5.2 8.3 8.5 5.6 556 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.28 Pearson χ2 (27) = 2166.54 Pr = 0 
Relnhead             
Head 10.3 7.5 14.7 7.1 10.2 16.6 9.5 9.7 6.9 7.5 3997 0.4 
Wife 10.4 5.7 12 8 8.8 13.2 7.8 14.8 9.3 10 2162 0.2 
Daughter 7.6 6.1 12.5 
11.
2 11 16 7.2 10.3 7.8 10.3 2307 0.2 
other relative 6.3 5.3 14.5 
13.
9 8.1 17.5 4.4 7.5 7.9 14.4 935 0.1 
not related 10.8 8.4 24.1 3.6 9.6 15.7 8.4 8.4 0 10.8 83 0.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.08 Pearson χ2 (36) = 267.3 Pr = 0 
 0 for uses 1 for does not use           
No 6.4 2 7.9 7.7 4.8 10.7 9.6 20.2 14.9 15.8 456 0.0 
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Count % 
yes, smokes nothing 9.4 6.8 13.9 9 10.1 16 8 10.3 7.3 9.1 9028 1.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.12 Pearson χ2 (9) = 145.9 Pr = 0.000 
Insured             
No 9.4 7.7 16.3 10.4 8.8 15.3 6.1 11.1 6.8 8 5990 0.6 
Yes 9 4.6 9 6.6 11.6 16.5 11.3 10.1 9.2 12 3494 0.4 
Cramer’s V = 0.18 Pearson χ2 (9) = 304.9 Pr = 0 
Needsvs             
No 9.6 4.4 8.9 5.8 10.9 14.3 12.8 10.3 10 12.8 2778 0.3 
Yes 6.7 5.2 9.6 9.4 14.2 25 5.4 9.4 6 9.1 716 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.18   Pearson χ2 (9) = 106.4 Pr = 0 
Indicator for service quality             
good 10.5 4.5 7.9 6.1 11.6 16.2 12.4 9.1 9.4 12.2 2794 0.3 
not good 3.3 5 13.3 8.3 11.6 17.7 7 14.1 8.4 11.3 700 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.16 Pearson χ2 (9) = 84.1 Pr = 0 
Svsqlty             
Yes 10.5 4.5 7.9 6.1 11.6 16.2 12.4 9.1 9.4 12.2 2794 0.8 
no, waiting times too long 2.4 4.1 12.9 7.1 14.4 20.3 5.6 10.3 11.5 11.5 340 0.1 
no, staff not polite 3.5 1.8 26.3 8.8 15.8 14 7 10.5 5.3 7 57 0.0 
no, did not receive enough information on 
treatment/illness 6.3 4.7 11.8 11 7.9 18.1 12.6 11.8 3.9 11.8 127 0.0 
Other 2.8 8 10.8 8.5 7.4 13.6 5.7 24.4 6.8 11.9 176 0.1 
Cramer’s V = 0.11 Pearson χ2 (36) = 154.1 Pr = 0 
NHIS service quality better             
Yes 11 2.8 5.9 5.9 8.9 18.7 10.5 11.2 9.8 15.4 1757 0.5 
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Count % 
No 7 6.4 12.2 7.2 14.4 14.3 12.1 9.1 8.6 8.6 1737 0.5 
Cramer’s V = 0.21 Pearson χ2 (9) = 154.8 Pr = 0 
NHIS cardholder versus nonholder             
Better 11 2.8 5.9 5.9 8.9 18.7 10.5 11.2 9.8 15.4 1757 0.5 
Same 7.1 5.6 11.6 8.5 17.4 15.4 12.6 5.7 9.6 6.5 1254 0.4 
Worse 7.6 8.7 15.2 3.1 7.3 11.8 12.1 16.3 4.5 13.2 355 0.1 
don't know/not sure 4.7 7.8 9.4 6.3 4.7 10.2 7.8 21.9 10.9 16.4 128 0.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.17 Pearson χ2 (27) = 299.7 Pr = 0 
paid for insurance             
yes, paid for self 7.2 4.9 10.2 8 12.6 16 10 9.7 9.8 11.7 1415 0.4 
yes, paid by relative/friend 8.9 3.9 8.1 4.7 11.3 16 13.4 11 9 13.7 1633 0.5 
yes, paid by employer/SSNIT 18.4 6.1 8.4 
10.
7 11.5 10.7 5.7 11.5 10 6.9 261 0.1 
no, other 11.6 8.7 5.8 13 5.8 10.1 14.5 10.1 11.6 8.7 69 0.0 
Cramer’s V = 0.10 Pearson χ2 (27) = 102.51 Pr = 0 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey V, 2008. 
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APPENDIX D 
FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY, HEALTH SERVICES AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN GHANA AND RWANDA 
 
Gini index for Ghana and Rwanda, 1995-2012
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Population density in Ghana and Rwanda, 1960-2014 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
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Per capita expenditures on health, in constant 2005 international dollar
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
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The impact of Ghana NHIS access to health care and financial protection: selected literature 
Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
Parmar et 
al (2014) 
Evidence on 
older people’s 
awareness of 
NHIS. 
Investigate 
whether social 
exclusion 
determines 
enrollment 
2012. 4050 
households and 
435 individuals 
aged 70+ in 5 
districts in 5 
administrative 
regions 
72% of older people 
are insured; 2.4 and 
4 times more likely 
for 3rd and 4th 
quartile of wealth, 
than for bottom 
quartile.  N/A N/A 
Chronic 
illness 
and 
hospitaliz
ation in 
past 12 
months’ 
increases 
odds of 
being 
insured 
Logit 
regression 
Primary: 
structured 
interview: 
household 
and 
individual 
Kusi et al 
(2015) 
Examine 
extent to 
which 
affordability 
of the NHIS 
contribution is 
a barrier to 
full insurance 
for households 
January-April 
2011.  
2430 
households in 3 
districts in 3 
regions 
46% of households 
(47% of population) 
are uninsured: tend 
to be poor and 
cannot afford, or 
relatively younger 
and healthier.    
Fully 
insured 
report 
higher 
illness per 
capita; a 
higher 
proportio
n have 
chronic 
disease 
Descriptive 
statistics 
including    
statistical 
tests  
 
Primary 
data: 
structured 
household 
survey 
Akazli et al  
(2014) 
Explore extent 
to which 
reproductive 
age mothers 
are covered by 
NHIS in the 
poorest region 
in Ghana 
2011. 5,469 
women aged 
15-49 
33.9% bottom 
quintile vs 58.3% in 
highest quintile are 
insured. 40% of 
respondents are 
insured. N/A N/A N/A 
Logistic 
regression.
Bivariate 
and 
descriptive 
analysis 
Primary: 
structured 
household 
interviews 
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Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
*Dixon 
Luginaa et 
al (2014)  
Examine the 
factors that 
influence 
enrolment in 
NHIS 
May-Dec 2011.  
 
2119 
individuals in 
Upper West 
Region 
54% of respondent 
are insured. 
Education a primary 
determinant. 
Gendered divisions9 N/A N/A 
Self-rated 
health is 
similar for 
insured 
and 
uninsured.  
Multinomi
al 
regression  
Primary: 
Structured 
individual 
interviews 
Gobah and 
Liang 
(2011) 
Assess the 
effect of the 
NHIS on 
access and 
utilizaiton of 
healthcare 
services in 
Akatsi District 
April-June 
2010. 320 
individuals, 3 
service 
providers, and 3 
Scheme 
employees 78% insured.  
91% of the insured, 
compared to 26% of 
uninsured sought care 
when ill.  23%(75%) of 
the  
Insured (uninsured) 
respondents who gave 
birth in 12 months had 
home deliveries. 
96%(83%) of insured 
had prenatal care. 
75%(25%) had skilled 
attendant. 83%(42%) 
had postnatal care.  
 
Fewer (27%) of 
the insured who 
gave birth in 12 
months paid out 
of pocket for 
birthing 
services, while 
the majority 
(83%) of the 
uninsured paid 
out of pocket.  N/A 
Descriptive 
statistics 
including 
statistical 
tests 
Structured 
household 
interviews
. semi-
structured 
key 
informant 
interviews 
Dzakpasu 
et al (2012) 
Assess impact 
of free 
medical care –
and currently 
through 
NHIS-to 
Jan 2004-2009 
Dec. A sample 
of 91,015 
deliveries for 
health facility 
delivery survey 
&    27,841 
65.4% of women 
insured in May 
2008, 91% in 
November 2008 and 
a decline to 83.7% 
in December 2009. 
An increase from 50.1% 
to 71.2% in facility 
delivery from 2004-
2009. 
A significant jump 
(7.5%) with the N/A N/A 
Regression
s: temporal 
trend 
analysis.  
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Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
pregnant 
women 
deliveries  for 
NHIS 
enrollment 
survey in seven 
contagious 
predominantly 
rural districts in 
BA 
Inequality decline: 
May 2008: 
Insurance coverage 
among richest is 
54.3% more than 
that for the poor.  
December 2009: 
only 11.4% higher.  
introduction of free 
NHIS coverage. 
Significant decline in 
inequality: 87.4% of 
richest vs 22.7% of 
poorest quintiles had 
facility delivery in 2004 
compared to 96.8% vs 
43.% in 2009.  
 
*Yilma et 
al (2012) 
Investigate 
whether 
enrollment in 
NHIS 
negatively 
affects use of 
insecticide 
bed nets 
September 
2009 & 
September 
2007. A panel 
of 400 
households in 
11 different 
communities in 
BA Region 
39% versus 53% of 
households insured 
in 2007 and 2009 
respectively. Better 
economic status 
increases likelihood 
Insured households use 
more OPD and 
hospitalizations. 
 
Evidence of moral 
hazard: Bed net use 
maintained among 
uninsured while declines 
among insured 
households.  N/A 
Fever 
incidence 
higher 
among 
insured 
(44) 
versus 
uninsured 
(36) 
household
s 
Propensity 
score 
matching.  
Probit 
regressions  
Jehu-
Appiah et 
al (2011) 
Evaluate 
equity in 
enrollment in 
NHIS. Assess 
determinants 
of NHIS 
demand across 
socioeconomi
c groups  
April 2009. 
3301 
households 
with 13865 
individuals in 
30 rural and 
urban 
communities 
Inequitable:   41% 
of richest vs 27% of 
poorest household. 
30% of households. N/A N/A N/A 
Principal 
component
s analysis. 
Multinomi
al logit 
regressions 
Primary: 
structures 
household 
surveys 
*Dixon 
Tenkorang 
et al 
(2014b) 
Investigate the 
effect of NHIS 
enrolment on 
the likelihood 
2008.  
1610 females 
aged 15-49 
nationwide N/A 
Insured make more 
ANC visits regardless of 
socio-economic and 
demographic factors. N/A N/A 
Multiple 
regressions
: Binomial 
Secondary
: Ghana 
DHS-V 
2008  
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Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
and timing of 
ante-natal care 
use 
Insurance has no 
association with crucial 
first visit. 
and logit 
models 
Akazli et al 
(2012) 
Assessment of 
financing and 
benefits 
incidence of 
NHIS 
2008: 14,050 
individuals in 
2,986 
households in 6 
districts.  
b)2005/06: 
36,488 
individuals in 
8687 
households 
nationwide  
The top quintile gains 
twice (24.3%) the 
benefits from using 
health care than the 
bottom quintile gains 
(12.7%); second, third 
and fourth gain 15.1%, 
23.5% and 24.4 % 
respectively 
Informal sector 
contributions to 
NHIS and OOP 
are regressive 
but VAT, 
corporate and 
income tax 
contributions 
are progressive.  N/A 
Kakwani 
indices 
estimations
. 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Primary: 
structured 
interviews 
 
Secondary
: GLSS5 
2005/06 
data 
*Blanchet 
et al (2012)   
Investigate 
effect of NHIS 
on health care 
utilization 
Sept 2008-June 
2009.  
2543 women 
age 18+ in 
Accra N/A 
NHIS-enrolled women, 
compared to not 
enrolled: 
-were 40% more likely 
to have attend clinic  
-were 83% more likely 
to have stayed overnight  
-had 57% more 
prescriptions N/A 
Women 
enrolled 
in NHIS 
are on 
average in 
slightly 
poorer 
health 
Descriptive 
statistics 
but also 
propensity 
score 
matching 
to reduce 
risk of 
confoundin
g  
Women 
Health 
Survey of 
Accra, II  
*Mensah et 
al (2010) 
Examine 
whether NHIS 
meets the 
MDG goals 
(#4&#5) of 
improved 
access to 
maternal and 
child health 
services 
2007. Women 
who have been 
pregnant in past 
4 years in the 
sample of 2000 
women aged 
18-49 in two 
districts each in 
BA and Upper 
East Regions  
Insured are more likely 
to: birth at hospital and 
with professional 
assistance, receive post 
natal check and more 
often and extensive, 
have children 
vaccinated, have 
received preventive 
check in 4 years N/A 
Insured 
have less 
frequency 
of infant 
death, 
maternal 
death or 
birth 
complica-
tions 
Propensity 
score 
matching 
Primary:St
ructured 
interviews 
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Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
Agyepong 
and Nagai 
(2010) 
Describe 
effectiveness 
of user fee 
exemptions 
and health 
insurance in 
removing 
financial 
barriers for 
children 
 under 5. 
2007. 300 
households 
with children 
under 5 
 
67.8% of under 5 
children are 
uninsured. 
Uninsured are more 
likely to be in the 
lower quintiles of 
wealth. 
80.4 NHIS card holders 
have used a clinic within 
past 12 months 
Insured 
children paid 
no fees though 
78.6% of users 
paid fees, of 
which 66.2% 
paid full bill.  
Indication of 
failure to 
request 
exemptions for 
fear of negative 
reaction from 
providers N/A 
Descriptive 
statistics 
with tests 
of 
statistical 
significanc
e 
Primary: 
household 
survey 
Secondary
: hospital 
records 
*Chankova 
et al (2008) 
Examine 
relationship 
between CBHI 
(MHO) 
membership 
and access to 
formal sector 
maternal 
health care 
August-October 
2004.  
300  
Women who 
delivered 
during previous 
year, from one 
CBHI and an 
adjacent non-
CBHI rural 
districts 
48% of insured are 
in upper tercile 
SES. Benefits are 
limited to inpatient 
care. 
Insured are 33.9% 
of population 
Insured are twice likely 
to have a caesarian 
delivery compared to 
uninsured.   
 
No significant 
difference between 
insured and uninsured in 
the use of formal health 
services.  N/A N/A 
Multiple 
regression: 
Logit and 
OLS 
models 
Primary:St
ructured 
household 
and 
individual 
surveys 
Sulzbach et 
al (2005) 
Investigate 
baseline 
effects of the 
NHIS 
September-
November 
2004. 
1808 
households plus 
1303 patients in 
three districts in 
different 
47%, 38% and 35% 
of insured belong in 
upper two quintiles 
for the 3 different 
districts.   
Median overnight stays 
for insured(uninsured) is 
5(4) per individual but 
4(7) per household 
Insured had two to five 
times the rate of 
uninsured caesarean. 
Delivery at health 
OOP for 
inpatient 
service for 
uninsured 
households 
(individuals) is 
8.3(23.3) times 
the amount paid 
by insured.  N/A 
OLS 
regression 
models 
Structured 
household 
and 
patient 
exit 
interviews 
Secondary
: Scheme 
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Studies on Ghana Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample  Enrollment  Utilization  
Financial 
protection 
Health 
state 
Quantitativ
e 
Data 
source 
administrative 
regions. 
 
facility is not 
significantly different. 
 Insured more likely to 
be ‘not satisfied’ with 
OPD and ‘satisfied’ with 
inpatient. 
OOP for OPD 
does not differ 
by insurance 
status. 
Insured pay 
2.5-2.9 times 
more for 
prenatal care 
but 2.5 times 
less for delivery 
care 
 
member-
ship data 
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The impact of Rwanda Mutuelle on access to health care and financial protection: selected literature 
Studies on Rwanda Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample Enrollment Utilization/quality 
Financial 
protection 
Health state 
Quantitative 
Source  
*Binagwaho 
et al (2012)  
Provide details on 
the on the effect of 
Mutuelle on child 
health  
2010. 
7889 under 5 
children 
nationwide 
 90%  
Insured have a 
high probability 
of receiving 
medical treatment 
when ill N/A 
Better height for 
age z-scores, 
lower likelihood 
to suffer from 
disease if 
insured 
Two-step IV, 
probit, and 
OLS models  
Rwanda 
DHS-V 
2010 
*Dhillon et 
al  (2012) 
Investigate impact 
of subsidizing 
Mutuelle enrolment 
removing co-
payments and 
improving service 
delivery on health 
facility use rates in 
Mayange district.  
April 2006-
February 2007 
Data on OPD 
utilisation rates 
and the 
personnel for 
each health 
center in 
Mayange and 
two 
comparison 
sites  
Removal of 
copayments 
resulted in: 
- 141.7 visits per 
day, up from 52.9.  
-additional 0.6 per 
capita visits for 
curative care 
nearly double off 
the 0.65 before.  
 
Insured children 
are 30-60% more 
likely to receive 
treatment when 
ill. N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
Regression 
analyses. 
Descriptive 
statistics 
including test 
of significance 
Second
ary: 
Health 
center 
data 
records 
*Lu et al 
(2012) 
Evaluate universal 
coverage for 
medical services or 
financial risk 
protection 
2000-2008. 
U5 children, 
birthing 
mothers, 
gen. population  N/A 
Increased 
utilization of 
medical care by 
insured 
Insured 
households are 
less likely to 
make 
catastrophic 
health 
expenditures N/A 
Logistic 
regression,  
DHS, 
LSMS,  
*Saskena et 
al (2010) 
Examine the effect 
of MHI on 
utilization of health 
2005/06. 
34,000 
uninsured or 
insured in MHI 
36.6% in 
MHI,  
Insured 
individuals are 2 
times likely to use 
OOP is 6.8% 
(13.4%) of 
capacity to pay 
[CTP] for MHI 
MHI household 
significantly less 
likely to report 
illness whereas  
EICV2§ 
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Studies on Rwanda Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample Enrollment Utilization/quality 
Financial 
protection 
Health state 
Quantitative 
Source  
service and financial 
risk protection 
(national 
survey) 
4.7% in 
other 
schemes 
Poorer 
households 
less likely  
health services 
than the uninsured 
(uninsured) 
household. 
 
2.2% (8.6%) of 
MHI (uninsured) 
households 
exceed 40% 
CTP. 
 
20.1% (41.6%) 
of MHI 
(uninsured) 
households 
exceed 10% 
CTP. 
 
Catastrophic 
expenditure is 4 
times less likely 
in MHI 
household.   
no significant 
difference in 
likelihood of 
illness by 
income status.  
*Hong et al 
(2011) 
Examine 
relationship between 
being insurance 
status and homebirth 
and births attended 
by skilled 
professional  
2005.  
8715 birthing 
mothers N/A 
Lower odds 
(OR=0.71) of 
homebirth or 
(OR=75) 
unassisted birth if 
insured  
Insured are less 
likely to have 
financial barriers 
to skill-attended 
delivery 
Insured have a 
higher 
probability of a 
safe delivery  
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
regressions: 
log odds  
estimations 
Rwanda 
DHS-
V, 2005 
*Kagubare 
(2006) 
Assess impact of 
CBHI on utilization 
of health services 
and financial 
sustainability 
1998-2002. 52 
health centers 
and 4 CBHI 
schemes in  
pilot and  
Four-fold increase 
(unchanged) in 
visits to 1.74(0.4) 
per insured 
(uninsured), per 
annum N/A 
N/A 
Multivariate 
regressions 
Second
ary: 
Health 
facility 
data on 
service 
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Studies on Rwanda Findings Data and methods 
Author(s) 
Research 
objective(s) 
Period studied 
and sample Enrollment Utilization/quality 
Financial 
protection 
Health state 
Quantitative 
Source  
control  
districts 
use and 
cost 
*Schneider 
et al (2007) 
Assess cost impact 
of two payment 
mechanisms 1. User 
fee by uninsured 2. 
Capitation by 
informal insurance 
schemes 
52 health 
centers  
MHI members 
report 
significantly 
higher utilization 
rates than user-fee 
paying individuals 
after adjusting for 
need.  
OOP spending 
increases 
headcount 
poverty ratio by 
0.6% (1.3%) for 
in insured 
(uninsured).  
 
MHI benefit 
without hospital 
care is not large 
enough to protect 
against poverty. 
 
 
 
*Studies which incorporate robust quantitative methods to estimate the effect of health insurance. 
§Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2005-2006, that is, the Living Standards Measurement Study series.
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Minimum package of insurance benefits by type of health facility, Rwanda 
 The minimum package of services provided 
National Referral Hospitals Advanced inpatient/outpatient services, surgery, 
laboratory, gynecology, obstetrics, and radiology; 
specialized services including ophthalmology, 
dermatology, ear nose and throat (ENT), 
stomatology and physiotherapy  
 
District Hospitals Inpatient/outpatient services, surgery, laboratory, 
gynecology, obstetrics, and radiology 
 
Health Centers Prevention activities, primary health care, inpatient 
and outpatient, maternity, laboratory, referral 
 
Dispensaries Primary health care, outpatient, and referral 
 
Health Posts Outreach activities (i.e immunization, family 
planning, child growth monitoring, ANC) 
 
Community IMCI, CBP, CBNP, Hygiene, Maternal health 
Source: Ministry of Health Rwanda, Annual Report 2012/2013. 
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Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme standard package of benefits  
Outpatient services 
General and specialist Consultations reviews 
General and specialist diagnostic testing including, laboratory investigation, X-rays, Ultrasound 
scanning 
Medicines on the NHIS Medicines list 
Surgical Operation such as Hernia repair 
Physiotherapy 
Inpatient service 
General and specialist in patient care 
Diagnostic tests 
Medication-prescribed medicines on the NHIS medicines list, blood and blood products 
Surgical operations 
In patient physiotherapy 
Accommodation in the general ward 
Feeding (where available) 
Oral health 
Pain relief (tooth extraction, temporary incision and drainage). 
Dental restoration (simple amalgam filling, temporary dressing). 
Maternity care 
Antenatal care 
Deliveries (normal and assisted) 
Caesarean session 
Post-natal care 
Emergencies 
These refer to crises in health situations that demand urgent attention such as: 
Medical emergencies 
Surgical emergencies 
Pediatric emergencies 
Obstetric and gynecological emergencies 
Road traffic accident 
Source:  National Health Insurance Authority vignette, 2015. 
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Ghana NHIS benefits package exclusions 
Appliances and prostheses such as heart aids, orthopedic aids and dentures 
Cancer treatment except breast and cervical 
HIV Retroviral drugs 
Heart and brain surgery except in cases of accidents 
Dialysis for chronic renal failure 
Organ transplant 
Angiography 
Echocardiography 
Photography 
Unlisted drugs 
Cosmetic surgeries and aesthetic treatment 
Assisted reproduction 
Non-diagnostic medical examinations such as for visa applications, driver’s license 
VIP ward accommodations 
Diagnosis and treatment abroad 
Morgue 
Source: National Health Insurance Authority vignette, 2010. 
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 Ghana NHIS medicines list by therapeutic classification 
Anesthetic agents 
Pre-operative medications and sedation for short-term procedures pre-anaesthetics 
Analgesics, antipyretics, NSAIDs and drugs used in gout 
Anti-allergic drugs 
Antidotes and other substances used in poisoning 
Anticonvulsants 
Anti-infective drugs 
Anti migraine drugs 
Anti neoplastic and immunosuppressive drugs 
Anti Parkinsonism drugs 
Drugs affecting the blood 
Blood products and blood substitutes 
Cardiovascular drugs 
Dermatological preparations 
Diuretics 
Gastrointestinal drugs 
Hormones and other endocrine drugs 
Immunological 
Muscle relaxants and cholinesterase inhibitors 
Ophthalmological preparations 
Oxytocics and anti-oxytocics 
Peritoneal dialysis solutions 
Psychotherapeutic drugs 
Drugs acting on the respiratory tract 
Solutions correcting water and electrolyte 
Parental nutrition 
Vitamins and minerals 
Other drugs 
Drugs for ear, nose and throat 
Drugs for dentistry 
Drugs for urology 
Source: National Health Insurance Authority vignette, 2010. 
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Regional Distribution of NHIS approved health facility by type of ownership in Ghana 
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Chemical 
shop 
19 34 12 6 1 69 17 10 9 25 202 
Pharmacy 81 16 10 19 86 9 5 2 10 28 266 
 Clinics: 
Private 46 17 9 17 76 8 10 1 11 23 216 
Mission - 12 - - 3 - - 1 - 2 18 
Quasi 
government 
- 1 1 - 4 1 - - - 2 7 
 Health Centers 
Mission 30 - 8 13 3 15 10 12 6 17 114 
Quasi-
government 
- - 1 1 - - - - - - 2 
 Primary Hospitals 
Private 56 5 7 14 30 1 5 - 5 4 127 
Mission 19 10 3 4 - 4 1 2 8 4 55 
Quasi 
government 
1 - 1 1 5 - - - - 1 9 
 Other Facilities 
Maternity 
Home 
60 36 20 20 20 5 1 5 9 24 245 
Ultrasound 13 7 4 3 3 1 - - - 5 36 
Diagnostic 
Center 
8 - 2 - 6 - - - 2 7 25 
Laboratory 8 5 9 2 19 2 3 1 - 19 68 
Dental 
clinic 
- - - - 3 - - - - 2 3 
Eye clinic 2 - 1 - 4 - - - 1 - 8 
Source: National Health Insurance Authority: Annual Report 2012. 
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The expenditures and revenue performance at different levels of the Rwandas CBHI Schemes, June 2011-June 2012 
 Section Level District Level National Level 
 million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  
Total expendituresa           18,173.4  1                  10,807.7  1                  3,406,539,112  1 
of which        
 Total Reimbursements to providers:       7,215.2  
                               
0.40        8,095.9  
                               
0.75     3,201.7  
                             
0.94  
Section level Health care     
Reimbursements       7,215.2  
                               
0.40    na      na    
DH Reimbursements   na     na         8,095.9  
                               
0.75    na    
 NRH Reimbursements   na     na     na       3,201.7   
       
Recurrent budget and salaries       1,907.4  
                               
0.10        2,317.4 
                               
0.21         129.5  
                             
0.04  
       
Total transfer payments:       9,050.8 
                               
0.50           394.4  
                               
0.04           75.4  
                             
0.02  
Transfers paid to the District Risk 
Pool       8,171.8  
                               
0.45    na      na    
Transfers paid to the Common 
Account          871.1 
                               
0.05    na      na    
Transfers paid to National Risk 
Pool   na    na           394.4  
                               
0.04           75.4   
Transfer from premium account to 
petty cash               7.9  
                               
0.00    na      na    
       
 
Total revenuesb( in millions RWF)    19,468.3                    10,501.7                    3,441.0            
of which        
Opening balance                                                     -                                                         -                  298.9  
                         
0.09  
  
3
3
0
 
 Section Level District Level National Level 
 million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  
       
Total insurance premium collections:    17,499.8 
                               
0.90                                                      -                                                      -     
Premiums collected from 
Category 1       4,649.6  
                               
0.24    na      na    
Premiums collected from 
Category 2    12,829.5  
                               
0.66    na      na    
Premiums collected from 
Category 3             20.7  
                               
0.00    na      na    
       
Insurance copayments by households       1,212.9  
                               
0.06                                                      -                                                      -     
       
Total receipts from transfers and other 
allocations:                                                     -           8,353.3  
                               
0.80     3,028.0 
                             
0.88  
Transfer receipts from premiums 
at section level                                                     -           6,108.0                                                    -     
Transfer receipts from national 
level                                                     -           1,143.1                                                    -     
Transfer receipts from other 
section/district source incl 
common account                                                     -           1,102.2          384.5   
Transfer receipts from 
MINECOFIN                                                     -                                                         -        2,113.1  
Contributions from private health 
insurance and other income from 
districts                                                     -                                                         -            530.4   
       
Other revenue sources          755.6  
                               
0.04        2,148.4  
                               
0.20         114.2  
                             
0.03  
       
Balance        1,294.8  
                               
0.07           -306.0 
                            
-0.03          34.5  
                             
0.01  
       
  
3
3
1
 
 Section Level District Level National Level 
 million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  million RWF Ratio  
       
Distribution of reserves 
Reserves:       1,294.8  1                                                     -                                                      -     
Amount of section level reserves 
allocated          259.0  0.02          776.9  0.60        259.0  0.20 
       
Deficits to be covered                                                     -              306.0        593.3 c  
       
Net reserves          259.0            470.9       (334.3)  
Source: Calculations based on data from Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Health CBHI Report 2012. 
a. To avoid double counting, expenditure items exclusive to each level (section, district and national) are added together with transfer payments by sections 
only but reimbursements and recurrent expenditures by all three. Hence the total is RWF 22,737,565,374. 
b. Total revenue is estimated by adding the total revenue at the section level, transfer payments by MINICOFIN, ‘other’ revenues at section and national levels 
and special contributions by private insurance to the national pool. Hence the total revenue estimate is RWF 24,374,296,072.  
c. This amount is stated in the statement of accounts but the accounts provide little detail about the source of this deficit. 
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Estimates of unit costs at hospitals in Rwanda and Ghana 
  Rwanda Ghana 
   Year International $ (PPP) International $ (PPP) 
Cost per bed day by hospital level* 
Primary  2005 17.9 15.00 
  2000 9.25 12.87 
Secondary  2005 23.35 19.57 
   2000 12.07 16.79 
Tertiary  2005 31.9 26.72 
   2000 16.48 22.93 
Cost per outpatient visit by hospital level* 
Primary  2005 4.98 4.05 
   2000 2.30 3.39 
Secondary  2005 7.07 5.74 
   2000 3.26 4.80 
Tertiary  2005 10.46 8.5 
   2000 4.82 7.10 
Cost per visit at health centre by  
population coverage for a 20-minute visit§ 
     
 
At 50% population coverageb  2005 7.03 6.56 
   2000 5.36 6.10 
At 80% population coverage  2005 8.29 7.08 
   2000 5.36 6.10 
At 95% population coverage  2005 12.57 10.65 
   2000 5.83 6.63 
Source:  Data tables of the World Health Organization Choosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective 
Project (WHO-CHOICE). 
*Cost estimates for public facility at 80% occupancy rate but excludes drugs and diagnostics.  
§Population coverage refers to ‘the percent of population with physical access to primary health. 
facilities, defined as living within 5 kilometers or 1 hour away from the facility’ (WHO-CHOICE). 
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